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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THIS 
STATUTORY DISCONNECTION PROCEEDING 
1. The initial Judicial Petition for Disconnection (the "Petition") listed Bluff dale 
Mountain Homes, L.G and South Farm, L.L.C. as petitioners and Bluff dale City 
("Bluffdale") as respondent. R. 1-2 
2. Since the Petition was not brought by those required under Utah Code Ann. § 
10-2-502-5(a), the lower court, without jurisdiction, authorized an amended Petition (R 163-
80) with the following additional parties: Laguna Investments; Malibu Investment 
Company, LP; JLC Investments, LLC; Hidden Valley Associates; T & M Holdings, LLQ 
Bluffdale Enterprises, LLQ James E. & Shirley C Butterfield (as trustees); Scott B. Barclay 
(as trustee); Don E. Petersen, Jr.; Don W. & Elaine W. Bennion (as trustees); Daro E. 
Hamilton; Myrtle's Seven, LTD; Fredrick K Osterloh; Rodney W. Butterfield; Weston 
Butterfield (as trustee); Danell C Bills; Jay G. & Arda D. Bennett; Vauna Parr; Roger L. & 
Susan Gailey (as trustees); Gary K. & Linda Kessimakis; The Patricia J. Rasmusson Family 
Limited Partnership; Lucille G Bearden (as trustee); Dale W. & Sharen L. Hamilton (as 
trustees); Robert & Deanna Phillips; Van Dee Bearden; Randall E. & Sheila E. Bloomdale; 
Billy L. & Donna J. Mangum (as trustees); Dianne B. Mangum (as trustee); Jean T. &Kim S. 
Mangum (as trustees); Michael L. & Deborah K. Mangum; Marilyn L. Russo (as trustee); and 
Dave Shelby Realtor, Inc. 
3. At trial, South Hills Development, L.L.G claimed to be the successor in 
interest to Bluffdale Mountain Home, L.G R 1283 at 4:. 
4. There are no prior or related appeals by any ol the parties to this action. 
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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0. However, because the Petition commencing this lawsuit was not filed by 
those required by statute (Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.5(5)(a)), the lower court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction and this Court's appellate jurisdiction is limited to reversing the Decree of 
Disconnection and dismissing the statutory proceeding. Hawxniv ToimcfNorth Salt Lake, 3 
Utah 2d 189,281 P.2d 216 (1955). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in determining that it had jurisdiction to enter a 
disconnection decision. R. 198; 1003; & 1283 at 14. The appellate court reviews a trial 
court's determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction in a disconnection case under a 
correction of error standard, according the trial court no deference. SeeHouard, 281 P.2d 
216; Skokos v Corradni, 900 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
II. Whether the trial court erroneously interpreted the determinative statutes to allow 
disconnection of the territory in question. The appellate court reviews a trial court's 
statutory interpretation for correctness, according the trial court no deference. SeeHowzrd, 
281 P.2d 216; Manmvnt Corp. v White City Water IrrpmimentDisL, 958 P.2d 222 (Utah 1998). 
A. Whether the trial court erred in adjusting the common municipal boundary 
between Bluff dale and Herriman City ("Herriman") to facilitate the annexation of territory 
into Herriman, in contravention of Utah Code § 10-2-510, which provides that Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-2-419 is the exclusive mechanism for adjacent cities' common boundary-
adjustments. R. 200; 1002-03; 1283 at 13-14 & 1297 at 103-04 & 104. 
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B. Whether the trial court erred in holding the proposed disconnection did not 
leave or create a peninsula or island of unincorporated territory prohibited by Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii). & 198; 1003,1008-10, & 1283 at 12-13. 
C Whether the trial court erred in allowing a Developer to circumvent a lawful 
municipal land use decision by using the statutory disconnection process, not following the 
statutory remedy of appealing that decision to the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
1001 (2003) (which was subsequently appealed in 2005 and supplanted by § 10-9a-801). 
III. Whether the trial court erroneously determined that "justice and equity" required 
disconnection in this matter. An appellate court reviews a trial court's application of a legal 
standard to the facts of the case for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's 
determination. SeeJensen v Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, \ 127,130 P.3d 325. 
A. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the citizens' challenge of a zoning 
ordinance by referendum is a factor in determining that justice and equity require 
disconnection pursuant to Utah Code § 10-2-502.7. & 1004 & 1297 at 104 & 109. 
B. Whether the trial court erred in holding that "justice and equity7' required 
disconnection, based on the City's planning and zoning process for one developer. & 199* 
C Whether the lower court erred in holding that raw ground requires 
disconnection where it will be immediately developed and require municipal services. & 200 
& 1011-12. 
IV. Whether the lower court made erroneous findings, including (1) whether the 
disconnection is viable, K 1297; and (2) whether the lower court erred in holding that the 
disconnection would not leave Bluff dale City with an area within its boarders for which the 
2 
cost of providing municipal services would materially increase. K 1003; 1008; & 1297. An 
appellate court reviews the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury under a 
clearly erroneous standard. RHN Corp. v VeM, 2004 UT 60, 96 P.3d 935. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
There are determinative constitutional provisions (U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 and 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7) and statutes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-501(1) & -502.5(5)(a)) 
showing the lower court lacked jurisdiction. In addition, Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-419 &-
510 preclude a court from using a disconnection to "abrogate, modify or replace" a common 
boundary between two municipalities absent a voluntary boundary adjustment agreement. 
The Utah Legislature set forth the elements developers must prove to justify a disconnection 
in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3). The requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3) 
and the former § 10-9-1001 (2003) set forth the standard of judicial review in this matter. 
The provisions relevant to a citizens' referendum petition of a zoning ordinance are 
set forth in Utah Constitution Article VI, § 2(b)(ii) and Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-7-102(3) and 
-601 etseq. 
The Court should apply the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-1-104(6) and 10-2-
502.7(3) (c)(iii) to determine whether the disconnection decree should be reversed because it 
creates an island or peninsula of unincorporated territory. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a statutory proceeding where a developer of property in Herriman, South 
3 
Farm L.L.C ("South Farm") and its property owner allies1 seek to disconnect nearly 40% of 
Bluff dale Gt /s land area. The property owners could have received municipal serves by 
remaining in Bluff dale, but are seeking to disconnect because they believe they will get more 
development concessions in the adjacent city of Herriman. Bluff dale favors large lots 
consisting of one to 1.75 units or residential density per acre. Herriman has indicated it will 
allow South Farm to develop at a density in excess of three dwelling residential units per 
gross acre. At trial, the parties stipulated that any disconnected land will be annexed and 
developed in Herriman. & 1283 at 102-03; 1295 at 38 &Ex. 130. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
When Bluff dale rejected South Farm's application to amend its general plan and 
zoning ordinance, South Farm along with one other developer, Bluff dale Mountain Homes, 
L.C (the "Two Developers") filed the underlying Petition. South Farm chose to not appeal 
Bluff dale's land use decision, although it was entitled to due so at the time pursuant to Ltah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. Bluff dale moved to dismiss for a failure to exhaust available 
remedies and for lack of jurisdiction. The lower court allowed the Two Developers to 
amend their petition by adding additional petitioners. The Utah Court of Appeals declined 
to grant permission to file an interlocutory appeal of that jurisdictional decision. 
Thereafter, the parties entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to resolve their 
differences. Accordingly Bluff dale enacted a zoning ordinance that, if applied to the 
property in dispute, would allow for the mixed developments proposed by the Two 
Developers. After the city enacted the new ordinance, a group of citizens filed a referendum 
1
 South Farm and South Hill Development, L.C. have paid all of the attorney's fees and 
costs incurred by all of the petitioners seeking disconnection. & 1295 at 195-196. 
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petition referring the zoning ordinance to the voters. The parties subsequently entered into 
a consent decree agreement resolving all their issues. They presented the proposed decree to 
the lower court, but it was not accepted. 
C Disposition in the Lower Court 
After a four-day bench trial, the lower court entered a Decree of Disconnection. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Lack of Lower Court Juris diction 
1. This action is a statutory municipal disconnection proceeding pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.5(5)(a). R. 1-28. 
2. The affected municipality is Bluff dale Gty, Salt Lake County, Utah. & 2. 
3. On July 5, 2002, South Farm filed a complete application to amend Bluff dale's 
general plan and to change the zoning for its 1,124 acres. & 1295 at 69, See Trial Exhibit 
(hereinafter "Ex.") 50 (Tab A). See also K 1295 at 67. 
4. The City Council eventually rejected the application on December 9,2003 
because it did not conform to its master plan and land use principles. Exs. 169, T & U. 
5. South Farm did not seek judicial review of the denial pursuant after 
determining it would be futile to appeal the land use decision. R. 1296 at 69-70. 
6. In an attempt to reach an accommodation with South Farm, the Bluff dale Gty 
Council eventually voted to reconsider the denial. Exs. 170-71. 
7. The Two Developers responded in February of 2003 by filing 52 requests to 
disconnect almost 40% of the Gt^s land so that it could be annexed into lieniman. Exs. 
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90-92. The proposed disconnection area comprises 3,971 acres and is illustrated on a map 
(Ex. 90) included in the Addendum. K 1283 at 223-24 & 1295 at 12. 
8. South Farm requested Bluff dale and Hertiman to voluntarily adjust their 
common municipal boundary to include the subject real property. South Farm also 
petitioned Bluff dale to disconnect the property and asked Herriman to annex it. Id 
9. Bluff dale Gty timely denied the disconnection. K 1-28; Exs. 179-81. 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.5(5)(a) allows "petitioners" to challenge a city's 
denial of a disconnection. "Petitioners" is a term of art defined by Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-
501(1) as persons who own "real property within the area proposed for disconnection" and 
"have signed a request for disconnection". Id 
11. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2- 501 (2) (b) provides that "each request for 
disconnection shal l . . . contain the names, addresses, and signatures of the owners of more 
than 50% of the real property in the area proposed for disconnection." 
12. The Petition giving rise to this litigation was filed by only the Two 
Developers, and not by any of the other affected property owners. K 1-28; Exs. 90-92. 
13. South Farm owned 1,124 acres and Bluff dale Mountain Homes owned 106.67 
acres in the disconnection area. K 20 & Exs. AD & CD. Combined, the Two Developers 
owed a total of 1,230.67 acres, comprising only 31% of the disconnection area. Id. 
14. Bluff dale moved to dismiss the Petition on the basis that the lower court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the disconnection proceeding. & 45-50; 56-59. 
15. Bluff dale also pled lack of jurisdiction as an affirmative defense. & 41; 198. 
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16. The lower court recognized the Petition did not comply with section 10-2-
502.5, but allowed the Two Developers to amend the Petition. Order on Motion to Dismiss, R 
160-162. A partial transcript of the July 30,2004 hearing (R 1278) provides as follows: 
THE COURT: It is my initial impression to grant the motion 
to dismiss, and that is based upon the fact that the petition in 
this case is brought in the names of fewer than all the persons 
who signed requests for disconnection with the Gty.*** 
"Petitioners" in the statute is a defined term. Petitioners means 
persons who (a) own title to real property within the area 
proposed for disconnection and (b) have signed a request for 
disconnection proposing to disconnect that area from the 
municipality. So when the statute says... that the petition 
against the municipality may be brought by the petitioners, I 
think that it is using petitioners in the defined sense in the 
statute, which is all the people who have signed the request for 
disconnection. So this particular petition would be defective in 
that it is not signed by all the persons who signed requests for 
disconnection in the Gty. I don't think this is a problem 
resolved by Rule 19. *** They intended the statute to preserve 
the requirement that the petition or request for disconnection 
be brought by persons representing a majority of the land 
affected by the disconnection. 
R 1278 at 4-5. Bluff dale's counsel informed the lower court 
M R GARDINER [T]he Court does not have jurisdiction - it 
clearly does not, because the petition is facially defective—you 
can't go ahead and say, alright, tiy to amend your petition so 
that we do. All you can do is dismiss the petition without 
prejudice. 
R 1278 at 12-13. Instead, the lower court ruled as follows: 
THE COURT: Alright, I'm going to rule, and consistent with 
my tentative ruling in the case, I'm going to allow the 
petitioners 30 days to amend the petition 
R 1 2 7 8 a t l 9 . 
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17. Bluff dale requested permission to file an interlocutory appeal the lower court's 
ruling, but permission was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals.2 & 181-84 & 203-06. 
18. The Two Developers filed an Amended Petition with an additional 33 of the 
original 52 requested property owners listed as petitioners. & 163-80 &Exs. 90-92. 
19. Bluff dale answered the Amended Petition by again pleading lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction as an affirmative defense. R 185-98. 
20. The lower court concluded that it had jurisdiction because the 52 Requests for 
Disconnection filed with the Qty contained the names and signatures of the owners of more 
than 50% of the property within the disconnection area. R. 1165-1166. Those "facts" are 
not disputed by Bluff dale in this matter. Id 
21. Bluff dale never admitted that more than 50% of the real property owners filed 
the Petition in the district court. Instead, Bluff dale only acknowledged that some of the 
administrative procedural requirements had been met. Bluff dale has never admitted that the 
property owners met the jurisdictional requirements in district court. & 172,178 & 255-56. 
B. The Lower Court Incorrectly Interpreted the Common Boundary 
22. Bluff dale Qty is bounded on the west by Herriman Qty. & 1295 at 61; Exs. 
BJ, BK, 91-92, 210, 212 & 220. South Farm views its proposed developments in Herriman 
and Bluffdale as coordinated projects planned together. R. 1295 at 38. 
23. From its beginning as a city, Fferriman committed to approve the South 
Farm's plans for development. Prior to incorporation, Herriman's community council sent a 
2
 When the appellate court declines to address subject matter jurisdiction in an interlocutory 
appeal, the parties may appeal subject matter jurisdiction once a final judgment is entered. 
Houghton v Department <f Health, 2005 UT 63,116,125 P.3d 860, 866. 
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letter to the Salt Lake County Commission dated April 6,1998 supporting South Farm's 
entire 2,081 acre project (half of which was located within Bluff dale's boundaries). & 1283 at 
248-49 & Ex. CFL The letter was signed by J. Lynn Crane, who is now the mayor of 
Herriman. Id && 1283 at 249. 
24. Two weeks later, the developer of South Farm's property3 provided a letter 
supporting FJerriman's efforts to incorporate as a city. The commitment included using in-
house and consultant services, attending County meetings, and financing a loan for an 
amount up to $97,000. K 1283 at 250-51 & Ex. CH. 
25. After Bluff dale rejected South Farm's application to amend the general plan 
and rezone, South Farm sought to obtain a voluntary boundary adjustment between 
Fferriman and Bluff dale. South Farm's alternative plan was to disconnect its property from 
Bluffdale so that it could annex into Herriman. K 1295 at 124. 
26. Consequently, the property owners filed simultaneous requests with Bluffdale 
and Herriman to either (1) adjust common boundaries, or (2) to disconnect and then annex. 
K 1283 at 215-16,224 &Exs. 90-92. 
27. Herriman never acted on South Farm's request for a voluntary boundary 
adjustment. & 1283 at 225. 
28. The Two Developers and other property owners plan to immediately annex 
into Herriman. & 1178-79 & 1283 at 226, 254. The parties to this action stipulated at trial 
that Herriman cannot decline a proper application for annexation. Id 
South Farm, L.L.C. and SF Development L.L.C., the predecessor to Rose Crest, Inc., 
are companies controlled by James Lee Sorenson. R. 1283 at 102, 104 & 116. 
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29. The map attached to the Requests for Disconnection shows the property 
owners who did not sign a Request for disconnection. They include but are not limited to 
parcels 1, 5, 3, 6, 59, 60, 70,72, 73, 84, 89,103,105,106,124,125, and 127. R. 1283 at 217-
219. 
30. Those parcels along the boundary line of Bluff dale that did not sign Requests 
for Disconnection, could annex back into Bluff dale and take some of the parcels, whose 
owners signed Requests for disconnection. R. 1283 at 121,222-223. 
C The Lower Court Created an Unincorporated Island or Penninsula 
31. It is undisputed the proposed disconnection area consists of 3,971 acres, K 
1295 at 12, and is identical to Bluff dale's Planning District 4. R. 1296 at 12 & Exs. M-N. 
Bluff dale is comprised of a total of approximately 10,000 acres. & 1296 at 12. 
32. It is undisputed the area at issue is bounded by Heniman on the west, 
Bluff dale on the east, Riverton City on the north and Camp Williams, a federal military 
installation, on the south. & 1295 at 61, 81 &Exs. 210,212-16. 
33. Camp Williams provides its own (self-contained) municipal services. K 1296 
at 179. Unincorporated areas receive municipal services from the County, while 
incorporated areas receive services from cities. If the lower court views Camp Williams as 
"incorporated territory*' in its disconnection analysis, then there is no dispute that the 
disconnected area would be unincorporated land surrounded by incorporated lands. 
34. The Utah Code defines peninsula in an unincorporated area to mean "an area 
surrounded on more than 1/2 of its boundary distance, but not completely, by incorporated 
territory and situated so that the length of a line drawn across the unincorporated area from 
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an incorporated area to an incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of 
the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area." Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(6). 
35. Blaine Gehring, Bluff dale city planner, testified that the perimeter of the 
disconnection area is 90,399.91 feet. R 1296 at 170 &Ex. A. Mr. Gehring applied the 
mathematical formula found in Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(6) and concluded that the area 
was a peninsula. Id He was the only person who testified about the exact length of the 
circumference of the disconnection area. Id 
36. Shane Jones, former city engineer, testified that the disconnected area is a 
peninsula. R 1296 at 132. 
37. Mike Bradshaw, South Farm's engineer, admitted in his testimony that the 
definition of peninsula does not state where a line from the length of the unincorporated 
area to an incorporated area on the opposite side should be drawn. R 1295 at 62. He 
further admitted that he could draw several lines in several locations in the disconnection 
area that would meet the statutory definition of a peninsula. & 1295 at 65, 78-80. 
38. The property owners' assertion that the disconnection area is not a peninsula 
is based on the notion that the unincorporated territory in Utah County should be included 
in applying the statutory definition of a peninsula. R 1295 at 74 & Ex. 209. 
D. The Developer Circumvented The Municipal Land Use Development and 
Management Act 
39. The majority of the land in Bluff dale consists of rural, country-type residential 
developments. R 1296 at 165. Roughly 30% of Bluff dale's developed land area consists of 
lots smaller than one acre and 60% are one acre or larger. R 1295 at 116. 
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40. Bluffdale encouraged South Farm to develop with one acre lots. R. 1295 at 
32. 
41. At the time South Farm filed its application, it knew that the disconnection 
area was master planned for one acre lots. & 1283 at 182-83. 
42. South Farm submitted an application to Bluffdale that was patterned after 
another application it has submitted to Salt Lake County (and later Herriman) for a mixed 
use development. K 1295 at 113. 
43. The applicant hopes to construct 3,183 residential dwelling units on 674 acres 
for a density of 4.72 units per residential acre. Ex. 50 at Tab K. The proposed development 
also includes acres for streets, church sites, commercial space and parks. The residential 
density per gross acre is 2.83 (calculated by dividing 3,183 units by 1,124.6 acres). Id 
44. Only 10% of South Farm's proposed development will be allocated to the 
residential development of one-acre lots. R. 1283 at 187. 
45. The application bears little if any resemblance to Bluff dale's mater plan. Id 
46. South Farm's application triggered this disconnection action. K 1283 at 182. 
47. The crux of the instant dispute is Bluff dale's master-planning of one-acre 
residential lots versus South Farm's plan for mixed use development. & 1295 at 120. 
48. If South Farm had known that Bluffdale would stick to its plan for one-acre 
lots, it would have filed for disconnection back in 1993 or 1997. & 1283 at 240. 
49. All of South Farm's proposals to Bluffdale contained a residential density of 
2.8 units per gross acre (except for the parties' Consent Decree). Ex. 123. In the Consent 
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Decree, South Farm and the other property owners agreed to residential density of 2.6 units 
per gross acre. & 1295 at 114. 
50. South Farm's position at trial was that since the property in the disconnection 
area is adjacent to Herriman or Riverton, Bluff dale should have considered the property for 
uses with higher densities. & 1283 at 205-06. 
51. On December 9, 2003, Bluff dale denied South Farm's application because the 
Gty Council determined it did not conform to the master plan's land use principles. Ex. 
169. 
52. After the denial, the Two Developers immediately decided to seek a 
disconnection proceeding instead of South Farm filing an appeal of the land use decision to 
the district court. & 1295 at 143-44. 
53. At trial, the Two Developers stipulated that they did not appeal Bluff dale's 
lawful land use decision because an appeal would have been futile. R 1296 at 69-70. 
E. The Citizens' Petition for Referendum Does Not Justify The Disconnection 
54. In June 2005, Bluff dale entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 
("MOU") with the property owners. & 1295 at 163. The property owners testified 
Bluff dale behaved reasonably after entering into that agreement. & 1295 at 164. Pursuant 
to the MOU, Bluff dale enacted the zoning ordinance that the property owners needed for 
approval of their application. R 1295 at 144. Absent the citizen's referendum, the 
disconnection lawsuit would not have continued. See R 1295 at 93. 
55. Instead of waiting for the June 2006 referendum election, the property owners 
decided to pursue this disconnection action. R 1295 at 146-47. 
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F, Bluffdale's Planning and Zoning Process Did Not Create The Justice and 
Equity Requirement for Disconnection 
56. The lower court concluded that justice and equity required disconnection 
because Bluffdale's planning and zoning process was characterized by unreasonable delays 
and changing standards. & 1185-86. 
57. The lower court's criticism focused on Bluffdale's processing of one single 
application: South Farm. South Hills did not file a land use application until after Bluff dale 
had entered into the MOU and adopted the mixed use zoning classification. 1295 at 165. 
58. It is undisputed that South Farm initiated its application of May 2002, 
completed it in July 2002, and was turned down in December 2003. Exs. 50,169, T & U. 
From the beginning of the process, South Farm knew that Bluff dale consisted mostly one-
acre lots. K 1295 at 30-31. South Farm's engineer testified in his deposition that Bluff dale 
had treated South Farm fairly up to May 2002, when South Farm filed its application, but he 
changed his mind at trial. & 1295 at 133-34. Although the property owners' Requests for 
Disconnection (Ex. 90) claimed they had spent ten years planning with Bluff dale, only South 
Farm presented testimony supporting that claim. The other testifying property owners had 
to admit that they had no experience with Bluffdale's planning process. & 1283 at 5 & 1295 
at 215,218. 
59. The 10-years claimed by South Farm included all of its proceedings before Salt 
Lake County beginning in 1993, and all of the additional proceedings with Herriman before 
and after it incorporated. K 1283 at 5 & 230. South Farm did not seriously concentrate on 
developing in Bluff dale until May 2001. K 1295 at 29. The 16 months Bluffdale spent 
before ultimately rejecting South Farm's application is comparable to the waiting periods of 
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other municipalities. South Farm waited 12 months for disposition by Salt Lake County, and 
an additional 10 months for Herriman to negotiate a development agreement for South 
Farm's twin development outside of Bluffdale. & 1283 at 40-42. During the same time 
period, Bluffdale has processed several other third-party applications for residential lots or 
mixed use developments. R. 1296 at 23. 
60. The Two Developers believe the City acted responsibly between June 2005 
and November 2005 when the lower court rejected the Consent Decree. Bluffdale made 
several changes to its development standards, enacted a new zoning classification, and 
executed a Consent Decree in an attempt to accommodate the Two Developers proposals 
for a mixed-use development. R. 1295 at 90. Bluffdale cannot be blamed for the lower 
court's rejection of the Consent Decree. & 675-79 & 1296 at 131. 
61. Bluffdale invested a considerable amount of time and effort in creating plans 
for development of the disconnection area. K 1296 at 122. Bluffdale had completed a 
Transportation Master Plan, a Revised Land Use Plan, a Revised Storm Drainage Plan and a 
Revised Master Plan before the instant action was initiated. K 1296 at 105. Bluffdale 
completed a culinary water system plan shortly after litigation was commenced in this matter, 
but the lower court refused to consider it. & 1296 at 113. 
62. Regardless of the amount of time it might have taken for Bluffdale to process 
the application, South Farm would have still sought disconnection because it was unwilling 
to develop the property in accordance with the Bluff dale's master plan. R 1295 at 120. 
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63. Bluffdale enacted Resolution 2005-05, which provided that South Farm would 
provide Bluffdale a waterline easement and the Qty declared an intent to allow South Farm 
to develop in a way comparable to its development in Herriman. Ex. 38. 
64. South Farm told Bluffdale that it did not considered Resolution 2002-05 
neither binding nor enforceable. & 1283 at 242-44. After it was enacted, South Farm felt 
that it still did not have a deal acceptable to the Qty. & 1283 at 253-54. The Consent 
Decree complied with the resolution's requirements. R. 1296 at 200. 
G. Undeveloped Land That Will Be Immediately Developed In An Adjacent City 
Does Not Create The Justice and Equity Requiring A Disconnection 
65. The real property at issue is largely undeveloped; there is only one home and a 
large water treatment plant located therein. R. 1295 at 14 &C Ex. 210. 
66. The land will remain mostly vacant in the period of time between its 
disconnection from Bluffdale and its annexation into Herriman; the Two Developers have 
already filed a petition for annexation. R. 1283 at 254,1295 at 66 & Ex. 90. 
67. South Farm plans to develop in Herriman in the same manner as it proposed 
in Bluffdale. R 1295 at 324. South Hills plans to develop its 640 acres residentially with a 
density of at least 2.8 units per gross acre. K 1295 at 152-53 &Ex. 130. 
68. If the disconnection is granted, Bluffdale will lose the benefits of the proposed 
developments. & 1295 at 94. Bluffdale will lose the system improvements and amenities 
the Two Developers would have helped to finance. R. 1295 at 196. 
69. The property owners prepared some materials opposing the referendum. See 
Ex. CK. The materials list the benefits that Bluffdale stands to lose in the disconnection: an 
increased and improved road system; trails and open space allowing for access to foothills 
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for equestrian pedestrian users; regional park with amphitheatre for everyone's use; 
recreation center for youth and adult programs; a commercial center; preservation of the 
Mountain View corridor; land for a future fire station; culinary and secondary water storage 
capacity increased storm water runoff capacity protecting Bluff dale; and design control 
guidelines which will raise neighboring property values. 
70. There is little or no evidence in the record to suggest that Bluff dale will not 
lose these benefits in a disconnection. 
H. Marshaling of the Evidence on the Issue of Whether the Disconnection is 
Viable 
71. The property owners must prove the viability of a disconnection by the 
preponderance of the evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(a). 
72. South Farm's in-house engineer testified the disconnection was viable because 
the land was vacant land and, once disconnected, would remain vacant. & 1295 at 66. 
73. South Hills' CEO testified it was viable because the raw land with minimal 
services would remain in the same state the day after it was disconnected. & 1295 at 176. 
74. The Two Developers' consulting engineer testified the disconnection was 
viable because there would be no existing infrastructure before and immediately after the 
disconnection. & 1295 at 229. 
75. The Two Developers' financial expert testified that the disconnection would 
be viable because there was very limited tax revenue produced by the property and very 
limited services provided to the property. K 1295 at 324-25. She opined it is viable because 
the property is undeveloped and produces only about $1,750 in tax revenues. Id 
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76. The lower court found the disconnection was viable as undeveloped land. & 
1184. 
77. The lower court also found that the property would be viable if it was annexed 
into Herriman and developed in the manner proposed by the Two Developers because 
Karen Wikstrom of Wikstrom Planning Consultants testified 
credibly that because of the increase in'critical mass'of 
population brought by the planned development, together with 
planned and existing commercial and retail elements, the 
planned community will provide more than offsetting revenues 
though sales taxes. 
R a t 1184. 
78. The evidence suggesting that undeveloped land makes the disconnection 
viable is insufficient. The Two Developers have petitioned Herriman for annexation; 
Herriman has no choice but to accept the annexation; Herriman is committed to approving 
South Farm's development; and South Hills will develop its 640 acres as a residential 
development with density of at least 2.8 per gross acre. R 1179. 
79. When asked whether the taxes generated would pay for the two police calls 
and eight fire calls per year that the property annually requires, Petitioners' financial expert 
answered: "I don't know that, I can't state that as a fact". R 1296 at 11 & Ex. 130. 
80. Karen Wikstrom opined that the disconnection would remain viable in 
Herriman because the residential development creates commercial development. R 1296 at 
43-45. That testimony is insufficient to support a finding that the disconnection is viable in 
Herriman because Ms. Wikstrom's sweeping proposition does not comport with the specific 
findings contained in her report. Ex. 130. 
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81. Wikstrom concluded that the disconnection will cost Herriman almost $^5 
million more to serve the disconnection then it will generate from all forms of revenue 
available to the general fund. Ex. 130 at 51. Her analysis included all commercial 
development. Id at 43. All of South Hills' development will all be residential, K 1296 at 43, 
which may contribute to municipal deficits. R 1296 at 45. Ms. Wikstrom was unable to 
identify any additional commercial development that would be created by the Two 
Developers' proposal. K 1296 at 43-44 & Ex. 130. 
82. Ms. Wikstrom also admitted that according to Herriman's budget documents, 
Exs. D & E, Herriman does not generate sufficient taxes or other lawful sources of funds to 
pay for Herriman Gty's general fund expenditures. 
Question: [Herriman] is not funding its general city obligations 
through taxes, it is using development fees to do that, isn't it? 
Answer: Uh uhh (affirmative). 
K 1296 at 39. 
Question: They are [Herriman] using the development fees 
contrary to the state statute to fund general services. 
Answer. Uh uhh (affirmative). 
IdztAO. 
83. Herriman's general fund shortfalls include the following: $2,132,629 (2002-
2003); $2,920,328.00 (estimated for 2003-2004); $5,706,180.00 (2004-2005); and $6,165,240 
(2005-2006). E x s . D & E . 
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I. Marshalling of the Evidence on Whether the Disconnection will Leave an Area 
Within its Boundaries for Which the Cost's Requirements or Other Burdens of 
Providing Municipal Services Would Materially Increase Over Previous Years 
84. On the theory that vacant land will remain vacant immediately after it is 
disconnected, South Farm's engineer testified it would not materially increase municipal 
costs to Bluffdale City. & 1295 at 67-69. South Farm's CEO, David Millheim, testified 
there would be no impact on Bluffdale's roads. & 1295 at 168. He also testified, however, 
that Bluffdale would lose the improvements and amenities financed by the Two Developers. 
R 1295 at 196. 
85. As stated earlier, Ex. CK represents the document the Two Developers put 
together that lists the things that Bluffdale will lose as a result of the disconnection. R. 1295 
at 207-208. Again, the Two Developers' consulting engineer said there would be no negative 
impact upon Bluffdale because there is no infrastructure in the area. & 1295 at 231. But he 
admitted that his analysis does not take into account roads and transportation and is not sure 
whether the disconnection would have a negative impact on Bluffdale's water system. R 
1295 at 243-244. He admitted that it is possible that Bluffdale will lose preferred sites for its 
water system. & 1295 at 246. He also could not say with certainty that there would be no 
negative impact from surface runoff from the disconnected area through Bluffdale. & 1295 
at 256. The Two Developers' road expert testified there would not be a negative impact on 
Bluffdale's roads because traffic increases would only be 2-5% if the Mountain View 
Corridor goes in, but he admitted that no one knows whether it will go in or not. & 1295 at 
284. The road expert also admitted the disconnection would have an impact on 3600 West 
and 14400 South in Bluffdale. R. 1295 at 273-274. The Two Developers' financial expert 
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testified it would not have a negative impact on Bluff dale because it only provides $1,750.00 
in tax revenue to Bluff dale and she could not identify any municipal service costs. & 1295 at 
333. 
86. It is undisputed there is a 12-inch waterline owned by Bluff dale Qty in the 
disconnection area, and that it can serve 600 residential units. But if a secondary water 
system is used, it can serve 1600 residential units. & 1296 at 49-50. 
87. The waterline was constructed primarily to serve the area between the Welby-
Jacob canal, the eastern area of the property proposed for disconnection and the proposed 
Mountain View Corridor alignment. & 1296 at 76. The 12-inch waterline is sized for future 
waterlines to loop though the disconnected area. & 1296 at 86. Roads and waterlines must 
be looped and be interconnected for proper circulation throughout Bluff dale Qty. & 1296 at 
140. 
88. South Farm's application to Salt Lake Q)unty for the Rosecrest development, 
Ex. 252, acknowledges that every drainage pattern runs though Bluff dale. Id Ex. 252 (Tab 
G at 5). And that the Two Developers will use natural drainages. Id at 1. In addition, the 
master road plan contained in the application shows that 14400 South inside Bluff dale would 
be extended from 3600 West to South Farm's development. 
89. South Farm's land use application to Bluffdale, Ex. 50, shows the same thing. 
Tab I shows that South Farm's development alone will generate 51,184 external daily road 
trips and assumes again the extension of 14400 South from 3600 South to the development. 
Ex. 50 (Tab G). 
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90. The parties jointly determined what the specific costs would be for the 
development impacts on Bluff dale when they submitted the proposed settlement documents 
and consent decree to the court. Exhibit 123 (Tab 6D) shows the roads that would need to 
be improved in Bluffdale, i.e. 15000 South, 14400 South, 13400 South and 3600 West. The 
water plan map and storm drain plan map also show infrastructure that should be 
constructed in Bluffdale. Exhibit F divides the costs into two types i.e. project costs (those 
costs to be funded and paid by the Two Developers) and systems costs (those costs that 
would be incurred to serve the development and the Qty at large. See&nerally, Utah Code 
Ann. § 11-36-102. For Phase I, the transportation and drainage costs simply to improve 
3600 South from 13800 South to 14400 South will be $1,431,920.00 and offsite detention 
costs will be another one million dollars. K 1283 at 165 &Ex. 123 (Tab 6F). Likewise, 
Exhibit 123 (Tab 6F), shows that to do the Redwood Road connection in Bluffdale will cost 
Bluffdale an additional $1.4 million. Ex.123. 
91. The budget documents submitted to the lower court show that Bluffdale 
currently spends $206,319.00 for road maintenance and improvements. Exs. F & G. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case is a case of first impression. The case at bar is the first time a Utah court 
has allowed a developer to circumvent a municipal land use decision by using the statutory 
disconnection process, rather than by following the statutory remedy of appealing that 
decision to the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-101 etseq. This is also the first 
time that a Utah court has used a disconnection to effectively end a citizen referendum 
process. 
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There are compelling and undisputed reasons to reverse the lower court's pioneering 
but unlawful disconnection. The lower court plainly lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions 
and do what it did. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-501(2)(b)(l) &-502.5(5)(a)(i). For over 50 
years, the law in Utah has been that if the petition commencing the disconnection lawsuit is 
not filed by the individuals specified in the statute, the courts are "impotent to act and no 
grafting on the petition thereafter, either by physically signing it or by motion to be allowed 
to intervene and become petitioners, can breathe life into the still-bom petition so as to 
authorize the court to do more than dismiss the petition/5 Hcamrd, 281 P.2d at 220. 
It is also undisputed that the Two Developers are seeking, through a disconnection, 
to adjust the common municipal boundary between Bluff dale and Herriman. The Legislature 
has, however, prohibited the disconnection statute from being used to "abrogate, modify, or 
replace" the voluntary boundary adjustment procedure4. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-510. 
The disconnection in this matter leaves an island of unincorporated land, a result that 
is prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3) (c)(iii). The island results from the 
undisputed fact that the disconnection area would be surrounded by Bluff dale on the east, 
Riverton on the north, Herriman on the west, and Camp Williams on the south. (Camp 
Williams is a military based with self-contained municipal type services.) Even if Camp 
Williams was mistakenly treated as garden-variety unincorporated land, the definition of 
peninsula found in Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(6) provides that the effect of the 
disconnection results in an unincorporated peninsula, which is another outcome prohibited 
by the disconnection statute. 
4
 The boundary adjustment procedures are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-419. 
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The Two Developers are using the disconnection process as an inappropriate attempt 
to circumvent the statutorily-created method to obtain judicial review of a city's land use 
decision. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (2003). Although Bluff dale had master-planned 
the disconnection area for one-acre lot developments, the Two Developers have never filed 
an application meeting those requirements. Instead, South Farm filed a land use application 
requesting approval of a 1,124-acre, multi-use development with 2.8 dwelling units per gross 
acre. The denial of this request triggered the underlying disconnection proceeding. 
South Farm would have filed for disconnection in 1993 or 1997 if they had known 
that Bluff dale would not change its master plan in response to their application. South Farm 
and the other developer decided to seek a disconnection immediately after Bluff dale rejected 
South Farm's land use application. Once that decision was reached, the Two Developers 
undertook efforts to organize other property owners to support a disconnection. They 
chose to pursue a disconnection rather than to challenge the Gty^s land use decision in court 
because Utah law affords cities a substantial amount of legislative discretion. 
The citizens' call for a referendum ultimately prompted the Two Developers to 
continue this disconnection action. The Qty Council enacted a zoning ordinance pursuant 
to an agreement that would have enabled the Two Developers to proceed with their plans. 
The parties also mutually approved a development agreement and a stipulation to dismiss 
the underlying disconnection action. The case was not dismissed, however, due to the 
citizens' call for a referendum. SeeMoutyv Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 41,122 P.3d 521. 
Bluff dale citizens voted on June 27, 2005 to uphold the challenged zoning ordinance. 
Despite this favorable outcome, the Two Developers continue to refuse to develop their 
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property in Bluff dale. The citizens' right to refer the disputed zoning ordinance to the 
voters is protected by Utah Const, art. VI, § 2(b)(ii) and Title 20A, Chapter 7 the Utah Code. 
The lower court mistakenly concluded that citizens' call for a referendum created justice and 
equity factors that justified the disconnection. 
Finally, a review of the record shows that no reasonable fact-finder could have 
concluded that the Two Developers met their burden of proof for the disconnection on the 
elements specified in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE INITIAL PETITION 
WAS NOT BROUGHT BY THOSE PERSONS REQUIRED BY THE 
DISCONNECTION STATUTE 
The seminal Utah case deciding that the failure to file a disconnection petition by 
those specified in the disconnection statute creates a jurisdictional error is Haimndv Tofim of 
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 (1955). In Howrd, the court set forth the 
standard for determining whether a majority of real property owners had successfully filed a 
sustainable petition for disconnection. Id After determining that the petition was not signed 
by the required majority of property owners, the trial court counted the subsequent 
interveners to conclude that the plaintiffs had obtained a majority. Id at 191, 281 P.2d at 
217. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, and framed the jurisdictional inquiry as follows: 
Let it be conceded that if the court had been vested with 
jurisdiction to order the area disconnected, then the intervening 
parties, if otherwise qualified, could be considered as parties. 
But, if the court had not been vested with the jurisdiction ~ in 
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fact, lacked jurisdiction ~ because the petition was not signed 
and filed by a majority, we opine that permitting the 
intervention could not confer jurisdiction. 
Id at 192,281 P.2d at 218. The court reasoned that "the changing of the territorial limits of 
a city is primarily a legislative function." Id at 193, 281 P.2d at 219. "[Qourts are bound to 
confine the exercise of the power conferred upon them b}f the Legislature." Id "Before the 
court can pass upon the justice and equity of the matter it must first determine judicially the 
existence of requisites fixed by the legislature." Id at 195, 281 P.2d at 219. The act of obtaining 
a majority of property owners' signatures on the petition is a condition precedent to the right 
of a court to make a disconnection. See id at 195, 281 P.2d at 219-20. Consequently, Houurd 
held that if a petition was not signed by a majority of the owners, the court was "impotent to 
act and no grafting on the petition thereafter could breathe life into the stillborn petition so 
as to authorize the court to do more than dismiss the petition." Id at 195, 281 P.2d at 220. 
For that reason, the court in Houurdreversed after concluding that "the trial court never 
acquired jurisdiction to make the order of disconnection". Id 
The Houurd decision is foursquare with the case at bar. The original petition was not 
signed by enough property owners to satisfy the statutory threshold. Petitioners' attempt to 
insert additional property owners into the equation fails as a matter of law. 
In Mawrrvrt Corp. v White City Water Inpnnement DisL, 958 P.2d 222 (Utah 1998), the 
Supreme Court considered a petition by a group of residents to withdraw from a water 
improvement district. The applicable statute permitted withdrawal upon the filing of a 
petition with the district court by "a majority of the real property owners." Id at 223 (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-334 &-335). This Court stated it "agree[d] with the district court 
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that no amendments to the withdrawal petitions should be permitted after the date of filing, 
whether by way of addition, deletion, or reinstatement of names." Id at 226. 
Mariemont acknowledged the Haimrd decision as "the case most relevant to this issue." 
Hauurd held that "the trial court initially had jurisdiction only to determine whether a 
majority of real property owners petitioned for disconnection as cfthe time of the filing cfthe 
petition If it determined that this prerequisite had not been met, it could only dismiss the 
action for lack of jurisdiction. It could do no more." Id See South Jordan City v Sandy City, 
870 P.2d 273 (Utah 1994) (dismissing where disconnection was not signed by enough 
voters). Due to the initial Judicial Petition's facial fatal defect, the lower court never 
acquired the jurisdiction to disconnect property. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 
DISCONNECTION STATUTE 
A The Court Erred in Adjusting the Common Boundary 
Utah law prohibits the Two Developers from using the disconnection procedures to 
adjust boundaries between two municipalities. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-510 provides that 
"[t]his part [the disconnection statute] shall not be construed to abrogate, modify, or displace 
the boundary adjustment procedures in Section 10-2-419." 
There are good practical reasons for not allowing the disconnection statues to be 
used to modify a common municipal boundary. First, traditional municipal disconnections 
have been used to separate vacant land not needing municipal services from a city. It has 
never been used to allow developers to shop their developments in a competing municipal 
arena. Second and more importantly, it is undisputed in the case at bar that if this 
27 
disconnection is upheld, property owners who did not sign Requests for Disconnection can 
petition to annex back in and take with them properties whose owners did sign 
disconnection Requests. The constant jockeying of disconnection/annexation could 
undermine the secure fixing of municipal boundaries forever. 
Plainly, the lower court's order has the effect of adjusting the common boundary 
between Bluff dale and Herriman to the north and the east. The lower court was informed at 
trial that the Two Developers had already applied for annexation into Herriman, that 
Herriman was willing to provide the municipal services, and that Herriman was willing to 
allow the higher density development. R 1283 at 215-16. 
The Two Developers' intent to affect a boundary adjustment was clear from the 
inception of the proceedings giving rise to this action. The Two Developers filed petitions 
with Bluff dale and Herriman entitled "Petition to Bluff dale Gty and Herriman For 
Voluntary Boundary Adjustment, Disconnection and Annexation." Ex. 90. In the letter 
transmitting the "Petitions for Voluntary Boundary Adjustment/Disconnection" to 
Bluff dale Gty, counsel for the Two Developers wrote that: "This letter transmits 52 
petitions requesting Bluff dale Gty to adjust the boundaries between Bluff dale Gty and the 
Town of Herriman pursuant to [Utah Code Ann.] § 10-2-419." Ex. 95. 
In short, the Two Developers always intended to use the disconnection statute to 
circumvent the legislatively-mandated procedure for boundary adjustments. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-2-419. But, "where a statute's plain language or its structure and purpose 
demonstrate a legislative intent to preempt an area of law, the statute becomes the only 
source of law in the area...." Gottlingv RR. Inc, 2002 UT 95,18, 61 P.3d 989, 992. Further, 
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a court must read the plain language of the statute "as a whole", interpreting its provisions 
"in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and 'with other statues under the 
same and related chapters'". Grand County v Emery County, 2002 UT 57,123, 52 P.3d 1148. 
A party cannot accomplish indirectly what it is prohibited to do directly. 
The legislature did not view a boundary adjustment and a disconnection as being 
comparable. The procedures are quite different and are much more restrictive for a 
boundary adjustment. To initiate a disconnection, the owners of more than 50% of the 
affected real property must sign the petition. If 50% refuse to sign it, the court lacks 
jurisdiction to proceed. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-501(2)(b). A boundary adjustment, on 
the other hand, will not be allowed if both cities do not agree to it or if the owners of 25% 
or more of the affected property owners object. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-419(2)(b)(iv). 
The disconnection statute prohibits the exact result accomplished by the lower 
court's ruling: circumventing the boundary adjustment procedure of section 10-2-419 by 
disconnecting property from one city and annexing into another. The Legislature's intent in 
this matter is plainly expressed that no provision of the disconnection process can be used to 
"abrogate, modify, or displace the boundary adjustment procedure in section 10-2-419." 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-510. The lower court erred in allowing the disconnection of a large 
portion of Bluff dale for the purpose of affecting a boundary adjustment through the 
annexation of that area into Herriman. 
B. By Statutory Definition This Disconnection Leaves or Creates a Prohibited 
Island or Peninsula of Unincorporated Land 
By allowing the disconnection of the affected area, the lower court authorized the 
creation of a "peninsula" prohibited by the disconnection statue. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-
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502.7(3) (c) (iii) provides that a territory cannot be disconnected if the proposed 
disconnection would "leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated 
territory7'. A "peninsula" is defined as follows: 
"Peninsula" when used to describe an unincorporated area, 
means an area surrounded on more than one half of its 
boundary distance, but not completely, by incorporated territory 
and situated so that the length of a line drawn across the 
unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an 
incorporated area on the opposite side shall, be less than 25% of 
the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-104(b). 
In applying this mandate, the lower court correctly concluded that it was a two-step 
procedure requiring two separate calculations. First, to determine whether a "peninsula" will 
be created by the disconnection, the court must ascertain whether the resulting 
unincorporated area created by the disconnection is surrounded by incorporated territory on 
more than one half of its boundary distance. Second, the court must ascertain whether a line 
drawn across the unincorporated area is less than 25% of the total aggregate boundaries of 
the unincorporated area. 
In applying the first step, the lower court settled on a facetious, nonsensical 
interpretation of boundary distance by finding the size of the "unincorporated area" as used 
in the definition is infinite - thereby concluding that there could never be a peninsula. & 
1192. See generallyExs. 209 &216 (Maps of "peninsula"). The lower court then determined 
that the second step was so vague that it could be ignored without any attempt to ascertain 
its plain meaning or the legislative intent. Id The lower court concluded that if the term 
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"unincorporated area were limited to the newly disconnected area as the Qty proposes, the 
statute is rendered too vague to apply". Id. 
Rather than applying the definition in Utah Code, the lower court claimed to rely on 
the "historical definition of peninsula". R. 1194-1195. The lower court interpreted and 
applied the two-step inquiry in a manner that effectively removed the peninsula proscription 
from the disconnection statute. In reaching this result, the lower court completely ignored 
many of the well-settled rules of statutory construction. As to the first step, the lower court 
found that the size of the unincorporated area left or created by the disconnection was 
infinite: 
The unincorporated area that disconnection would "leave or 
create" would be bordered in part by Bluff dale and in part by 
Herriman; however, the unincorporated area that is left or 
created is seemingly infinite. The newly created unincorporated 
area would join other bordering unincorporated areas in Salt 
Lake County which in turn borders unincorporated areas in 
other counties throughout the state. In the court's view, all 
contiguous unincorporated areas must be considered in the 
calculation. Tracing the borders of incorporated territory 
reveals only islands and peninsulas of incorporated land in a 
vast ocean of unincorporated territory. In reality, unless other 
boundaries are utilized, the very definition which was created by 
the legislature, make the existence of a peninsula impossible, 
because every "peninsula" with measurable boundaries will also 
be an island.5 (emphasis added) 
R 1192. 
This erroneous finding led to a second finding that the boundary distance around the 
unincorporated area was also infinite, and therefore could not meet the requirement that 
5
 Ex. 209 is a map that graphically illustrates the court's mistaken reasoning. 
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"one half of its boundary distance" must be bounded by incorporated territory. This faulty 
logic led to the conclusion that the disconnection area would not result in a peninsula. 
The lower court declared the second prong vague and interpreted it in a manner that 
effectively removed that provision from the disconnection statute. In doing so, the lower 
court abdicated its duty to give meaning to all of the words and terms of a statute. 
Such a result clearly is not the legislature intended, nor is it what follows from a plain 
reading of the language of the disconnection statute. It appears that the lower court misread 
the word "or" for "and" in the "leave or create" language of the statutory restriction of 
section 10-2-502.7(3) (c)(iii). Thus, the lower court interpreted the "leave or create" language 
to be conjunctive when it is actually disjunctive. The disconnection process would obviously 
"create" a defined area of unincorporated territory. But the process would not "create" or 
"leave" unincorporated territory throughout the remainder of the county and state. In the 
instant matter, the disconnection would only "create" the unincorporated area bounded by 
Bluff dale, Riverton, Herriman and Camp Williams, unincorporated primarily6. 
The lower court explained its absurd view of the disconnection statute by stating: 
"[t]racing the borders of incorporated territory reveals only islands and peninsulas of 
incorporated land in a vast ocean of unincorporated territory." R 1192. The court 
continued, "the very definition which was created by the legislature makes the existence of a 
peninsula impossible, because of necessity, every "peninsula" with measurable boundaries 
will also be an island." K 1193. 
6
 Camp Williams provides its own municipal services. It does not obtain municipal services 
from the County like all other unincorporated lands in Salt Lake County do. 
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Rather than attempting to determine the Legislature's real intent, the lower court 
interpreted the disconnection statute in a manner that would provide no legislative direction 
for determining whether or not a particular disconnection would be permitted. Without any 
understanding of the legislative intent - and without voiding the statute for vagueness - the 
lower court granted the property owner's disconnection after finding that no peninsula, as 
the term is defined in the statute, could ever be created. 
The basic rules of statutory construction require a court to first consider the plain 
language of the statute. If the statute's plain language invokes some ambiguity, the court is 
required to look consider the legislative intent. 
The lower court in this matter also violated a cardinal rule of statutory construction 
by inferring substantive terms into the disconnection statute that were not already there. 
Rather than basing its interpretation on the language used in the statute, the lower court 
effectively rewrote the disconnection statute to conform it to an intent not expressed 
therein. 
In determining the legislative intent, a court must interpret the "plain" meaning of 
"the language of [that] statutory provision in light of other provisions within the same statute 
or act, and ... attempt to harmonize the provisions in accordance with the legislative intent 
so as to give meaning to each provision." Daus County Solid Waste Management & Energy 
Recovery Special Sera Dist v City cf Bountiful, 2002 UT 60,110, 52 P.3d 1174. See also Grand 
County v Emery County, 2002 UT 57, \ 23, 52 P.3d 1148. The rules of statutory construction 
provide that the "meaning of doubtful words or phrases" must be determined in light of and 
take their character from associated words or phrases. 
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Although the express term "leave or create" a peninsula of unincorporated territory is 
not specifically defined, the legislative enactment repeatedly refers to it as "the area proposed 
for disconnection". Section 10-2-501(1)(a) refers to the signatures required of real property 
owners, and limits them to those "in the area proposed for disconnection." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-2-501(2)(b)(i). The same section requires that the petitioners include a map or plat of 
the "territory proposed for disconnection". Id The area shown on the map or plat defines 
the unincorporated territory that is "created" by the disconnection. It cannot be infinite, or 
more or less. Instead, it is a finite amount of land bounded on three sides by incorporated 
territory and on one side by an unincorporated federal installation, Camp Williams. It is at 
that point were the "peninsula" ends; where the "unincorporated area created" is connected 
to that infinite territory referred in the lower court's decision. Although the peninsula may 
be adjacent to the infinite territory, it does not become part of it. 
The unincorporated area that disconnection would "create" is not "essentially 
infinite" as found by the lower court. Such a finding emasculates the entire statutory scheme 
of Title 10, and renders that restriction non-existent in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7. If the 
court's view of the meaning of that term was accepted, no peninsula would ever be created 
by a disconnection. This is a result that could not have been intended by the Legislature. 
The only logical conclusion is the lower court adopted an incorrect interpretation of the 
term peninsula to include the property infinitely beyond the disconnection area. 
This Court has stated that the rules of statutory construction are not artificial or 
arbitrary, but "arise quite naturally from the process of reasoning as to what the statute was 
intended". SeeHeathrmnu Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 370, 374 P.2d 839, 840 (Utah 1962). The 
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process of reasoning would not result in a meaning that voids the provision. "Statutory 
enactments are to be constructed so as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, 
and . . . interpretations are to be avoided which renders some parts of a provision 
nonsensical or absurd". Millett v Clark Clink Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). The 
lower court's view of the meaning of "peninsula" in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-104(6) creates a 
nonsensical and/or absurd result. 
Where there is doubt or uncertainty as to the interpretation of a statute, the rule of 
noscitura sodis (La, it is known from its associates) requires that the meaning of doubtful 
words or phrases be determined in light of and take their character from associated words or 
phrases. A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that all parts of the enactment should be 
considered together so as to produce a harmonious whole and to give effect to the intent 
and purpose to be divined from the entire act. Cf. Western A uto Transport, Inc. v Reese, 104 
Utah, 393,140 P.2d 348, 349 (Utah 1943). 
When the lower court's view of the broad terms Title 10 and in the specific terms of 
section 10-2-401, it becomes clear that such a view of the legislative intent is absurd. Utah 
law provides that a city may annex an island or peninsula of all unincorporated area within 
the peninsula contiguous to the municipality even without a petition. Utah Code Ann. §10-
2-418(l)(a)(i)(A). If the lower court's interpretation of peninsula were applied to this statute, 
then it would produce the absurd result of allowing a city to annex any and all 
unincorporated areas if some portion of the area was contiguous to its boundary. 
Applying the lower court's interpretation of "peninsula" to the same disconnected 
area yields a ludicrous result. Since part of the area is contiguous to Bluff dale, as required by 
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section 10-2-402(1)(a)(i), that peninsula would be contiguous to and part of the 
unincorporated area of Camp Williams and beyond. Therefore, applying the lower court's 
logic, Bluffdale would be permitted to annex an "infinite" amount of unincorporated 
territory. Under this absurd hypothetical, Bluffdale could have annexed all the 
unincorporated area south to the Utah County boundary, north to the Davis County 
boundary, and then west to the Oquirrhs and beyond. This example demonstrates how 
ridiculous the lower court's definition of peninsula really is, since the definitions included in 
section 10-2-104(b) apply to all provisions of Title 10. 
The area of the disconnected territory clearly meet? the definition of "peninsula." As 
shown in Exhibit A, and the testimony of the Bluffdale Gty Engineer, Shane Jones, the total 
"boundary distance", circumference of the proposed disconnection area is 90,399.91 feet. K 
1296 at 170. This boundary distance is surrounded by 51,559 feet of incorporated territory, 
which is more than 50% of the total boundary distance. Further, the shortest line that can 
be drawn across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to another incorporated 
area on the opposite side is 3,936 feet long. Id. The longest such line that can be drawn is 
17,146 feet long. Id. In either case, such line is far less than 25% of the total aggregate 
boundaries of the unincorporated area (25% of 90,400 equals 22,600). Id. 
Instead of accepting the calculations set forth above, the lower court incorrectly 
rejected these calculations and the whole statutory scheme upon which they were based by 
finding (without factual or rational support) that the boundary of the resulting 
"unincorporated area" is essentially infinite. 
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In applying the plain language of Section 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) and accepting that the 
Legislature would not and did not intend to enact a "nonsensical or absurd" provision, the 
disconnection area is a "peninsula" and therefore the disconnection is prohibited by Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii). The lower court's Decree of Disconnection must be 
reversed because the disconnection territory creates a "peninsula of unincorporated 
territory'' in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii). 
C. The Court Erred in Allowing the Two Developers To Use the Disconnection 
Process as a Means to Circumvent the Requirements of Section 10-9-1001 
It is undisputed that the disconnection lawsuit stems from a single municipal land use 
decision: Bluffdale's denial of South Farm's application to amend Bluffdale's master plan and 
rezone South Farm's land. & 163-180. So states the Amended Petition for Disconnection. 
Id Had Bluff dale granted the application there would be no disconnection. In contrast, if 
South Farm had known Bluff dale would remain true to its land use plan, calling for one-acre 
lots, South Farm would have filed for disconnection well before it filed its application on the 
county portion of South Farm in 1999. 
It is also undisputed that if citizens had not successfully filed a lawful petition 
referring the zoning ordinance designed to resolve the land use dispute, there would have 
been no disconnection. Lastly, it is undisputable that if the lower court had approved the 
parties' stipulation and Consent Decree to resolve this land use dispute, there would be no 
disconnection. 
Never before has a Utah court found that a municipal land use decision justifies a 
disconnection from a municipality- nor could it. No disconnection can be ordered unless 
both justice and equity require it. It is axiomatic that equity does not require anything if the 
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applicant fails to avail itself of the available legal remedies. Section 10-9-1001 (later repealed) 
granted South Farm the legal remedy of appealing Bluff dale's land use decision to the 
District Court. It is undisputed that South Farm chose to not do so. 
More importantly is the reason that South Farm chose not to appeal: it could not 
meet the arbitrary and capricious standard to reverse the City's decision. Consequently, 
application of the disconnection statute to circumvent the established procedures for 
appealing land use decisions must be reversed for two reasons. First, equity does not require 
a remedy when the applicant ignores a legal remedy. Second, to find justice and equity 
requiring disconnection in a land use dispute requires grafting in the land use dispute 
standard of judicial review. Otherwise, this Court will establish a precedent that future 
developers will follow; a precedent that will completely undermine a century of precedent of 
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Instead of appealing an adverse land use ruling, 
future developers will simply seek to disconnect and annex into a neighboring city. 
POINT III 
THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE JUSTICE AND EQUITY STANDARD 
A. Introduction 
Disconnecting property from a municipality by court action is an extraordinary 
remedy. "This court has clearly held time and time again, that the determination of 
municipal boundaries is a legislative function." Reams- Tribune Corp v Salt Lake County 
Cornrrin, 2001 UT 55,121, 28 P.3d 686, 691. Also, Utah law provides substantial deference 
to land use decisions by a city's legislative body. Bradley v Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 70 
P.3d 47. 
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A court may grant disconnection only if justice and equity require it. It is not 
sufficient for the property owners to merely show that they would be better off if the 
disconnection was granted. See generally, MCI Tdeoomnmmtions Corp. v Public Serrioe 
CommissioncfUtah, 840 P.2d 765, 772 (Utah 1992). 
In an early disconnection case, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the disconnection 
of property that was "clearly unnecessary for city purposes" and that had received "no 
benefit" from city services. InreChitfConsdidztedMirririg Ca, 71 Utah 430, 266 P. 1044 
(1928). The court noted that in the prior cases before the court "in the light of the facts 
appearing in the opinions of the court, no other or different conclusions would have been 
consonant with justice." Id7 
B. The Citizens' Call for A Referendum Cannot Properly Be Used As A Factor in 
Determining That Justice and Equity Require Disconnection 
The case at bar is the first time a Utah Court has ever concluded that the citizens' 
lawful use of the referendum process creates the justice and equity requirement necessary for 
disconnecting land from a municipality 
The political environment in the City is a factor that injustice 
and Equity favors disconnection. The divisions have escalated 
to the point that virtually any decision made by the City in favor 
of development is subject to a referendum. *** The City's 
administration has in effect become an agent with no authority, 
who can say no, but can never say yes, and provide a reliable 
7
 While the substantive standard of justice and equity is a stringent one, Petitioners' burden 
of proof was preponderance of the evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3). That burden 
does not lesson the substantive standard. For example, if the standard substantive for tort 
liability was gross negligence, a preponderance of the evidence burden does not translate 
into plaintiff only having to prove simple negligence. If the separation of powers is to be 
preserved, "justice and equity7' must be interpreted as a stringent substantive standard. The 
city council - not the court - should decide what is necessary for the citizens. Only stringent 
interpretation preserves the city council's legislative capacity as well as this Court's power. 
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decision not likely to be attacked by referendum. Leaving the 
property in the Qty will only prolong this dysfunctional and 
contentious process. The Court is not suggesting that citizen 
involvement or the referendum process is anything by salutary. 
It is, however, an unyielding mechanism for making zoning 
decisions. This unwieldiness is a factor favoring disconnection 
in this case. 
& at 1188-89. 
The lower court's reasoning is factually incorrect because it is undisputed the only 
referendum petition successfully filed was a challenge to adoption of a multi-use zoning 
classification in Bluff dale's zoning ordinance. On June 26, 2006, the Bluff dale voters upheld 
the ordinance. But the Two Developers have refused to seek application of the ordinance to 
develop their property in Bluff dale. 
The lower court's reasoning is also legally wrong for several important reasons. First, 
the legal standard of Justice and Equity requiring disconnection, has never been expanded to 
include political or referendum considerations. The Utah Supreme Court's analysis from In 
re Disconnection ofCertain Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1983) is directly relevant to this 
action: 
Decisions interpreting that standard have uniformly turned on 
what municipal services, improvements, or other benefits the 
territory received from the Qty, the tax base the territory 
provided to the Qty and the financial impact of its loss by 
disconnection; the effect of disconnection on the Gty's 
continued growth, financial health, and administration; and the 
economic interdependency of the Qty and the territory. 
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Further, lawful use of the citizens' referendum process is not an unwieldy 
mechanism.8 In Citizen's A wweness v Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117,1122 (Utah 1994), the court 
held that zoning decisions like the one giving rise to this action were properly referable. Utah 
law provides voters with the option to control basic zoning policy decisions. Id See also 
Wilsonv Manning, 657 P.2d 251,253 (Utah 1982). In Mouty v Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 
41,1f 25,122 P.2d 521, 529, this Court recently affirmed that the current referendum statute 
does not limit the type of municipal actions that can be referred to the voters. 
If anything, the citizens' lawful use of the referendum process suggests that justice 
and equity do not require a disconnection in the case at hand. While the citizens' right to 
refer a local ordinance to the voters is constitutionally protected, 56? Utah Const, art. VI, § 
l(i)(b), the property owners right to disconnect from a city is not.9 The legislative power of 
this State is supreme within constitutional limits. Thomas v Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 
Utah 108,159,197 P.2d 477, 503 (1948). The legislative power of the voters via initiative 
and referendum is co-equal with that of the legislature. But the voters' power to control a 
basic zoning decision certainly is not supreme when a district court labels the power as 
"unwieldy and dysfunctional" and determines that the voters' invocation of that power can 
be considered as a factor in a disconnection. 
8
 If the lower court was truly concerned about the Bluff dale's "unwieldy7' or "dysfunctional 
process", it could have simply approved the parties' Consent Decree. 
9
 Utah law requires parties to show that a city has acted arbitrary and capriciously to overturn 
a land use decision. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (2003). 
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C The City's Delay in Processing One Land Use Application Does Not Justify 
Disconnecting 40% of Bluffdale's Territoiy 
The lower court determined that disconnection was justified because "Bluffdale Gty's 
zoning and planning process was characterized by unreasonable delays and changing 
standards". & at 1184. The undisputed facts tell a different story. 
1. Delay 
First, regardless of when South Farm filed its land use application, it still would have 
sought to disconnect because it was not willing to comply with Bluff dale's master plan for 
one-acre lots. 
Second, any delay that occurred was only in relation to South Farm's application. No 
other party pled that they submitted an application that was delayed.10 Bluff dale has timely 
processed other applications for residential lot or mixed use developments. 
Third, some or all of the delay is directly attributable to South Farm's intransigence 
since it was never willing to accept the density allowed by the Gty's master plan. It was 
never willing to amend its plan to any residential density of less than 2.8 units per gross acre, 
which happens to be the same density South Farm sought for its twin development first in 
Salt Lake County and later in Herriman. 
Fourth, it is undisputed Bluff dale took about 17 months to reject South Farm's 
application. This is less than the time it took for Salt Lake County to amend its zoning 
10
 Even if delay on one land use application could create the justice and equity requirement 
necessary to disconnect the territory, the only territory that could be disconnected would be 
the property included in South Farms' application. A Decree of Disconnection must be 
limited to the territoiy which severance from the Gty would be just and equitable. In re West 
Jordan, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 127,129,369 P.2d 286,287 (1962). 
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ordinance to allow for South Farms' twin development and to negotiate a development 
agreement with Herriman, 22 months. 
Lastly, despite the delay, Bluff dale and South Farm ultimately reached an agreement 
resolving all disputes. If the lower court had simply approved the Consent Decree, it would 
have prevented the additional delay that South Farm is currently experiencing. 
2. Changing Standards 
At all times relevant to this action the property sought to be disconnected was zoned 
A-5 and was master-planned for acre-lot residential development. Any discussion to change 
those requirements was generated by South Farm. Bluff dale even went to the extraordinary 
measure of adopting eight land use principles in November of 2002 so it could consider 
South Farm's application. No other change in standard occurred. The only other change 
discussed during the relevant time period was Bruce Parker's proposal to master plan the 
disconnection area for mixed use development. This same type of plan was also proposed 
by South Farm, but with a different layout. Neither plan was ever approved. 
Finally, if South Farm was upset with the delays and changed in standard; South Farm 
has other legal remedies available to it. It could have filed for a declaratory action, see 
Patterson v A rneriamFork City, 2003 UT 7, 67 P.3d 466, or sought mandamus to require the 
City to make a decision. See generallyArcherv Utah State Lard Use Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 
P.2d 622 (Utah 1964) (discussing mandamus for an oil and gas lease). South Farm could 
have taken the steps to seek mandamus against Bluff dale. SeeMerrihewv Salt Lake County 
Planning, 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983); Crist v Mapleton City, 28 Uah 2d 7, 497 P.2d 633 (1972). 
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Rather than pursuing those legal remedies, South Farm elected to initiate the instant 
disconnection action. 
D. Raw Ground Requiring Municipal Services Should Not Be Disconnected 
The first reason the lower court gave for concluding that justice and equity required 
disconnection is that "undeveloped land has historically been considered appropriate for 
disconnection " Although there are examples11 to justify such a statement, the lower 
court failed to consider why "undeveloped land has historically been considered for 
disconnection". Ordinarily, such property is "clearly unnecessary for Qty purposes." In re 
QxtfConsdidzted Mining Ca, 266 P. at 1047. Undeveloped land does not ordinarily require 
municipal services. Cf. Christensen, 243 P. at 376-77, Kennextt Copper Corp., 415 P.2d at 210-11, 
Hoimrd, 7 Utah 2d 281-284, 323 P.2d at 263-65. Qties are typically created to supply services 
to developed or developing areas ~ not to areas that will remain agricultural or undeveloped. 
The case at bar, however, involves undeveloped property necessary for Bluff dale's growth 
that will be intensely developed and will require comprehensive municipal services. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
A The Finding That The Disconnection Is Viable Is Clearly Erroneous 
Two undisputed facts show the disconnection isn't viable in Herriman. First, it will 
11
 SeeHoimrdv Toimcf North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 (1955) (referencing 
unplatted low or swampy land suitable for farming and industrial plant); In re Disconnection cf 
Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1983) (analyzing vacant and unimproved lands 
except for lights, a pond and picnic areaj; Kenneoott Copper Corp. v City cf Bingham Canyon, 18 
Utah 2d 60, 62, 415 P.2d 209, 211 (1966) (stating "no inhabitants and no reasonable 
prospect of any... in the future"); Christensen v Toun cf Clearfield, 66 Utah 455, 243 P. 376 
(1926) (discussing wholly agricultural land). 
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cost almost $55 million more for Herriman to service it then the developed disconnection 
area will generate in revenues. Ex.130. Second, Herriman cannot presently provide 
municipal services without unlawfully using one-time development fees. Exs. D & E. 
B. The Finding That the City's Cost for Providing Municipal Services Would Not 
Increase Was Clearly Erroneous 
The Two Developers' witnesses offered their opinions that the disconnection would 
not increase the costs of providing municipal services in Bluff dale. See eg. & 1283 at 166-67 
& 173. Each of their opinions was premised on the false notion that the area will remain 
vacant and undeveloped. 
The Two Developers and their experts also testified that traffic will only slightly 
increase. But, the issue is not how much the traffic will increase on Bluff dale's roads. The 
issue is whether Bluff dale will be required to expend more to make additional improvements 
and/or furnish additional services. To this specific issue, the evidence is overwhelming that 
as a result of the disconnected, developable land, the costs to Bluffdale residents will 
substantially increase for several reasons. 
The first reason is drainage. South Farm's original 1999 general plan amendment 
application acknowledges that every drainage pattern runs though Bluffdale, Ex. 252 (Tab 
G), and that the projects "will use natural drainages". Id South Farm's own plans show that 
its drainage will occur though Bluffdale. Id The water infrastructure, Ex. BS, and storm 
drain facilities, Ex. I, would have to be constructed in Bluffdale. 
The second reason is transportation. South Farm's application also shows that it will 
need 14400 South to be extended within Bluffdale from 3600 West to its proposed 
development. South Farm's development alone will generate 51,184 daily external road trips 
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Exs. 50 & BW. Specifically the maps therein show the roads that would have needed to 
have been improved within the Gty 15000 South, 14400 South, 13400 South, and 3600 
West. 
The parties jointly determined what the costs would be for the developments impacts 
on Bluff dale when they prepared the Consent Decree. Exs. 123 &F, divides these costs into 
two types, £e, project costs and system costs. The transportation and drainage plan show 
that the cost simply to improve 3600 West from 13800 South to 14400 South in Phase 1 will 
be $1,431,920. The construction of an off site detention facility will cost the City an 
additional $1,000,000. R 1283 at 165 &Ex. 123 (Tab 6F). The Redwood Road connection 
within Bluff dale will cost the City another $1.4 million. Id The road costs alone total over 
$2.8 million, but according to Bluffdale's recent budget documents (Ex. G), Bluffdale 
currently expends $206,319.00 annually for road improvements. Consequently, it is beyond 
reason to suggest that disconnection and development of the area will not substantially 
increase the cost to Bluffdale residents for municipal services. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court plainly lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the Disconnection 
Decree circumvents Utah referendum constitutional provisions and statutes. It also 
circumvents the Utah Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 10-9a-J01 to - 803. Lastly, the disconnection case at bar is not anything like 
the municipal disconnections authorized by the statute. Peninsulas and islands are created; a 
common municipal boundary is changed; and the area at issue is being developed and 
requires municipal services. Development in Herriman plainly is not viable. For these 
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compelling reasons, the lower court's Disconnection Decree should be set aside and 
reversed. 
DATED this Hi day of August, 2006. 
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Douglas J. Parry 
ToddD.Weiler 
Craig & Kleinman 
Attorneys for Appellant Bluff dale City 
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Addendum "A" 
(Constitutional Provision and Statutes) 
United States Constitution 
Amendment XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians 
not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President 
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and 
judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis 
of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such 
state. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or 
under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an 
officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or 
judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have 
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including 
debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection 
or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall 
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, 
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article VI, Section 1. [Power vested in Senate, House, and People.] 
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in: 
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of 
the State of Utah; and 
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) (a) (i) The legal voters of the State of Utah, in the numbers, under the conditions, 
in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for 
adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; 
or 
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a two-
thirds vote of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the 
voters of the State, as provided by statute, before the law may take effect. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, limit, or 
prohibit the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking wildlife shall be 
adopted upon approval of two-thirds of those voting. 
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the conditions, 
in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people of the 
county, city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, 
as provided by statute; or 
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, city, or 
town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before the law or 
ordinance may take effect. 
10-1-104. Definitions. 
As used in this title: 
(1) "City" means a municipality that is classified by population as a city of the first class, a city of the 
second class, a city of the third class, a city of the fourth class, or a city of the fifth class, under Section 
10-2-301. 
(2) "Contiguous" means: 
(a) if used to described an area, continuous, uninterrupted, and without an island of territory not 
included as part of the area; and 
(b) if used to describe an area's relationship to another area, sharing a common boundary. 
(3) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the executive of any municipality. 
Unless otherwise provided: 
(a) in a city of the first or second class, the governing body is the city commission; 
(b) in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class, the governing body is the city council; and 
(c) in a town, the governing body is the town council. 
(4) "Municipal" means of or relating to a municipality. 
(5) "Municipality" means a city of the first class, city of the second class, city of the third class, city 
of the fourth class, city of the fifth class, or a town, as classified in Section 10-2-301. 
(6) "Peninsula," when used to describe an unincorporated area, means an area surrounded on more 
than 1/2 of its boundary distance, but not completely, by incorporated territory and situated so that the 
length of a line drawn across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an incorporated area 
on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area. 
(7) "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, organization, association, trust, 
governmental agency, or any other legal entity. 
(8) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of the state of Utah and ordinances, rules, and 
regulations properly adopted by any municipality unless the construction is clearly contrary to the intent 
of state law. 
(9) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, includes and applies to a town clerk. 
(10) "Town" means a municipality classified by population as a town under Section 10-2-301. 
(11) "Unincorporated" means not within a municipality. 
Amended by Chapter 292, 2003 General Session 
10-2-401. Definitions — Property owner provisions. 
(1) As used in this part: 
(a) "Affected entity" means: 
(i) a county in whose unincorporated area the area proposed for annexation is located; 
(ii) an independent special district under Title 17A, Chapter 2, Independent Special 
Districts, whose boundaries include any part of an area proposed for annexation; 
(iii) a school district whose boundaries include any part of an area proposed for 
annexation; and 
(iv) a municipality whose boundaries are within 1/2 mile of an area proposed for 
annexation. 
(b) "Annexation petition" means a petition under Section 10-2-403 proposing the 
annexation to a municipality of a contiguous, unincorporated area that is contiguous to 
the municipality. 
(c) "Commission" means a boundary commission established under Section 10-2-409 
for the county in which the property that is proposed for annexation is located. 
(d) "Expansion area" means the unincorporated area that is identified in an annexation 
policy plan under Section 10-2-401.5 as the area that the municipality anticipates 
annexing in the future. 
(e) "Feasibility consultant" means a person or firm with expertise in the processes and 
economics of local government. 
(f) "Municipal selection committee" means a committee in each county composed of 
the mayor of each municipality within that county. 
(g) "Private," with respect to real property, means not owned by the United States or 
any agency of the federal government, the state, a county, a municipality, a school 
district, a special district under Title 17A, Special Districts, or any other political 
subdivision or governmental entity of the state. 
(h) "Specified county" means a county of the second, third, fourth, fifth, or sixth class. 
(i) "Urban development" means: 
(i) a housing development with more than 15 residential units and an average density 
greater than one residential unit per acre; or 
(ii) a commercial or industrial development for which cost projections exceed 
$750,000 for all phases. 
(2) For purposes of this part: 
(a) the owner of real property shall be the record title owner according to the records 
of the county recorder on the date of the filing of the petition or protest; and 
(b) the value of private real property shall be determined according to the last 
assessment roll for county taxes before the filing of the petition or protest. 
(3) For purposes of each provision of this part that requires the owners of private real 
property covering a percentage or majority of the total private land area within an area to 
sign a petition or protest: 
(a) a parcel of real property may not be included in the calculation of the required 
percentage or majority unless the petition or protest is signed by: 
(i) except as provided in Subsection (3)(a)(ii), owners representing a majority 
ownership interest in that parcel; or 
(ii) if the parcel is owned by joint tenants or tenants by the entirety, 50% of the 
number of 
owners of that parcel; 
(b) the signature of a person signing a petition or protest in a representative capacity 
on behalf of an owner is invalid unless: 
(i) the person's representative capacity and the name of the owner the person 
represents are indicated on the petition or protest with the person's signature; and 
(ii) the person provides documentation accompanying the petition or protest that 
substantiates the person's representative capacity; and 
(c) subject to Subsection (3)(b), a duly appointed personal representative may sign a 
petition or protest on behalf of a deceased owner. 
Amended by Chapter 206, 2001 General Session 
10-2-402. Annexation — Limitations. 
(1) (a) A contiguous, unincorporated area that is contiguous to a municipality may be 
annexed to the municipality as provided in this part. 
(b) An unincorporated area may not be annexed to a municipality unless: 
(i) it is a contiguous area; 
(ii) it is contiguous to the municipality; 
(iii) except as provided in Subsection 10-2-418(1 )(b), annexation will not leave or 
create an unincorporated island or peninsula; and 
(iv) for an area located in a specified county with respect to an annexation that occurs 
after December 31, 2002, the area is within the proposed annexing municipality's 
expansion area. 
(2) Except as provided in Section 10-2-418, a municipality may not annex an 
unincorporated area unless a petition under Section 10-2-403 is filed requesting 
annexation. 
(3) An annexation under this part may not include part of a parcel of real property and 
exclude part of that same parcel unless the owner of that parcel has signed the annexation 
petition under Section 10-2-403. 
(4) A municipality may not annex an unincorporated area in a specified county for the 
sole purpose of acquiring municipal revenue or to retard the capacity of another 
municipality to annex the same or a related area unless the municipality has the ability 
and intent to benefit the annexed area by providing municipal services to the annexed 
area. 
(5) The legislative body of a specified county may not approve urban development 
within a municipality's expansion area unless: 
(a) the county notifies the municipality of the proposed development; and 
(b) (i) the municipality consents in writing to the development; or 
(ii) (A) within 90 days after the county's notification of the proposed development, the 
municipality submits to the county a written objection to the county's approval of the 
proposed development; and 
(B) the county responds in writing to the municipality's objections. 
(6) (a) An annexation petition may not be filed under this part proposing the 
annexation of an area located in a county that is not the county in which the proposed 
annexing municipality is located unless the legislative body of the county in which the 
area is located has adopted a resolution approving the proposed annexation. 
(b) Each county legislative body that declines to adopt a resolution approving a 
proposed annexation described in Subsection (6)(a) shall provide a written explanation of 
its reasons for declining to approve the proposed annexation. 
Amended by Chapter 294, 2003 General Session 
10-2-409. Boundary commission - Creation - Members. 
(1) The legislative body of each county: 
(a) may create a boundary commission on its own initiative at any time; and 
(b) shall create a boundary commission within 30 days of the filing of a protest under 
Section 10-2-407. 
(2) Each commission shall be composed of: 
(a) in a county with two or more municipalities: 
(i) two members who are elected county officers, appointed by: 
(A) (I) in a county of the first class operating under a form of government in which the 
executive and legislative functions are separated, the county executive with the advice 
and consent of the county legislative body; or 
(II) in a county of the first class operating under a form of government in which the 
executive and legislative functions of the governing body are not separated, the county 
legislative body; or 
(B) in a specified county, the county legislative body; 
(ii) two members who are elected municipal officers from separate municipalities 
within the county, appointed by the municipal selection committee; and 
(iii) three members who are residents of the county, none of whom is a county or 
municipal officer, appointed by the four other members of the boundary commission; and 
(b) in a county with only one municipality: 
(i) two members who are county elected officers, appointed by the county legislative 
body; 
(ii) one member who is a municipal officer, appointed by the governing body of the 
municipality; and 
(iii) two members who are residents of the county, neither of whom is a county or 
municipal officer, appointed by the other three members of the boundary commission. 
(3) At the expiration of the term of each member appointed under this section, the 
member's successor shall be appointed by the same body that appointed the member 
whose term is expiring, as provided in this section. 
Amended by Chapter 206, 2001 General Session 
10-2-418. Annexation of an island or peninsula without a petition — Notice — 
Hearing. 
(1) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection 10-2-402(2), a municipality may annex an 
unincorporated area under this section without an annexation petition if: 
(i) (A) the area to be annexed consists of one or more unincorporated islands within or 
unincorporated peninsulas contiguous to the municipality; 
(B) the majority of each island or peninsula consists of residential or commercial 
development; 
(C) the area proposed for annexation requires the delivery of municipal-type services; 
and 
(D) the municipality has provided most or all of the municipal-type services to the 
area for more than one year; or 
(ii) (A) the area to be annexed consists of one or more unincorporated islands within 
the municipality, each of which has fewer than 500 residents; and 
(B) the municipality has provided one or more municipal-type services to the area for 
at least one year. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection 10-2-402(1 )(b)(iii), a municipality may annex a 
portion of an island or peninsula under this section, leaving unincorporated the remainder 
of the unincorporated island or peninsula, if: 
(i) in adopting the resolution under Subsection (2)(a)(i), the municipal legislative body 
determines that not annexing the entire unincorporated island or peninsula is in the 
municipality's best interest; and 
(ii) for an annexation of one or more unincorporated islands under Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii), the entire island of unincorporated area, of which a portion is being annexed, 
complies with the requirement of Subsection (l)(a)(ii)(A) relating to the number of 
residents. 
(2) (a) The legislative body of each municipality intending to annex an area under this 
section shall: 
(i) adopt a resolution indicating the municipal legislative body's intent to annex the 
area, describing the area proposed to be annexed; 
(ii) (A) publish notice at least once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper 
of general circulation within the municipality and the area proposed for annexation; or 
(B) if there is no newspaper of general circulation in the areas described in Subsection 
(2)(a)(ii)(A), post at least one notice per 1,000 population in places within those areas 
that are most likely to give notice to the residents of those areas; 
(iii) send written notice to the board of each special district whose boundaries contain 
some or all of the area proposed for annexation and to the legislative body of the county 
in which the area proposed for annexation is located; and 
(iv) hold a public hearing on the proposed annexation no earlier than 60 days after the 
adoption of the resolution under Subsection (2)(a)(i). 
(b) Each notice under Subsections (2)(a)(ii) and (iii) shall: 
(i) state that the municipal legislative body has adopted a resolution indicating its 
intent to annex the area proposed for annexation; 
(ii) state the date, time, and place of the public hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(iv); 
(iii) describe the area proposed for annexation; and 
(iv) state in conspicuous and plain terms that the municipal legislative body will annex 
the area unless, at or before the public hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(iv), written 
protests to the annexation are filed by the owners of private real property that: 
(A) is located within the area proposed for annexation; 
(B) covers a majority of the total private land area within the entire area proposed for 
annexation; and 
(C) is equal in value to at least 1/2 the value of all private real property within the 
entire area proposed for annexation. 
(c) The first publication of the notice required under Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) shall be 
within 14 days of the municipal legislative body's adoption of a resolution under 
Subsection (2)(a)(i). 
(3) (a) Upon conclusion of the public hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(iv) and subject 
to Subsection (3)(b), the municipal legislative body may adopt an ordinance annexing the 
area proposed for annexation under this section unless, at or before the hearing, written 
protests to the annexation have been filed with the city recorder or town clerk, as the case 
may be, by the owners of private real property that: 
(i) is located within the area proposed for annexation; 
(ii) covers: 
(A) for a proposed annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(i), a majority of the total 
private land area within the entire area proposed for annexation; or 
(B) for a proposed annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), 10% of the total private 
land area within the island of unincorporated area that is proposed for annexation; and 
(iii) is equal in value to at least: 
(A) for a proposed annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(i), 1/2 the value of all private 
real property within the entire area proposed for annexation; or 
(B) for a proposed annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), 10% of the value of all 
private real property within the island of unincorporated area that is proposed for 
annexation. 
(b) A municipal legislative body may not adopt an ordinance annexing an area 
proposed for annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(ii) unless the legislative body of the 
county in which the area proposed for annexation has previously adopted a resolution 
approving the annexation. 
(4) (a) If protests are timely filed that comply with Subsection (3), the municipal 
legislative body may not adopt an ordinance annexing the area proposed for annexation, 
and the annexation proceedings under this section shall be considered terminated. 
(b) Subsection (4)(a) may not be construed to prohibit the municipal legislative body 
from excluding from a proposed annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(ii) the property 
within an unincorporated island regarding which protests have been filed and proceeding 
under Subsection (l)(b) to annex some or all of the remaining portion of the 
unincorporated island. 
Amended by Chapter 227, 2003 General Session 
10-2-419. Boundary adjustment - Notice and hearing — Protest. 
(1) The legislative bodies of two or more municipalities having common boundaries may adjust their 
common boundaries as provided in this section. 
(2) (a) The legislative body of each municipality intending to adjust a boundary that is common with 
another municipality shall: 
(i) adopt a resolution indicating the intent of the municipal legislative body to adjust a common 
boundary; 
(ii) hold a public hearing on the proposed adjustment no less than 60 days after the adoption of the 
resolution under Subsection (2)(a)(i); and 
(iii) (A) publish notice at least once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general 
circulation within the municipality; or 
(B) if there is no newspaper of general circulation within the municipality, post at least one notice per 
1,000 population in places within the municipality that are most likely to give notice to residents of the 
municipality. 
(b) The notice required under Subsection (2)(a)(iii) shall: 
(i) state that the municipal legislative body has adopted a resolution indicating the municipal 
legislative body's intent to adjust a boundary that the municipality has in common with another 
municipality; 
(ii) describe the area proposed to be adjusted; 
(iii) state the date, time, and place of the public hearing required under Subsection (2)(a)(ii); 
(iv) state in conspicuous and plain terms that the municipal legislative body will adjust the 
boundaries unless, at or before the public hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(ii), written protests to the 
adjustment are filed by the owners of private real property that: 
(A) is located within the area proposed for adjustment; 
(B) covers at least 25% of the total private land area within the area proposed for adjustment; and 
(C) is equal in value to at least 15% of the value of all private real property within the area proposed 
for adjustment; and 
(v) state that the area that is the subject of the boundary adjustment will, because of the boundary 
adjustment, be automatically annexed to a local district providing fire protection, paramedic, and 
emergency services, as provided in Section 17B-2-515.5, if: 
(A) the municipality to which the area is being added because of the boundary adjustment is entirely 
within the boundaries of a local district: 
(I) that provides fire protection, paramedic, and emergency services; and 
(II) in the creation of which an election was not required because of Subsection 17B-2-214(3)(c); and 
(B) the municipality from which the area is being taken because of the boundary adjustment is not 
within the boundaries of the local district; and 
(vi) state that the area proposed for annexation to the municipality will be automatically withdrawn 
from a local district providing fire protection, paramedic, and emergency services, as provided in 
Subsection 17B-2-601(2), if: 
(A) the municipality to which the area is being added because of the boundary adjustment is not 
within the boundaries of a local district: 
(I) that provides fire protection, paramedic, and emergency services; and 
(II) in the creation of which an election was not required because of Subsection 17B-2-214(3)(c); and 
(B) the municipality from which the area is being taken because of the boundary adjustment is 
entirely within the boundaries of the local district. 
(c) The first publication of the notice required under Subsection (2)(a)(iii)(A) shall be within 14 days 
of the municipal legislative body's adoption of a resolution under Subsection (2)(a)(i). 
(3) Upon conclusion of the public hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(ii), the municipal legislative body 
may adopt an ordinance adjusting the common boundary unless, at or before the hearing under 
Subsection (2)(a)(ii), written protests to the adjustment have been filed with the city recorder or town 
clerk, as the case may be, by the owners of private real property that: 
(a) is located within the area proposed for adjustment; 
(b) covers at least 25% of the total private land area within the area proposed for adjustment; and 
(c) is equal in value to at least 15% of the value of all private real property within the area proposed 
for adjustment. 
(4) The municipal legislative body shall comply with the requirements of Section 10-2-425 as if the 
boundary change were an annexation. 
(5) An ordinance adopted under Subsection (3) becomes effective when each municipality involved 
in the boundary adjustment has adopted an ordinance under Subsection (3) and as determined under 
Subsection 10-2-425(5) if the boundary change were an annexation. 
Amended by Chapter 233. 2005 General Session 
10-2-501. Municipal disconnection — Definitions — Request for disconnection — Requirements 
upon filing request. 
(1) As used in this part "petitioners" means persons who: 
(a) own title to real property within the area proposed for disconnection; and 
(b) have signed a request for disconnection proposing to disconnect that area from the municipality. 
(2) (a) Petitioners proposing to disconnect an area within and lying on the borders of a municipality 
shall file with that municipality's legislative body a request for disconnection. 
(b) Each request for disconnection shall: 
(i) contain the names, addresses, and signatures of the owners of more than 50% of the real property 
in the area proposed for disconnection; 
(ii) give the reasons for the proposed disconnection; 
(iii) include a map or plat of the territory proposed for disconnection; and 
(iv) designate between one and five persons with authority to act on the petitioners' behalf in the 
proceedings. 
(3) Upon filing the request for disconnection, petitioners shall: 
(a) cause notice of the request to be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a 
newspaper of general circulation within the municipality; 
(b) cause notice of the request to be mailed to each owner of real property located within the area 
proposed to be disconnected; and 
(c) deliver a copy of the request to the legislative body of the county in which the area proposed for 
disconnection is located. 
Amended by Chapter 279. 2003 General Session 
10-2-502.5. Hearing on request for disconnection - Determination by municipal legislative 
body -- Petition in district court. 
(1) Within 30 calendar days after the last publication of notice required under Subsection 10-2-501(3) 
(a), the legislative body of the municipality in which the area proposed for disconnection is located shall 
hold a public hearing. 
(2) At least seven calendar days before the hearing date, the municipal legislative body shall provide 
notice of the public hearing: 
(a) in writing to the petitioners and to the legislative body of the county in which the area proposed 
for disconnection is located; and 
(b) by publishing a notice in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality or, if there is 
none, then by posting notice of the hearing in at least three public places within the municipality. 
(3) In the public hearing, any person may speak and submit documents regarding the disconnection 
proposal. 
(4) Within 45 calendar days of the hearing, the municipal legislative body shall: 
(a) determine whether to grant the request for disconnection; and 
(b) if the municipality determines to grant the request, adopt an ordinance approving disconnection of 
the area from the municipality. 
(5) (a) A petition against the municipality challenging the municipal legislative body's determination 
under Subsection (4) may be filed in district court by: 
(i) petitioners; or 
(ii) the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located. 
(b) Each petition under Subsection (5)(a) shall include a copy of the request for disconnection. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 279, 2003 General Session 
10-2-502.7. Court action. 
(1) After the filing of a petition under Section 10-2-502.5 and a response to the petition, the court 
shall, upon request of a party or upon its own motion, conduct a court hearing. 
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence regarding the viability of the disconnection proposal. 
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(a) the viability of the disconnection; 
(b) that justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality; 
(c) that the proposed disconnection will not: 
(i) leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other 
burdens of providing municipal services would materially increase over previous years; 
(ii) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function as a 
municipality; or 
(iii) leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory; and 
(d) that the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in a cost-
effective manner and without materially increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of 
providing to the area the services that the municipality will no longer provide to the area due to the 
disconnection. 
(4) In determining whether petitioners have met their burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3) 
(c)(i) and (ii), the court shall consider all relevant factors, including the effect of the proposed 
disconnection on: 
(a) the municipality or community as a whole; 
(b) adjoining property owners; 
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways; 
(d) water mains and water services; 
(e) sewer mains and sewer services; 
(f) law enforcement; 
(g) zoning; and 
(h) other municipal services. 
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be in writing with findings and 
reasons. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 279, 2003 General Session 
10-2-510. Boundary adjustment procedure not affected. 
This part shall not be construed to abrogate, modify, or replace the boundary adjustment procedure 
provided in Section 10-2-419. 
Amended by Chapter 389, 1997 General Session 
MUNICIPAL LAND USE 
10-9-1001 
PART 9 
SOLAR ENERGY ACCESS 
10-9-901. Restrictions for solar and other energy devices. 
(1) The legislative body, in order to protect and ensure access to sunhVht flJ 
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History: C. 1953, 10-9-901, enacted by L 
1991, ch. 235, § 52. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Treatises. — Thomas and Backman, Utah 
Real Property Law (LexisNexis 1999) § 
11 n c / . \ '> s .05(a). 
PART 10 
APPEALS AND ENFORCEMENT 
10-9-1001. Appeals. 
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(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the 
specific constitutional taking issues that are the subject of the request 
for arbitration filed with the private property ombudsman by a 
property owner. 
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the private property om-
budsman after the time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has 
expired does not affect the time to file a petition. 
(3) The courts shall: 
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and 
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-1001, enacted by L. ment, effective May 3, 1999, added Subsection 
1991, ch. 235, § 53; 1992, ch. 30, § 13; 1999, (2)(b) and the Subsection (2)(a) designation. 
ch. 291, § 3; 2003, ch. 124, § 3. The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- added "or in violation of" in Subsection (2)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Attorney fees. 
Burden of proof. 
Construction and application. 
Limits of discretion. 
Prerequisites for relief. 
Public comments. 
Standard of review. 
Attorney fees. 
It was not bad faith, under § 78-27-56(1), for 
town residents to seek judicial review after 
having failed in their administrative challenge 
to a zoning ordinance; thus, an award of attor-
ney fees on this basis was improper. Hatch v. 
Boulder Town Council, 2001 UT App 55, 21 P.3d 
245. 
Burden of proof. 
Party appealing a denial of a rezoning re-
quest must show that the decision not to 
change the zoning classification of the property 
was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Therefore, 
plaintiff who failed to show that the existing 
zoning of property for residential use could not 
promote the general welfare did not prevail, in 
spite of plaintiff's evidence that the proposed 
rezoning was also reasonable. Harmon City, 
Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31, 997 P.2d 
321. 
Construction and application. 
Subsection (3), which largely codified the 
relevant case law when it was enacted, did not 
alter the deferential review of a municipality's 
legislative zoning classification decisions under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard. Harmon 
City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31, 997 
P.2d 321. 
Limits of discretion. 
The district court's use of the substantial 
compliance doctrine in the face of city ordi-
nances that were expressly mandatory was 
erroneous, since the city could not exercise 
discretion when it had itself legislatively re-
moved any such discretion. Springville Citizens 
for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 
1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332. 
Prerequisites for relief. 
In action alleging that a city's noncompliance 
with its ordinances makes its land use decision 
illegal, plaintiffs must also establish prejudice 
and what relief, if any, they are entitled to as a 
result of the illegal decision. Springville Citi-
zens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332. 
In an action arising from dissension over a 
city's land use decisions, because the landown-
ers had failed to pursue their administrative 
remedies by appealing to the development com-
mission and the city council before filing their 
complaint, as required by this section, dismis-
sal was proper. Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 
UT 7, 469 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 67 P3d 466. 
Public comments . 
City's consideration of public comments as a 
justification for its zoning decision reflected a 
reasonable judgment that properly took into 
account citizens' concerns. Bradley v. Payson 
City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 
70 P.3d 47. 
Standard of review. 
Undisputed facts demonstrating that munici-
pality's land use decision was the result of 
careful consideration and that it was supported 
by substantial evidence precluded a finding 
that the the city's decision was arbitrary and 
capricious. Springville Citizens for a Better 
Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 
979 P.2d 332. 
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The Legislature uses "arbitrary and capri- fore, the district court was correct in using the 
cious" to define both review of adjudicative "reasonably debatable" standard in reviewing 
actions by a board of adjustments under § 10- the city council's refusal to rezone plaintiff's 
9-708 and review of legislative actions of a property. Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 
municipality under this section, but the Legis- UT App 31, 997 P2d 321; Bradley v. Payson 
lature has provided for judicial review under City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 
the substantial evidence standard only for ad- 70 P. 3d 47. 
judicative functions under § 10-9-708. Harmon Appellate review of a municipality's land use 
City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31, 997
 d e c i s i 0 n is limited to determining whether the 
?S i V *• 1 a 11 11 ,1 „ , decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
The deferential reasonably debatable stan-
 R a l h L W a d s w o r t h C o n s t r > ) I n c v W e s t J o r . 
dard of review applies to a municipality s legis-
 d a n C i t 2 0 0 0 ^ A 4 9 > 9 9 9 R 2 d m o 
lative action such as a zoning decision; there-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments Am. Jur. 2d. — 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and 
in Utah Law, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 841 (2000). Planning § 915 et seq. 
Treatises. — Thomas and Backman, Utah C.J.S. — 101AC.J.S. Zoning and Land Plan-
Real Property Law (LexisNexis 1999), §
 n m g § 265 et seq. 
10.02(n). 
10-9-1002. Enforcement. 
(1) (a) A municipality or any owner of real estate within the municipality in 
which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority 
of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other 
remedies provided by law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate 
actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful 
building, use, or act. 
(b) A municipality need only establish the violation to obtain the 
injunction. 
(2) (a) The municipality may enforce the ordinance by withholding building 
permits. 
(b) It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, or change the 
use of any building or other structure within a municipality without 
approval of a building permit. 
(c) The municipality may not issue a building permit unless the plans of 
and for the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, or 
use fully conform to all regulations then in effect. 
History: C. 1953,10-9-1002, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 235, § 54. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Treatises. — Thomas and Backman, Utah A.L.R. — Laches as defense in suit by gov-
Real Property Law (LexisNexis 1999), § ernmental entity to enjoin zoning violation, 73 
4.02(b)(2)(ii)(B)(II); § 10.02(j). A.L.R.4th 870. 
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10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted — Time for filing -
- Tolling of time — Standards governing court review -- Record on review — Staying of decision. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision made under this 
chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that person has exhausted the 
person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances, if applicable. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in violation of the 
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court within 30 
days after the local land use decision is final. 
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a property owner files 
a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with the property rights ombudsman under 
Section 63-34-13 until 30 days after: 
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or 
(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a written statement under Subsection 63-34-13(4)(b) 
declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator. 
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific constitutional taking issue 
that is the subject of the request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman by a property 
owner. 
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the properly rights ombudsman after the time under 
Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has expired does not affect the time to file a petition. 
(3) (a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this chapter is valid; 
and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal. 
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion is valid if the 
decision, ordinance, or regulation is reasonably debatable and not illegal. 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is supported 
by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, ordinance, or regulation 
violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made or the ordinance or 
regulation adopted. 
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the municipality takes final 
action on a land use application for any adversely affected third party, if the municipality conformed 
with the notice provisions of Part 2, Notice, or for any person who had actual notice of the pending 
decision. 
(5) If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge to the enactment of a land 
use ordinance or general plan may not be filed with the district court more than 30 days after the 
enactment. 
(6) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's decision is final. 
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the reviewing 
court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders, and, if available, a true and 
correct transcript of its proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true and correct 
transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7). 
(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record provided by the land 
use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the land use authority or 
appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the land use authority or appeal 
authority, respectively, and the court determines that it was improperly excluded. 
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence. 
(9) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the land use authority or authority appeal 
authority, as the case may be. 
(b) (i) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a 
constitutional taking issue under Section 63-34-13, the aggrieved party may petition the appeal authority 
to stay its decision. 
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authority may order its decision stayed pending 
district court review if the appeal authority finds it to be in the best interest of the municipality. 
(iii) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a 
constitutional taking issue is filed under Section 63-34-13, the petitioner may seek an injunction staying 
the appeal authority's decision. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 254, 2005 General Session 
20A-7-102. Initiatives and referenda authorized — Restrictions. 
By following the procedures and requirements of this chapter, Utah voters may, subject to the 
restrictions of Article VI, Sec. 1, Utah Constitution and this chapter: 
(1) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to: 
(a) the Legislature or to a vote of the people for approval or rejection if it is a proposed state law; or 
(b) a local legislative body or to a vote of the people if it is a local law; 
(2) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a two-thirds vote of the 
members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be referred to the voters for their approval or 
rejection before the law takes effect; and 
(3) require any law or ordinance passed by a local legislative body to be referred to the voters for 
their approval or rejection before the law takes effect. 
Amended by Chapter 272. 1994 General Session 
20A-7-601. Referenda — General signature requirements — Signature requirements for land 
use laws — Time requirements. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a person seeking to have a law passed by the local 
legislative body submitted to a vote of the people shall obtain legal signatures equal to: 
(a) 10% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes exceeds 25,000; 
(b) 12-1/2% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 25,000 but is more 
than 10,000; 
(c) 15%) of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 10,000 but is more 
than 2,500; 
(d) 20% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 2,500 but is more 
than 500; 
(e) 25%o of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 500 but is more 
than 250; and 
(f) 30%o of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last 
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 250. 
(2) (a) As used in this Subsection (2), "land use law" includes a land use development code, an 
annexation ordinance, and comprehensive zoning ordinances. 
(b) A person seeking to have a land use law passed by the local legislative body submitted to a vote 
of the people shall obtain legal signatures equal to: 
(i) in a county or in a city of the first or second class, 20%o of all votes cast in the county or city for all 
candidates for governor at the last election at which a governor was elected; and 
(ii) in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or a town, 35%o of all the votes cast in the city or town 
for all candidates for governor at the last election at which a governor was elected. 
(3) (a) Sponsors of any referendum petition challenging, under Subsection (1) or (2), any local law 
passed by a local legislative body shall file the petition within 45 days after the passage of the local law. 
(b) The local law remains in effect until repealed by the voters via referendum. 
(4) If the referendum passes, the local law that was challenged by the referendum is repealed as of the 
date of the election. 
Amended by Chapter 258, 2004 General Session 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court 
of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its 
jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court 
of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division 
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or this 
state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital 
felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the 
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a 
charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari for 
the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review 
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative 
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Amended by Chapter 302, 2001 General Session 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES, LC and 
SOUTH FARM, LLC 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal 
corporation, 
Respondent. 
PETITION FOR DISCONNECTION OF 
MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES 
Civil No QLj-^oq^^o 
judge ufmn *\ 
The Petitioners petition this Court and complain of Respondent as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Petitioner Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC, ("Bluffdale Homes")is a Utah limited 
liability company. 
2. Petitioner South Farm, LLC, ("South Farm") is a Utah limited liability company. 
3. Respondent Bluffdale City (the "City") is a Utah municipal corporation. 
JURISDICTION 
4. Jurisdiction of this Court over this Petition is conferred by § 10-2-502.5, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
5. Bluffdale Mountain and South Farm (collectively, the "Petitioners") are among a 
group of landowners (collectively, the "Landowners") who petitioned the City for a 
disconnection of their properties (the "Disconnection Properties") from the City and were denied 
that disconnection (the detailed history of which is explained below). 
6. The Disconnection Properties are presently undeveloped and uninhabited. 
7. There is no municipal infrastructure presently serving the Disconnection 
Properties. 
SOUTH FARM'S HISTORY WITH THE CITY 
8. South Farm acquired its property that is the subject of this Petition between 1980 
and 1985. 
9. South Farm has other property that it is developing as "Rosecrest" which is 
located in the City of Herriman ("Herriman") adjacent to portions of the Disconnection 
Properties. 
10. After approximately seven years of internal planning South Farm began to try to 
develop its Bluffdale property similarly to the development of Rosecrest in Herriman. 
11. Between 1993 and 2001 meetings regarding South Farm's proposed development 
were held with former Bluffdale Mayor Wanlass (4 times) and former Mayor Nelson (12 times). 
12. Other meetings over this time were held with Salt Lake County representatives, in 
? 
conjunction with the incorporation of Herriman, with representatives from the City present. 
13. On or about October of 2001 the City installed a water line on South Farm's 
property without obtaining a right-of-way. 
14. On January 8, 2002, as a part of the resolution of the illegal construction of the 
water line, the Bluffdale City Council adopted Resolution No. 2002-05 concerning the future 
development of South Farm's property and South Farm granted a right-of-way without cost to 
the City for the water line. 
15. Resolution No. 2002-05 stated, in relevant part: 
1. That the best use of the Rosecrest property in the City is to 
develop the Rosecrest property with a mixture of uses, density, 
commercial, recreational, transportation, and open space elements 
compatible with the Rosecrest real property in the Town of 
Herriman that is adjacent and contiguous to the Rosecrest property 
in the City of Bluffdale. 
* * * 
3. It is the best use of the property to develop the property with a 
mixture of uses including mixed residential properties, commercial 
properties, recreational properties, schools, churches, trails and 
open spaces consistent with a Master Development Agreement 
with Rosecrest. 
* * * 
5. That the City will work in a speedy and timely fashion to 
review the development applications of Rosecrest that are 
applicable to each phase and approve or deny each application in 
accordance with the relevant sections of the Bluffdale Municipal 
Code and Master Development Agreement to be mutually 
approved by the City and Rosecrest. 
* * * 
7. That the City will work with the applicable service districts to 
bring the necessary infrastructure to the property to ensure timely 
and orderly development of the property. 
(Emphasis added.) 
16. Four members of the present City Council voted for Resolution 2002-05. 
17. On May 6, 2002 South Farm filed with Bluffdale City an Application for a 
General Plan Amendment and Zone Change on 1,124 acres for 3,183 dwelling units. 
18. Six months passed with no action from the City on the Application. 
19. On November 12, 2002, over the objection of South Farm and without first acting 
on South Farm's Application, the Bluffdale City Council adopted a new General Plan for 
"Planning Area No. 4" (which includes almost all of the lands that are the subject of this 
Petition) materially changing the rules regarding the development of South Farm's property. 
20. Six more months passed with no action from Bluffdale on South Farm's 
Application. 
21. On April 22, 2003, South Farm provided $70,000.00 for the City to outsource its 
planning review of South Farm's Application due to staff shortages and budgetary restraints of 
the City. 
22. The City then hired consultants with South Farm's money to review South Farm's 
applications. 
23. On July 15, 2003, the consultant's recommendations were received by the City. 
24. Between receiving the consultant's recommendation on July 15 and October 7, 
2003, the City, ignoring both South Farm's Application and the recommendations of its own 
consultant, the City created and proposed its own plan amendments to Planning Area No. 4. 
25. On December 4, 2003, the City's retained outside consultants reported to the City 
that South Farm's Application met the intent of the General Plan for Planning Area No. 4. 
26. Despite that independent report, on December 9, 2003, more than 19 months after 
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they were filed, the City rejected South Farm's Application. 
27. From 2001 to early 2004 South Farm participated in approximately 23 meetings 
with the City's staff, 24 Planning Commission meetings and 25 City Council meetings. 
28. During this planning process South Farm submitted at least seven different 
alternative proposals in an effort to address the concerns of the City Council, the Planning 
Commission, City staff and citizens. 
29. During that period of time the City had three different City Planners and three 
different City Attorneys. 
30. From 1997 until early 2004 South Farm spent nearly $950,000.00 trying to obtain 
entitlements for the development of its property. 
31. To date, those efforts have produced no General Plan Amendment, no zone 
change, no development agreement, no preliminary plat, no final plat and, to put it simply, no 
development. 
OPTIONS OF THE OTHER LANDOWNERS 
32. Based on the prolonged, expensive and fruitless experiences of South Farm in 
dealing with the City, and their other unpleasant interfaces with the City, the other Landowners, 
including Bluffdale Homes, determined that it made no sense to try to obtain reasonable 
development rights for their properties from the City. 
33. During the process of the City's adoption of its General Plan effectively denying 
the other Landowners any reasonable development rights, the Landowners expressed their 
concerns about the unfair and improper treatment, but were ignored by the City. 
S 
FILING OF THE PETITIONS 
34. On February 12, 2004, the Landowners submitted petitions (the "Disconnection 
Petitions") to the City to disconnect the Disconnection Properties from the City. (A copy of an 
exemplar of the Disconnection Petitions is attached and incorporated as Exhibit "A".) 
COMPLIANCE WITH §10-2-501, U.C.A. 
35. As required by §10-2-50 l(2)(b)(i), U.C.A., the Disconnection Petitions contained 
the names, addresses, and signatures of the owners of more than 50% of the real property in the 
area proposed for disconnection. 
36. In fact, the Disconnection Petitions (including additional petitions that were filed 
later) represented 88% of the private property within the area proposed for disconnection. 
37. If property owned by an arm of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints is 
excluded for the calculations (as the LDS Church does not take positions on political issues such 
as this) the percentage is 91%. 
38. The other large remaining property that did not join in the Disconnection Petitions 
is controlled by the out-of-Utah Trust Department of a large bank. 
39. To date, no property owner within the area proposed for disconnection has 
opposed the disconnection. 
40. The Disconnection Petitions also requested the City to adjust the boundaries 
between the City and Herriman pursuant to §10-2-419, so that the Disconnection Properties 
would be transferred to be within the municipal boundaries of Herriman. 
41. The Disconnection Petitions also sought, pursuant to §10-2-403, to have the 
Disconnection Properties (and certain other properties including two existing islands of 
unincorporated property) annexed into Herriman after they were disconnected from the City. 
42. As required by §10-2-50l(2)(b)(ii), the Disconnection Petitions specified the 
reasons for the proposed disconnection: 
Our decision to disconnect our lands from Bluffdale did not 
come lightly and is a decision of last resort. After more than ten-
years of planning efforts, both formal and informal, spanning three 
mayoral administrations, and costing hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, Bluffdale has been unresponsive to the needs of the 
landowners in Planning Area Number Four. 
Bluffdale has not fulfilled its commitments to work with 
the landowners to approve a reasonable master plan for their lands. 
Bluffdale does not presently provide municipal services such as 
roads, sewer and water to these lands and has refused to prepare 
itself to provide such services to these lands. Bluffdale has not 
committed the staff or resources to respond to development 
applications in a competent and timely manner. Where Bluffdale 
has hired outside consultants, largely paid for by the landowners 
Bluffdale has ignored the reasoned and considered 
recommendations of the professionals they hired. 
In the spirit of utmost good-faith, we have worked hard for 
many years to react and respond to community concerns and 
comments regarding the design and development of these lands. 
We have encouraged Bluffdale to participate and to work together 
with landowners to build a stronger community. These efforts 
have reached the point of exhaustion. Bluffdale's rejection of the 
development of these lands is a loud and clear message that 
Bluffdale will not serve these lands. While we appreciate those at 
Bluffdale who have attempted to work with us, it is time for us to 
remove these lands from the municipal boundaries of Bluffdale. 
43. As required by §10-2-50 l(2)(b)(iii), the Disconnection Petitions provided a map 
or plat of the territory proposed for disconnection. 
44. As required by § 10-2-501 (2)(b)(iv), the Disconnection Petitions designated three 
representatives to act on behalf of the petitioners. 
45. Pursuant to §10-2-50 l(3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection 
Petitions to be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general 
circulation within the municipality. (A copy of the Proof of Publication is attached and 
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incorporated by reference as Exhibit "B".) 
46. Pursuant to §10-2-50 l(3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection 
Petitions to be mailed to each owner of real property located within the area proposed to be 
disconnected. (A copy of the Affidavit of Hollis S. Hunt attesting to the mailing attached and 
incorporated by reference as Exhibit "C".) 
47. Pursuant to §10-2-50 l(3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection 
Petitions to be delivered to the Salt Lake County Council, the legislative body of the county in 
which the area proposed for disconnection is located. (A copy of the Affidavit of Hollis S. Hunt 
attesting to the delivery is attached and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "D".) 
48. The City has acknowledged that the Landowners have complied with the 
requirements of § 10-2-501. 
COMPLIANCE WITH §10-2-502.7, U.C.A. 
49. Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(3)(a) the Petitioners have the burden of proving the 
viability of the disconnection. 
50. The disconnection is viable. 
5L The City has never disputed the viability of the disconnection. 
52. To establish this viability the Petitioners engaged the services of Wikstrom 
Economic and Planning Consultants and also did other analyses of the viability of the 
disconnection using resources of Bluffdale Homes and South Farm. 
53. The Petitioners provided the detailed analysis of the disconnection viability to the 
City. 
54. The City has never disputed any part of the viability analysis. 
55. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(b) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that 
justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality. 
56. It is just and equitable that the Court should respect and honor the wishes of 
virtually all of the landowners in the area proposed for disconnection when the City has treated 
the area so unfairly, neither provided nor even planned for the provision of public infrastructure 
or services and unreasonably prevented development of the Disconnection Properties. 
57. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(i) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that 
the proposed disconnection will not leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for 
which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal services would materially 
increase over previous years. 
58. As the Disconnection Properties are completely unserviced by the City and are 
located on the periphery of the City the disconnection will not leave the municipality with an 
area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing 
municipal services would materially increase over previous years. 
59. Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(3)(c)(ii) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that 
the disconnection will not make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to 
continue to function as a municipality. 
60. The Disconnection Properties provide the City each year with only approximately 
$1,750.00 (not a typo) in property taxes which, out of a total General Fund budget of the City of 
2,021,000.00, is less than one-tenth of one percent (0.1 %) of the budgeted revenues. 
61. The preservation of, literally, 99.9 percent of the City's budget would not work 
any hardship on the City. 
n 
62. Further, as the City has installed absolutely no infrastructure on the Disconnection 
Properties there can be no adverse impact on such infrastructure. 
63. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that 
the disconnection will not leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated 
territory. 
64. The disconnection would not leave or create any islands or peninsulas of 
unincorporated territory. 
65. The proposed disconnection will actually cure the existence of two current islands 
and one possible peninsula within the boundaries of the City. 
66. The Disconnection Properties are contiguous with an area that is presently 
unincorporated. 
67. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(d) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that the 
county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in a cost-effective 
manner and without materially increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of 
providing to the area the services that the municipality will no longer provide to the area due to 
the disconnection. 
68. Salt Lake County is capable, in a cost-effective manner and without materially 
increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of providing to the area the 
services that the municipality will no longer provide to the area due to the disconnection. 
69. In the present undeveloped and uninhabited condition of the Disconnection 
Properties there are essentially no municipal services provided and none are required and thus no 
costs are involved. 
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70. The Landowners have also petitioned Herriman to annex the Disconnection 
Properties. 
71. Pursuant to §10-2-405, Herriman will have to annex the Disconnection Properties. 
72. Any costs for servicing the Disconnection Properties during the process of 
development and afterwards will not fall on Salt Lake County but will, instead, be the 
responsibility of Herriman. 
73. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(a), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider all relevant 
factors, including the effect of the proposed disconnection on the municipality or community as a 
whole. 
74. The disconnection will have no adverse impacts on the City as a whole. 
75. The Disconnection Properties are physically distinct from the remaining portions 
of the City and, for the most part, separated by a distinct and significant physical boundary. 
76. Disconnection would actually help preserve the characteristics of the remaining 
area of the City by allowing the remaining areas to be developed with a different zoning and 
density pattern than is appropriate for the Disconnection Properties. 
77. Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(4)(b), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on adjoining property owners. 
78. The disconnection would have no adverse impacts on adjoining property owners. 
79. On the south of the Disconnection Properties is Camp Williams (a Federal 
military base) which would not be affected at all. 
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80. To the west of Disconnection Properties, in Herriman, is a development planned 
for a density and configuration similar to what has been proposed for the Disconnection 
Properties. 
81. On the northeastern angular side of the Disconnection Properties the adjoining 
properties are almost completely separated from the Disconnection Properties by a physical 
boundary, the Welby-Jacobs Canal over which there are no bridges, roadways or pedestrian 
access between the Disconnection Properties and the remainder of the City. 
82. Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(4)(c), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on existing or projected streets or public ways. 
83. There are no existing or projected public streets in the Disconnection Properties 
except for the proposed Mountain View Corridor (formerly known as the Legacy Highway) 
which would not be negatively impacted by the proposed disconnection. 
84. Even if the City has some plans for public streets inside the Disconnection 
Properties there is no reason to believe that such streets would be negatively impacted by the 
proposed disconnection. 
85. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(d), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on water mains and water services. 
86. There are no existing water mains or water services to the Disconnection 
Properties and thus the disconnection will have no impact. 
87. Disconnection would actually facilitate delivery of water services since there are 
adjacent services provided by Herriman. 
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88. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(e), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on sewer mains and sewer services. 
89. There are no existing sewer mains in or sewer services provided to the 
Disconnection Properties. 
90. Sewer services to the Disconnected Properties will be provided by the South 
Valley Sewer District. 
91. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(f), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on law enforcement. 
92. Law enforcement services, such as they are since the area is uninhabited and 
virtually bare ground, are and will continue to be provided by the Salt Lake County Sheriff. 
93. The disconnection will have no effect on the provision of law enforcement 
services. 
94. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(g), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on zoning. 
95. The zoning of the Disconnection Properties currently maintained by the City is 
irrationally low, discriminates against moderate income families and violates the City's 
obligations regarding low income housing. 
96. Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(4)(h), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on other municipal services. 
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97. The proposed disconnection will have no impact on the provision of other 
municipal services since the City provides no such services to the uninhabited bare ground of the 
Disconnection Properties. 
98. The City has never denied, or even offered a single shred of evidence, regarding 
the proof by the Landowners that the proposed disconnection meets all of the tests for 
disconnection specified in §10-2-502.7. 
DENIAL OF DISCONNECTION PETITIONS 
99. On May 11, 2004, the Bluffdale City Council voted to deny the Disconnection 
Petitions. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Declaration of Disconnection 
Petitioners incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 - 99 above. 
100. Petitioners are entitled to a judgment declaring that the Disconnection Properties 
of the Landowners should be disconnected from the City. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
On the foregoing Petition the Petitioners pray for relief as follows: 
1. For a determination by the Court that disconnection of the Disconnection 
Properties subject to the Disconnection Petitions is proper and required by §10-2-502.7, U.C.A. 
2. For an Order disconnecting the properties from the City. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate. 
izi 
a p DATED this \? day of May, 2004. 
Petitioners' Addresses: 
South Farm, LLC 
2511 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC 
5635 South Waterbury Court, C-100 
Holladay,UT 84121 
BAIRD& JONES LC 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
BAfce R. Baird 
HUNT & RUDD 
Attorneys for Petitioner South Farms 
Hollis S. Hunt 
i ^ 
EXHIBIT "A 
PETITION TO BLUFFDALE CITY AND HERRIMAN FOR VOLUNTARY BOUNDARY 
ADJUSTMENT, DISCONNECTION AND ANNEXATION 
I/we, Bluffdale Mountain Homes, are the owners of the following property(ies): 
Tax ED # Approximate Property Address Number on attached Map 
33-17-400-004 Bluffdale, Utah 117 
Pursuant to §10-2-419, U.C.A., I/we hereby petition Bluffdale City and Herriman City to 
voluntarily adjust the municipal boundaries between Bluffdale City and Herriman City to transfer the 
above-referenced property(ies) and the other properties shown on Map # lthat is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein from Bluffdale City to Herriman. Further, pursuant to §10-2-501 I/we also petition 
Bluffdale City to disconnect the above-referenced property(ies) as shown on Map # 1 from Bluffdale. 
Pursuant to § 10-2-403 I/we also hereby petition Herriman to annex the property(ies) shown on the Map # 2 
into Herriman City. 
I/we hereby designate Donald Wallace, Robert Jones and Loretta Wilcox as the persons with 
authority to act on my/our behalf in the proceedings regarding these petitions. 
Reasons for Disconnection from Bluffdale 
Our decision to disconnect our lands from Bluffdale did not come lightly and is a decision of last 
resort. After more than ten-years of planning efforts, both formal and informal, spanning three mayoral 
administrations, and costing hundreds of thousands of dollars, Bluffdale has been unresponsive to the needs 
of the landowners in Planning Area Number Four. 
Bluffdale has not fulfilled its commitments to work with landowners to approve a reasonable 
master plan for their lands. Bluffdale does not presently provide municipal services such as roads, sewer 
and water to these lands and has refused to prepare itself to provide such services to these lands. Bluffdale 
has not committed the staff or resources to respond to development applications in a competent and timely 
manner. Where Bluffdale has hired outside consultants, largely paid for by the landowners, Bluffdale has 
ignored the reasoned and considered recommendations of the professionals they hired. 
In the spirit of utmost good-faith, we have worked hard for many years to react and respond to 
community concerns and comments regarding the design and development of these lands. We have 
encouraged Bluffdale to participate and to work together with landowners to build a stronger community. 
These efforts have reached the point of exhaustion. Bluffdale's rejection of the development of these lands 
is a loud and clear message that Bluffdale will not serve these lands. While we appreciate those at 
Bluffdale who have attempted to work with us, it is time for us to remove these lands from the municipal 
boundaries of Bluffdale. 
DATED this fc^day of fc-bf^^ry 2004 
OWTNTEIp) _ _ — Mailing Address (optional) 

EXHIBIT "B" 
.1.4 3 SOUTH MAIN ST. 
P.O.BOX 45838 
LT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8414 5 
ED.TAX I.D.# 87-0217663 
%Mf aJff SribttWf Morning News 
PROOF OF PUBLICATION 
CUSTOMER'S 
COPY 
CUSTOMER NAME AND ADDRESS [ACCOUNT NUMBER 
ROSECREST INC & SOUTHFARM, LL 
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 
2 5 1 1 S WEST TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84115 
R4619700L-07 
DATE 
03/05/04 
ACCOUNT NAME 
I I 
NOTICE 
». r f ? 1 1 . ^ * ° r Municipal Disconnection 
I Bluffdale City (see legal description below) 
| Notice is hereby giveni pursuant to §10-2-501, Utah Code Annotated, that pet 
'ions have been filed with Bluffdale City seeking to disconnect the property specific 
in foe legal description below from Bluffdale Cry. The petitions represent the owr 
ership of approximately 3100 acres percent (84 %) of the properties within the are 
i proposed for disconnection. The petitions are supported by an analysis of the isst* 
more or less to the center of said Secti™ on. 
ROSECREST INC & SOUTHFARM, LL 
TELEPHONE 
801-461-9700 
INVOICE NUMBJ 
TL8202C6R 
SCHEDULE 
START 02/20/04 END 03/05/04 
CU3T* REF. NO. 
CMTIQN 
ooum vvn'04" East along the westlinenfVntr <&/•«» ™ lu %???!?" *0; ™* 
Section 19; thence North Wm l * fnS Sl !« * to H NorJhwest corner of sa 
2650.924 feet to ! w « n 2 ralo, lg th,e wesf ,,ne °* said Section 18 f 
NOTICE PETITIONS FOR MUNICIPAL 
SI2E 
167 LINES 3.00 COLUMN 
TIMES 
MISC. CHARGES 
,00 
RATE 
LESS AND EXCEPT PARCEL 138 
the Northeast <&rtSd l o k R ^ fiSXffoo-J)•?£• w ^ T 9u,ar,er° feet more or less to the Nnrihw.";^l!le!!Sei!or1!h 9° Q?*<> West for 13l9.95i S^-J^KJ^tS 
1 . 6 8 
AD CHARGES 
2 , 5 2 5 . 0 
TOTAL COSJ 
2 ,525.0 | 
• - - • » . w . w w, ,CJJ iy me iNorrnw 
?u2!1enr/N0,!,laJLd sectlon; foence \ 
to the POINT OF BEGINNING. Containing 19 acres more or less 
| ALSO LESS AND EXCEPTING PARCEL 144 
larly described as follows/ ' ke Bose and Mer'd'an, being more particu-
' ^ ^ ^ ^ 
more or less to the Southeast come? S thl M°« 0 J 2 2 , °n E a s ! for J 370.072 feet 
Quarter of said Section 2 J ' t a c ^ o ^ 8 9 ^ ^ °L«* Northwe* 
'le» to the Southwest corner o f W K r t f t i ^ / S ]?,2^0 0 0 feet m° 'e or 
.said Section 21; thence North 01 £35'55M We P ^ n ^ o A "°mweti Quarter of 
'Northwest corner of the Northeast Quarter^ th/M r t 3rl l9 2»4ne e t t m o r e ,o r ,ess to * * 21: thence North 88*53'56" East fo? 1 f 1A o n A r t t l w e s t 0u,arter of sald Section 
BEGINNING. or 'J J 6 -9 1 3 feet more or less lo the POINT OF 
Containing 41 Acres more or less 
^ ^ 3 9 9 1 Acres more or less 
AFFIDAVIT OF PUBLICATION^ ••r»_i IICIII m a i n * 
AS NEWSPAPER AGENCY CORPORATION LEGAL BOOKKEEPER, I CERTIFY THAT THE ATTACHED 
ADVERTISEMENT OF NOTICE PETITIONS FOR MUNICIPAL FOR 
ROSECREST INC & SOUTHFARM, LL WAS PUBLISHED BY THE NEWSPAPER AGENCY 
CORPORATION, AGENT FOR THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE AND DESERET NEWS,DAILY NEWSPAPERS 
PRINTED IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE WITH GENERAL CIRCULATION IN UTAH, AND PUBLISHED 
IN SALT LAKE CITY, SALT LAKE COUNTY IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
PUBLISHED ON START 02/20/04 END 03/05/04 
SIGNATURE 
DATE 0 3 / 0 5 / 0 4 
^S^lO^^^^J Notary Public ' SJANIEBEST I 
^ West Big Mountain Drive • 
raylorsville Utah 84123 | 
vly Commission Expires • 
November 19,2006 I 
StatepfJJtah
 mm j 
THIS IS NOT A STATEMENT BUT A "PROOF OF PUBLICATION" 
PLEASE PAY FROM BILLING STATEMENT. 
\ c / 
EXHIBIT "C 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING PURSUANT TO U.CA. 
§10-2-501(3)(b) TO PROPERTY OWNERS WITHIN THE 
PROPERTY AREA TO BE DISCONNECTED 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, HOLLIS S. HUNT, Attorney at Law, on the 26th day of February, 2004, did mail, 
by certified mail and regular mail, to those Property Owners of record being situated 
within the area seeking disconnection as required in U.C.A. §10-2-501 (3)(b) as noted in 
Exhibit "A" attached, a Notice for Petitioners for Municipal Disconnection as is set out in 
Exhibit "B" attached to this Affidavit. 
DATED March 25,2004 
^JK^JLAJ J^.^J«^^odr-
HOLLIS S. HUNT 
Attorney at Law 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25* day of March, 2004. 
QC<4. •*!•« A.A. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KAftEN USOM5ST} 
tMeWATCmUNK 
*ANOV, UT. M O * 
COM* EXP. 01*114001 
(Name 
Additional 
JAIIdredge, Dennis K & Debra R 
[Barclay, Scott B 
Bearden, Lucille C 
Bennett, Golden J & Arda D 
Bennion, Don W & Elaine 
[Bills, Danell C 
IBIoomdale, Randall E & Sheila E 
IBIuffdale Enterprises LLC 
IB luff dale Mountain Homes, LC 
[Board of Education Jordan School District 
IBouldon, Douglas D & Judith A 
(Buckmiller, Daniel K. & Kelly C 
| Butterfield, James E & Shirley C 
Butterfield, Rodney W 
Butterfield, Weston M 
Carlson, Michael M 
[Carlson, Rose L. 
I Cental Utah Water Conservancy Dist 
Ichristensen, Del S 
jChristensen, Marvin L ET AL 
ICIive, David L Jr & Joan 
I Cooper, Clarence B & Hazel F 
IDave Shelby Realtor Inc 
|Dee Bearden, Van 
IDoxey, Evans T. & Mariene L. 
1 First Security Bank 
jGailey, Roger L & Susan 
[Gibson, Donna D 
IGroomer, Russell 
Hamilton Land & Livestock LTD 
Hamilton, Dale W & Sharen L 
Hamilton, Daro E. 
1 Harvey, J Neil & Rita M 
Address 
8812 S Bluejay Ln 
3802 S 2300 E 
1759 W American Park Cir 
I479W1200S 
4260 S Parkview Dr 
182 S 200 W 
6872 S Meadow Dr 
*615 South Lakeview Drive 
5635 S Waterbury Way #C100 
*9150 South 500 West 
245 N Vine St. #803 
16775S1825W 
I6237 W 13100 S 
I6223W 13100 S 
862 E Fairway Dr 
14800S1300W 
1088 E9400 S 
355 W University Pkwy 
4524 S 785 E 
Note 1:12550 S. Tithing Hill Drive 
6526 S State St 
4594 S Westview Dr 
517 E8680S 
2862 W 13760 S 
3690 S 5600 W 
PO Box 810490 
E11 CalleDiido 
16575 S Camp Williams Rd 
2865 W 7085 S 
Note 2: 4850 W. 13400 South 
330 E 1200 S 
*5570 W. Rocky Pount Drive 
16535 S Camp Williams Rd 
City 
Salt Lake City 
Salt Lake City 
Salt Lake City 
Kamas 
Salt Lake City 
Herriman 
Salt Lake City 
•Bountiful 
Salt Lake City 
*Sandy 
Salt Lake City 
Riverton 
Herriman 
Herriman 
Bountiful 
Riverton 
Sandy 
Orem 
Murray 
Riverton 
Murray 
Salt Lake City 
Sandy 
Riverton 
West Valley 
Dallas 
Guaynabo 
Riverton 
West Jordan 
Riverton 
Kamas 
Riverton 
Riverton 
State 
Ut 
Ut 
Ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
*UT 
Ut 
*UT 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
lut 
UT 
Ut 
ut 
Ut 
ut 
ut 
Tx 
PR 
ut 
ut 
ur 
ut 
UT 
ut 
Zip 
84121 
84109 
84119 
84036 
84124 
| 84065 
84121 
M8010 
84121 
84070 
84103 
84065 
84065 
84065 
84010 
84065 
84094 
84058 
84107 
84065 
84107 
84124 
84070 
84065 
84120 
75381 
"00969 
84065 
84084 
84065 
84036 
84065 
84065 
Parcel # 
33-18-200-020-0000 
33-22-100-006-0000 
33-16-300-009-0000 
33-16-300-011-0000 
33-08-400-003-0000 
33-18-200-008-0000 
33-17-100-017-0000 
33-07-300-001-0000 
33-17-400-004-0000 
33-06-300-011-0000 
33-08-400-001-0000 
33-27-100-020-0000 
33-17-100-002-0000 
33-22-100-002-0000 
33-17-200-017-0000 
33-27-200-002-0000 
33-27-200-001-0000 
33-16-300-026-0000 
33-18-200-011-0000 
33-16-300-019-0000 
33-18-200-021-0000 
33-17-300-001-0000 
33-22-300-001-0000 
33-16-300-018-0000 
33-17-200-001-0000 
33-27-100-016-0000 
33-21-100-016-0000 
33-22-400-015-0000 
33-17-100-018-0000 
33-06-400-019-0000 
33-16-300-010-0000 
33-07-200-005-0000 
33-22-400-014-0000 | 
| Hidden Valley Associates 
I Jack Lashley / Laguna Investment Company 
IJLC Investments 
1 Jones, Kurtis D & Terie N 
Jordan Valley Water Conservancy Dist 
Judd, Brian L & Deborah K 
IKessimakis, Gary K & Linda 
(King, Lyman & Michelle 
Knouse, Paul T & Viemarie 
1 Laguna Investments 
ILarsen, John D. & Joyce 
ILosee, Chris 
Mac 8, LLC 
IMalibu Investment Company 
IMangum, Billy L & Donna M 
IMangum, Dianne B 
IMangum, Michael L. & Deborah K 
JM call is ter, Sarah M 
IMcDougal, Curtis 
IMcMullin, Gam H & Pam £ 
(Michel Investments LLC 
Miles, Waiter M & Pacrta G 
Miller, Velina K & Killion, Sharron 
Mitchell, Grant L & Judi R 
(Myrtle's Seven Ltd 
loisen, Jens A & Kama 
lOndrak, Keven L & Joanne E 
lOsterloh, Frederick R 
JParr, Vauna 
1 Patricia J Rasmusson Family Ltd Part 
jPeel, Don 
Petersen, Don E Jr 
Phillips, Jack A Jr. & Jean 
Phillips, Robert & Deanna 
Provo Reservoir Canal Co 
Rentmeister, Jay & Garva 
Rubey, Paul R & Carol A 
Note 2: 14 Lone Hollow 
2688 E Wanda Way 
1880 EDelannLn 
13739S6315W 
|P.O.Box70 
199 E6100 S 
4648 S 345 E 
T1418 East Michigan Avenue 
9803 Powderhouse Rd 
*2688 East Wanda Way 
196 E 9140 S 
7696 S 2250 W 
10299 S Springcrest Ln 
j*2020 East 3300 South, #26 
462 S100 E 
6966 S Harvest View Way 
3246 W 7300 S 
275 E13275S 
11576 S State St #303 
2655 WSilverpoint Way 
2956 E Cobblemoor Ln 
1412 W Mango Rd 
15103 S1800W 
1942EParkridgeDr 
4059 S 5200W 
2896 E Hyland Hills Rd 
3864S2520W 
8955 S Cobble Canyon Ln 
2862 W 13760 S 
P.O. Box 1037 
4030 E Charlton Ave 
10519 S Weeping Willow Dr 
10133 S Birnam Woods Wy 
2910 S Buccaneer Dr 
1156 S State St #104 I 
12872 S1830W 
P.O. Box 374 I 
Sandy 
Salt Lake City 
Salt Lake City 
Herriman 
West Jordan 
Murray 
Murray 
Salt Lake City 
Cheyenne 
Salt Lake City 
Sandy 
West Jordan 
South Jordan 
Salt Lake City 
Ivins 
I West Jordan 
West Jordan 
Draper 
Draper 
Riverton 
Sandy 
Taylorsville 
Bluffdale 
Salt Lake City 
West Valley 
Salt Lake City 
Salt Lake City 
Sandy 
Riverton 
Beaver 
Hemet 
Sandy 
South Jordan 
Magna j 
Orem 
Riverton 
Draper 
[UT 
Ut 
Ut 
Ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
UT 
Wy 
UT 
Ut 
Ut 
Ut 
UT 
Ut 
ut 
ut 
|Ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
ut 
Ca 
Ut 
Ut 
Ut 
Ut 
Ut I 
yt 
f 84092 
84117 
I 84121 
84065 
84084 
84107 
84107 
84105 
82009 
84105 
84070 
84084 
84095 
64109 
84738 
84084 
84084 
' 84020 
| 84020 
84065 
I 84093 
84123 
I 84065 
84121 
84120 
I 84109 
84119 
84093 
84065 
84713 
92544 
84070, 
84095 
84044 
84097 
84065 
84020 
33-17-300-002-00001 
33-18-100-001-0000 
33-17-100-019-0000 
33-17-200-012-0000 
33-16-300-025-0000 
33-17-100-020-0000 
33-18-200-004-0000 
33-07-300-008-0000 
33-07-400-004-0000 
33-19-100-001-0000 
33-18-200-003-0000 
133-17-200-013-0000 
33-22-300-006-0000 
33-07-100-005-0000 
133-27-100-013-0000 
33-27-100-009-0000 
33-27-100-007-0000 
33-18-200-002-0000 
33-16-300-020-0000 
33-16-200-016-0000 
33-21-100-006-0000 
33-18-200-016-0000 
33-20-200-004-0000 
33-18-200-005-0000 
33-17-400-003-0000 
33-16-300-003-0000 
33-27-100-014-0000 
33-08-300-007-0000 
33-16-300-016-0000 
33-16-300-017-0000 
33-18-100-003-0000 
33-16-300-019-0000 
33-18-200-022-0000 
33-17-200-011-0000 
33-17-200-006-0000 
33-18-200-013-0000 
33-16-300-015-00001 
[Rueckert, Stephen 
Russo, Marilyn L 
ISart Lake County Water Concervancy Dist 
Scholle, Richard E & Laksana I 
Seeley, Steven L. & N Lorane 
(Sharp, Norms in K & Myra C 
T & M Holdings, LLC 
The Corp of PB of CH of JC of LDS 
Utah Board of Water Resources 
Utah Power & Light Co 
Wells Fargo Bank Northwest 
Wilcox, Loretta 
Wilson, Shane R & Katherine C 
Winegar, Joel E & Lorraine 
Workman, Wayne 
[South Farms, LLC 
PO Box 273 
P.O. Box 1026 
P.O. Box 70 
2530 S Chesterfield St 
1613 E Casper Rd 
2331 W Donnarae Cir 
581 N 600 E 
*50 East North Temple 
P.O. Box 146201 
700 NE Multnomah St #700 
P.O.Box 13495 
12020 S 4000 W 
*241 South 200 East 
10314 S Springcrest Ln 
16475 Camp Williams Rd 
2511 South West Temple Street 
Riverton 
Salome 
West Jordan 
Salt Lake City 
Sandy 
Riverton 
Orem 
Salt Lake City 
Salt Lake City 
Portland 
Arlington 
Riverton 
Lehi 
South Jordan 
Riverton 
South Salt Lake City 
Ut 
Az 
Ut 
Ut 
Ut 
Ut 
Ut 
UT 
Ut 
Or 
Te 
Ut 
UT 
Ut 
Ut 
Ut 
84065 
85348 
84084 
84119 
84092 
84065 
84097 
84150 
84114 
97232 
76094 
84065 
84043 
84095 
84065 
84115 
33-27-100-017-0000 I 
33-16-300-023-0000 
33-17-200-019-0000 
33-16-300-014-0000 
33-18-200-015-0000 
33-16-300-024-4001 
33-21-100-012-0000 
33-06-100-019-0000 
33-17-400-001-0000 
33-22-300-002-0000 
33-21-100-002-0000 
33-17-400-006-0000 
33-17-200-012-0000 
33-18-200-019-0000 
33-22-400-016-0000 
33-18-400-006 | 
NOTICE 
Petitions for Municipal Disconnection 
Bluffdale City (see legal description below) 
Notice is hereby given pursuant to §10-2-501, Utah Code Annotated, that 
petitions have been filed with Bluffdale City seeking to disconnect the property specified 
in the legal description below from Bluffdale City. The petitions represent the ownership 
of approximately 3100 acres percent (84 %) of the properties within the area proposed for 
disconnection. The petitions are supported by an analysis of the issues specified in §10-
2-502.7 related to the proposed disconnection. A copy of that analysis is on file with 
Bluffdale City and available for public inspection. Also on file and available for public 
inspection are a number of maps illustrating the properties involved, the relevant 
development infrastructures and other matters necessary for the consideration of the 
petitions 
Pursuant to §10-2-501 the petitioners have delivered a copy of the petitions and 
supporting information to the legislative body of Salt Lake County and are mailing a 
copy to all property owners within the affected area. The petitioners are also causing this 
Notice to be published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation 
a notice of the request for disconnection. Pursuant to §10-2-502.5 Bluffdale is required 
to hold a public hearing on the request for disconnection no more than 30 days after the 
final publication. 
Pursuant to §10-2-501 the petitioners have designated Donald Wallace, Robert 
Jones and Loretta Wilcox as the persons with authority to act on their behalf in 
connection with the disconnection proceedings. 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION: 
A parcel of land lying in Sections 6, 7, 8,15,16,17,18, 19,20,21,22 and 27 of 
Township 4 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more particularly 
described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the West Quarter corner of said Section 6; thence South 89°36'05" East 
along the centerline of said Section 6 for 3763.944 feet to the west line of the Welby 
Canal; thence along said canal for the following One Hundred Forty Seven (147) courses; 
South 32°19'55" East for 122.651 feet; thence South 23°18'28" East for 49.828 feet; 
thence South l O ^ e ^ " East for 48.555 feet; thence South 00°10'56" West for 48.412 
feet; thence South 07°16'50" West for 52.937 feet; thence South 14°17'03" West for 
106.982 feet; thence South 06°22'06" West for 55.045 feet; thence South 00°43'3r 
West for 52.928 feet; thence South 01°35'47" East for 214.599 feet; thence South 
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10°05'19" East for 57.621 feet; thence South 17045'4r East for 55.569 feet; thence 
South 25°32'39" East for 55.349 feet; thence South 28°09'27" East for 554.609 feet; 
thence South 35oH'01" East for 310.277 feet; thence South 37°17'31" East for 165.659 
feet; thence South 44°49'05" East for 112.612 feet; thence South 51°23'01" East for 
215.838 feet; thence South 42°10'48" East for 52.329 feet; thence South 31°33'56" East 
for 106.838 feet; thence South 26°17'40" East for 212.555 feet; thence South 29°31'21" 
East for 106.223 feet; thence South 38°02'18" East for 58.641 feet; thence South 
49°41'00" East for 161.798 feet; thence South 53°28'05" East for 229.399 feet; thence 
South 53°25'35" East for 44.402 feet; thence South 53°24'55" East for 174.082 feet; 
thence South 55°48'08" East for 160.484 feet; thence South 70°39'18" East for 54.337 
feet; thence South 86°58'33" East for 56.348 feet; thence North 84°00'14" East for 
161.248 feet; thence South 87°22'44" East for 52.180 feet; thence South 80°15'14" East 
for 270.231 feet; thence South 77°44'20" East for 52.132 feet; thence South 65°48'00" 
East for 51.809 feet; thence South 50°22'H" East for 50.211 feet; thence South 
40°18'00" East for 51.808 feet; thence South 33°26'33" East for 241.730 feet; thence 
South 31°29'26" East for 154.228 feet; thence South 20°20'08" East for 106.043 feet; 
thence South 13°33'51" East for 423.556 feet; thence South 21°37'17" East for 56.533 
feet; thence South 27°10,54" East for 412.294 feet; thence South 28°35'34" East for 
433.534 feet; thence South 31 °31 '03" East for 428.536 feet; thence South 19°55'18" East 
for 50.061 feet; thence South 00°54'12" East for 47.742 feet; thence South 20°48'38" 
West for 158.104 feet; thence South 13°19'41" West for 59.086 feet; thence South 
35°53'23" East for 60.836 feet; thence South 74°29'38" East for 212.583 feet; thence 
South 67°35' ir East for 100.955 feet; thence South 67°18'50" East for 360.265 feet; 
thence South 65°07'27" East for 210.380 feet; thence South 59°49'02" East for 372.880 
feet; thence South 52°54'59" East for 105.787 feet; thence South 43°55'00" East for 
163.875 feet; thence South 42°45'41" East for 277.617 feet; thence South 34°15'21" East 
for 107.029 feet; thence South 27°00'54" East for 778.589 feet; thence South 22°14'40" 
East for 54.148 feet; thence South 17°13'01" East for 595.287 feet; thence South 
26°14'18" East for 114.291 feet; thence South 50°14'59" East for 60.701 feet; thence 
South 63°28'0r East for 348.152 feet; thence South 63°28'01" East for 295.997 feet; 
thence South 55°28'17" East for 52.340 feet; thence South 50°09'01" East for 105.261 
feet; thence South 48°19'32" East for 360.507 feet; thence South 48°19'32" East for 
380.852 feet; thence South 46°19'24" East for 108.048 feet; thence South 40o28'H" East 
for 106.848 feet; thence South 30°42'43" East for 473.939 feet; thence South 33°57,21" 
East for 54.448 feet; thence South 28°53'29" East for 139.550 feet; thence South 
36°26'57" East for 106.518 feet; thence South 46°4r07" East for 166.181 feet; thence 
South 51013'15M East for 168.834 feet; thence South 60°10'03" East for 53.216 feet; 
thence South 72°43'17" East for 53.432 feet; thence South 81°25'55" East for 102.039 
feet; thence South 73°24'31" East for 68.206 feet; thence South 64°25'17" East for 
89.155 feet; thence South 58°36'14" East for 667.789 feet; thence South 60°35'49" East 
for 106.336 feet; thence South 70°09'05" East for 107.406 feet; thence South 75°03'21" 
East for 523.941 feet; thence South 87°19'57" East for 114.951 feet; thence North 
84°42'53" East for 102.480 feet; thence South 68°ir04" East for 211.037 feet; thence 
South 8r41'17" East for 161.218 feet; thence South 71°28'13" East for 50.515 feet; 
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thence South 59°46>29" East for 48.571 feet; thence South 52°13,26" East for 128.083 
feet to the south line of the north half of Section 16; thence South 89°19'49" East along 
said south line for 1781.243 feet more or less to the West Quarter comer of Section 15; 
thence South 89°28'41" East along the south line of the north half of said Section 15 for 
422.224 feet more or less to the west right-of-way line of Redwood Road; thence along 
said right-of-way line for the following eight (8) courses; with a non-tangent curve to the 
left, having a radius of 2616.500 feet, a central angle of 09°33'16" (chord bearing and 
distance of South 14°38'56" East - 435.817 feet) and for an arc distance of 436.322 feet; 
thence South 19°25'34" East for 93.100 feet; thence South 13042'56n East for 301.500 
feet; thence South 19°25'34" East for 1400.000 feet; thence South 25°08'12" East for 
301.500 feet; thence South 19025'34" East for 1000.393 feet; thence South 13°42'56" 
East for 301.500 feet; thence South 19°25'34" East for 7311.125 feet to the intersection 
of said west right-of-way and the south line of the north half of Section 27; thence North 
89035'39" West along said south line for 1401.748 feet more or less to the center of said 
Section 27; thence North 89°35'39" West along the centeriine of said Section 27 for 
1320.000 feet more or less to the Southwest comer of the east half of the Northwest 
Quarter of said Section 27; thence North 00°42'20" West along the west line of the east 
half of said Northwest Quarter for 2627.441 feet more or less to the Northwest comer of 
the east half of said Northwest Quarter; thence South 89°36,50" West along the north 
line of said Section 27 for 1380.651 feet more or less to the Southwest comer of said 
Section 22; thence North 00°03'29" East along the west line of said Section 22 for 
2598.603 feet more or less to the West Quarter comer of said Section 22; thence North 
01°06'41" East along the west line of said Section 22 for 1326.035 feet more or less to 
the Northeast comer of south half of the north half of said Section 21; thence South 
89°59'33" West along the north line of the south half of north half of said Section 21 for 
2640.000 feet more or less to the northeast comer of the south half of the Northwest 
Quarter said Section 21; thence South 00°52'20" East for 1307.072 to the center of said 
Section 21; thence North S9°53 '11" West along the south line of the Northwest Quarter 
of said Section 21 for 2607.161 to the West Quarter comer of said Section 21; thence 
South 89°58'02" West along the centeriine of said Section 20 for 2640.000 feet more or 
less to the center of said Section 20; thence North 00°0r58" West along the centeriine of 
said Section 20 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the North Quarter comer of said Section 
20; thence South 89°28'28" West along the north line of said Section 20 for 2617.134 
feet to the Northwest comer of said Section 20; thence South 00°22,04" East along the 
west line of said Section 20 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the West Quarter comer of 
said Section 20; thence North 89°16'28" West along the centeriine of said Section 19 for 
5280.000 feet more or less to the West Quarter comer of said Section 19; thence North 
00°43'32" East along the west line of said Section 19 for 2640.000 feet more or less to 
the Northwest comer of said Section 19; thence North 00°15'11" East along the west line 
of said Section 18 for 2650.924 feet to the West Quarter Comer of said Section 18; 
thence North 00°36,54>> East along the west line of said Section 18 for 2623.328 feet to 
the Northwest comer of said Section 18; thence North 00°09,22" West along the west 
line of said Section 7 for 2693.831 feet to the West Quarter comer of said Section 7; 
thence North 00°07,48" West along the west line of said Section 7 for 2673.457 feet to 
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the Northwest comer of said Section 7; thence North 00° 11*30" West along the west line 
of said Section 6 for 2677.167 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Containing 4052 Acres Gross, more or less 
LESS AND EXCEPT PARCEL 138 
A parcel of land lying in Northeast Quarter of Section 19 of Township 4 South, Range 1 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast comer of said Section 19; thence South 45°02,26" West 
for 1844.418 feet more or less to the southwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of the 
Northeast Quarter of said section; thence North 00°05'40" West for 1319.955 feet more 
or less to the Northwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said 
section; thence South 89°16'09" East for 1307.406 feet more or less to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
<• 
Containing 19 acres more or less. 
ALSO LESS AND EXCEPTING PARCEL 144 
A parcel of land being the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 21, 
Township 4 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, being more particularly 
described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the being the Nortliieast Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of said Section 21; thence South 00°52'20" East for 1370.072 feet more or less to 
the Southeast corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 
21; thence South 89°59'33" West for 1320.000 feet more or less to the Southwest corner 
of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 21; thence North 
01°35'55" West for 1344.924 feet more or less to the Northwest corner of the Northeast 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 21; thence North 88°53'56" East for 
1336.913 feet more or less to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Containing 41 Acres more or less 
Net Acreage 3991 Acres more or less 
^ t 
EXHIBIT "D 
AFFIDAVIT OF DELIVERY PURSUANT TO U.C.A. 
§10-2-501(3)(c) TO SALT LAKE COUNTY WHEREIN THE 
PROPERTY AREA TO BE DISCONNECTED IS LOCATED 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, HOLLIS S. HUNT, Attorney at Law, on the 12lh day of February, 2004, did 
cause to be delivered to the Offices of Salt Lake County in Salt Lake City a Petition for 
Voluntary Boundary Adjustment/Disconnection with exliibits as noted in Exhibit "A" as 
required in §10-2-50 l(3)(c). 
DATED March 25,2004 
HOLLIS S. HUNT 
Attorney at Law 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25th day of March, 2004. 
/ / 
KAREN LISONBEE 
mTAmHMK'mntiuTJm 
1586 WATERS LANE 
SANOY.UT. MOM 
COMM.EXP. M-11-2006 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Addendum "C" 
(Amended Petition for Disconnection of Municipal 
Boundaries entered by the Third District Court on 
August 4, 2004) 
~H<^\ 
Bruce R. Baird, #0176 
BAIRD& JONES L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
299 South Main, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-1400 
Facsimile: (801) 328-1444 
Hollis S.Hunt, #1587 
HUNT & RUDD 
Attorneys for Petitioner South Farm, LLC 
392 East 12300 South, Suite A 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Telephone: (801) 495-3500 
Facsimile: (801)495-1877 
. ! 
01*Al/631 AMU:37 
LI; , 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES, LC; 
SOUTH FARMS, LLC; LAGUNA 
INVESTMENTS; MALIBU INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, LP; JLC INVESTMENTS, LLC; 
HIDDEN VALLEY ASSOCIATES; T & M 
HOLDINGS, LLC; BLUFFDALE 
ENTERPRISES, LLC; JAMES E. & 
SHIRLEY C. BUTTERFIELD (as Trustees of 
the Butterfield Family Trust); SCOTT B. 
BARCLAY (as Trustee of the B.G. Holbrook 
Family Trust); DON E. PETERSEN, JR.; DON 
W. & ELAINE W. BENNION (as Trustees of 
the Don W. & Elaine Bennion Family Trust); 
DARO E. HAMILTON; MYRTLE'S SEVEN, 
LTD; FREDRICK R. OSTERLOH; RODNEY 
W. BUTTERFIELD; WESTON 
BUTTERFIELD (as Trustee to the Weston 
Morris Butterfield Family Trust); DANELL C. 
BILLS; JAY G. & ARDA D. BENNETT; 
VAUNA PARR; ROGER L. & SUSAN 
GAILEY (as Trustees for Blain S. & Opal L. 
Gailey); GARY K. & LINDA KESSIMAKIS; 
THE PATRICIA J. RASMUSSON FAMILY 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Utah 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
DISCONNECTION OF MUNICIPAL 
BOUNDARIES 
Civil No. 040909920 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
|WS 
Corporation; LUCILLE C. BEARDEN (as 
Trustee of the Lucille C. Bearden Family 
Trust); DALE W. & SHAREN L. 
HAMILTON (as Trustees of the Dale and 
Sharen Hamilton Trust); ROBERT JR. & 
DEANNA PHILLIPS; VAN DEE BEARDEN; 
RANDALL E. & SHEILA E. BLOOMDALE; 
BILLY L. & DONNA J. MANGUM (as 
Trustees of the Billy Lavoy and Donna Joyce 
N. Mangum Trust); DIANNE B. MANGUM 
(as Trustee of the Dianne B. Mangum Trust); 
JEAN T. & KIM S. MANGUM (as Trustees of 
the Jean T. Mangum Trust); MICHAEL L. & 
DEBORAH K. MANGUM; MARILYN L. 
RUSSO (as Trustee of the Russo Family 
Trust); and DAVE SHELBY REALTOR, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal 
corporation, 
Respondent. 
The Petitioners petition this Court and complain of Respondent as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Petitioner Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC, ("Bluffdale Homes")is a Utah limited 
liability company. 
2. Petitioner South Farms, LLC, ("South Farms") is a Utah limited liability 
company. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Petitioner Laguna Investments is a Utah limited partnership. 
Petitioner Malibu Investment Company is a Utah limited partnership. 
Petitioner JLC Investments is a Utah limited liability company. 
Petitioner Hidden Valley is a Utah partnership. 
M 
7. Petitioner T & M Holdings is a Utah limited liability company. 
8. Petitioner Bluffdale Enterprises is a Utah limited liability company. 
9. Petitioner James E. & Shirley C. Butterfield are Trustees of the Butterfield Family 
Trust. 
10. Petitioner Scott Barclay is Trustee of the B.G. Holbrook Family Trust. 
11. Petitioner Don E. Petersen, Jr. is an individual and tenant-in-common with 
Eleanor M. Petersen, Lisa Layden, Bonnie Robbins and Scott Petersen. 
12. Petitioner Don W. & Elaine W. Bennion are Trustees of the Don W. & Elaine 
Bennion Family LLC. 
13. Petitioner Daro E. Hamilton is an individual. 
14. Petitioner Myrtle's Seven is a Utah limited partnership. 
15. Petitioner Fredrick R. Osterloh is an individual and tenant-in-common with 
Brenda A. Osterloh, Craig W. Osterloh, Kimiko K. Osterloh. Michael P. Osterloh, Denise E. 
Osterloh. 
16. Petitioner Rodney W. Butterfield is an individual and tenant-in-common with 
Viola Diane Butterfield, Kenneth R. Butterfield, Dean W. Butterfield, James T. Butterfield, 
Jeremy W. Butterfield, Colleen B. Borovatz, Lucinda B. Davis, Rebecka B. Thomas, Jullian 
Butterfield, and Thomas N. Butterfield. 
17. Petitioner Weston Butterfield is Trustee to the Weston Morris Butterfield Family 
Trust. 
18. Petitioner Danell C. Bills is an individual. 
19. Petitioner Jay G. & Arda D. Bennett are individuals. 
IV.S 
20. Petitioner Vauna Parr is an individual and tenant-in-common with Van Dee 
Bearden and Joseph Bearden. 
21. Petitioner Roger L. & Susan Gailey are individuals and Trustees for Blain S. & 
Opal L. Gailey. 
22. Petitioner Gary K. & Linda Kessimakis are individuals. 
23. Petitioner Patricia J. Rasmusson Family Limited Partnership, is a Utah 
Corporation. 
24. Petitioner Lucille C. Bearden is Trustee of the Lucille C. Bearden Family Trust. 
25. Petitioner Dale W. & Sharen L. Hamilton are Trustees of the Dale and Sharen 
Hamilton Trust. 
26. Petitioner Robert, Jr. & Deanna Phillips are individuals. 
27. Petitioner Van Dee Bearden is an individual. 
28. Petitioner Randall E. & Sheila E. Bloomdale are individuals. 
29. Petitioner Billy L. & Donna J. Mangum are Trustees of the Billy Lavoy and 
Donna Joyce N. Mangum Trust. 
30. Petitioner Dianne B. Mangum is Trustee of the Dianne B. Mangum Trust. 
31. Petitioner Jean T. & Kim S. Mangum are Trustees of the Jean T. Mangum Trust. 
32. Petitioner Michael L. & Deborah K. Mangum are individuals. 
33. Petitioner Marilyn L. Russo is Trustee of the Russo Family Trust. 
34. Petitioner Dave Shelby Realtor, Inc., is a Utah corporation. 
35. Respondent Bluffdale City (the "City") is a Utah municipal corporation. 
nt 
JURISDICTION 
36. Jurisdiction of this Court over this Petition is conferred by §10-2-502.5, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
37. Bluffdale Mountain, South Farm and the other named Petitioners (collectively, the 
"Petitioners") are among a group of landowners (collectively, the "Landowners") who petitioned 
the City for a disconnection of their properties (the "Disconnection Properties") from the City 
and were denied that disconnection (the detailed history of which is explained below). 
38. Petitioners represent the ownership of approximately 75% of the real property in 
the land proposed to be disconnected from the City. 
39. The Disconnection Properties are presently undeveloped and uninhabited. 
40. There is no municipal infrastructure presently serving the Disconnection 
Properties. 
SOUTH FARM'S HISTORY WITH THE CITY 
41. South Farm acquired its property that is the subject of this Petition between 1980 
and 1985. 
42. South Farm has other property that it is developing as "Rosecrest" which is 
located in the City of Herriman ("Herriman") adjacent to portions of the Disconnection 
Properties. 
43. After approximately seven years of internal planning South Farm began to try to 
develop its Bluffdale property similarly to the development of Rosecrest in Herriman. 
44. Between 1993 and 2001 meetings regarding South Farm's proposed development 
^ 
were held with former Bluffdale Mayor Wanlass (4 times) and former Mayor Nelson (12 times). 
45. Other meetings over this time were held with Salt Lake County representatives, in 
conjunction with the incorporation of Herriman, with representatives from the City present. 
46. On or about October of 2001 the City installed a water line on South Farm's 
property without obtaining a right-of-way. 
47. On January 8, 2002, as a part of the resolution of the illegal construction of the 
water line, the Bluffdale City Council adopted Resolution No. 2002-05 concerning the future 
development of South Farm's property and South Farm granted a right-of-way without cost to 
the City for the water line. 
48. Resolution No. 2002-05 stated, in relevant part: 
1. That the best use of the Rosecrest property in the City is to 
develop the Rosecrest property with a mixture of uses, density, 
commercial, recreational, transportation, and open space elements 
compatible with the Rosecrest real property in the Town of 
Herriman that is adjacent and contiguous to the Rosecrest property 
in the City of Bluffdale. 
* * * 
3. It is the best use of the property to develop the property with a 
mixture of uses including mixed residential properties, commercial 
properties, recreational properties, schools, churches, trails and 
open spaces consistent with a Master Development Agreement 
with Rosecrest. 
* * * 
5. That the City will work in a speedy and timely fashion to 
review the development applications of Rosecrest that are 
applicable to each phase and approve or deny each application in 
accordance with the relevant sections of the Bluffdale Municipal 
Code and Master Development Agreement to be mutually 
approved by the City and Rosecrest. 
* * * 
A 
7. That the City will work with the applicable service districts to 
bring the necessary infrastructure to the property to ensure timely 
and orderly development of the property. 
(Emphasis added.) 
49. Four members of the present City Council voted for Resolution 2002-05. 
50. On May 6, 2002 South Farm filed with Bluffdale City an Application for a 
General Plan Amendment and Zone Change on 1,124 acres for 3,183 dwelling units. 
51. Six months passed with no action from the City on the Application. 
52. On November 12, 2002, over the objection of South Farm and without first acting 
on South Farm's Application, the Bluffdale City Council adopted a new General Plan for 
"Planning Area No. 4" (which includes almost all of the lands that are the subject of this 
Petition) materially changing the rules regarding the development of South Farm's property. 
53. Six more months passed with no action from Bluffdale on South Farm's 
Application. 
54. On April 22, 2003, South Farm provided $70,000.00 for the City to outsource its 
planning review of South Farm's Application due to staff shortages and budgetary restraints of 
the City. 
55. The City then hired consultants with South Farm's money to review South Farm's 
applications. 
56. On July 15, 2003, the consultant's recommendations were received by the City. 
57. Between receiving the consultant's recommendation on July 15 and October 7, 
2003, the City, ignoring both South Farm's Application and the recommendations of its own 
consultant, the City created and proposed its own plan amendments to Planning Area No. 4. 
58. On December 4, 2003, the City's retained outside consultants reported to the City 
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that South Farm's Application met the intent of the General Plan for Planning Area No. 4. 
59. Despite that independent report, on December 9,2003, more than 19 months after 
they were filed, the City rejected South Farm's Application. 
60. From 2001 to early 2004 South Farm participated in approximately 23 meetings 
with the City's staff, 24 Planning Commission meetings and 25 City Council meetings. 
61. During this planning process South Farm submitted at least seven different 
alternative proposals in an effort to address the concerns of the City Council, the Planning 
Commission, City staff and citizens. 
62. During that period of time the City had three different City Planners and three 
different City Attorneys. 
63. From 1997 until early 2004 South Farm spent nearly $950,000.00 trying to obtain 
entitlements for the development of its property. 
64. To date, those efforts have produced no General Plan Amendment, no zone 
change, no development agreement, no preliminary plat, no final plat and, to put it simply, no 
development. 
OPTIONS OF THE OTHER LANDOWNERS 
65. Based on the prolonged, expensive and fruitless experiences of South Farm in 
dealing with the City, and their other unpleasant interfaces with the City, the other Landowners, 
including Bluffdale Homes, determined that it made no sense to try to obtain reasonable 
development rights for their properties from the City. 
66. During the process of the City's adoption of its General Plan effectively denying 
the other Landowners any reasonable development rights, the Landowners expressed their 
concerns about the unfair and improper treatment, but were ignored by the City. 
FILING OF THE PETITIONS 
67. On February 12, 2004, the Landowners submitted petitions (the "Disconnection 
Petitions") to the City to disconnect the Disconnection Properties from the City. (A copy of an 
exemplar of the Disconnection Petitions is attached and incorporated as Exhibit "A".) 
COMPLIANCE WITH 810-2-501, U.C.A. 
68. As required by § 10-2-501 (2)(b)(i), U.C.A., the Disconnection Petitions contained 
the names, addresses, and signatures of the owners of more than 50% of the real property in the 
area proposed for disconnection. 
69. In fact, the Disconnection Petitions (including additional petitions that were filed 
later) represented 88% of the private property within the area proposed for disconnection. 
70. If property owned by an arm of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints is 
excluded for the calculations (as the LDS Church does not taike positions on political issues such 
as this) the percentage is 91%. 
71. The other large remaining property that did not join in the Disconnection Petitions 
is controlled by the out-of-Utah Trust Department of a large bank. 
72. To date, no property owner within the area proposed for disconnection has 
opposed the disconnection. 
73. The Disconnection Petitions also requested the City to adjust the boundaries 
between the City and Herriman pursuant to §10-2-419, so that the Disconnection Properties 
would be transferred to be within the municipal boundaries of Herriman. 
74. The Disconnection Petitions also sought, pursuant to § 10-2-403, to have the 
Disconnection Properties (and certain other properties including two existing islands of 
unincorporated property) annexed into Herriman after they v/ere disconnected from the City. 
hi 
75. As required by § 10-2-501 (2)(b)(ii), the Disconnection Petitions specified the 
reasons for the proposed disconnection: 
Our decision to disconnect our lands from Bluffdale did not 
come lightly and is a decision of last resort. After more than ten-
years of planning efforts, both formal and informal, spanning three 
mayoral administrations, and costing hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, Bluffdale has been unresponsive to the needs of the 
landowners in Planning Area Number Four. 
Bluffdale has not fulfilled its commitments to work with 
the landowners to approve a reasonable master plan for their lands. 
Bluffdale does not presently provide municipal services such as 
roads, sewer and water to these lands and has refused to prepare 
itself to provide such services to these lands. Bluffdale has not 
committed the staff or resources to respond to development 
applications in a competent and timely manner. Where Bluffdale 
has hired outside consultants, largely paid for by the landowners 
Bluffdale has ignored the reasoned and considered 
recommendations of the professionals they hired. 
In the spirit of utmost good-faith, we have worked hard for 
many years to react and respond to community concerns and 
comments regarding the design and development of these lands. 
We have encouraged Bluffdale to participate and to work together 
with landowners to build a stronger community. These efforts 
have reached the point of exhaustion. Bluffdale's rejection of the 
development of these lands is a loud and clear message that 
Bluffdale will not serve these lands. While we appreciate those at 
Bluffdale who have attempted to work with us, it is time for us to 
remove these lands from the municipal boundaries of Bluffdale. 
76. As required by §10-2-50 l(2)(b)(iii), the Disconnection Petitions provided a map 
or plat of the territory proposed for disconnection. 
77. As required by § 10-2-501 (2)(b)(iv), the Disconnection Petitions designated three 
representatives to act on behalf of the petitioners. 
78. Pursuant to §10-2-50 l(3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection 
Petitions to be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general 
circulation within the municipality. (A copy of the Proof of Publication is attached and 
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incorporated by reference as Exhibit "B".) 
79. Pursuant to § 10-2-501 (3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection 
Petitions to be mailed to each owner of real property located within the area proposed to be 
disconnected. (A copy of the Affidavit of Hollis S. Hunt attesting to the mailing attached and 
incorporated by reference as Exhibit "C".) 
80. Pursuant to § 10-2-50 l(3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection 
Petitions to be delivered to the Salt Lake County Council, the legislative body of the county in 
which the area proposed for disconnection is located. (A copy of the Affidavit of Hollis S. Hunt 
attesting to the delivery is attached and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "D".) 
81. The City has acknowledged that the Landowners have complied with the 
requirements of § 10-2-501. 
COMPLIANCE WITH §10-2-502.7, ILCA. 
82. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(a) the Petitioners have the burden of proving the 
viability of the disconnection. 
83. The disconnection is viable. 
84. The City has never disputed the viability of the disconnection. 
85. To establish this viability the Petitioners engaged the services of Wikstrom 
Economic and Planning Consultants and also did other analyses of the viability of the 
disconnection using resources of Bluffdale Homes and South Farm. 
86. The Petitioners provided the detailed analysis of the disconnection viability to the 
City. 
87. The City has never disputed any part of the viability analysis. 
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88. Pursuant lo <'j II) ,' *>0,! "'('i)(h> llu1 Petitioners, hnu !lie liunlm ot pros nig that 
just ice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality. 
89. It is just ai id equitable tl: lat the Cour t shou ld respec t and h o n o r UK vvisncs 
virtually all o f the landowners in the area proposed for disconnect ion when the City has treated 
the area so unfairly, neither provided nor even planned for the provis ion o f public infrastructure 
or services and unreasonably prevented deve lopment o f the Disconnect ion Properties. 
90. Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(3)(c)(i) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that 
which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal senices would materially 
increase ovei previoi is yeai s ' . . 
91. As the Disconnection Properties are completely unserviced by the City and are 
located on the pei iphei y of the Cit; ' the discoi u lection will i not lea vc the mi inicipality with an 
area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing 
municipal services would materially increase over previous years. 
92. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(ii) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that 
the disconnection will not make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to 
continue to function as a municipality. 
93. The Disconnection Properties provide the City each year with only approximately 
$1,750.00 (not a typo) in property taxes which, oi it of a total Genei al I a iiid bi idget of tl :ie City of 
2,021,000.00, is less than one-tenth of one percent (0.1 %) of the budgeted revenues. 
94. 1 he preservation of ! literally, 99.9 percei it of tl le Cit> 's bi idget woi ilcl i lot v\ ork 
any hardship on the City. 
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95. Further, as the City has installed absolutely no infrastructure on the Disconnection 
Properties there can be no adverse impact on such infrastructure. 
96. Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that 
the disconnection will not leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated 
territory. 
97. The disconnection would not leave or create any islands or peninsulas of 
unincorporated territory. 
98. The proposed disconnection will actually cure the existence of two current islands 
and one possible peninsula within the boundaries of the City. 
99. The Disconnection Properties are contiguous with an area that is presently 
unincorporated. 
100. Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(3)(d) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that the 
county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in a cost-effective 
manner and without materially increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of 
providing to the area the services that the municipality will no longer provide to the area due to 
the disconnection. 
101. Salt Lake County is capable, in a cost-effective manner and without materially 
increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of providing to the area the 
services that the municipality will no longer provide to the area due to the disconnection. 
102. In the present undeveloped and uninhabited condition of the Disconnection 
Properties there are essentially no municipal services provided and none are required and thus no 
costs are involved. 
n 
103. The Landowners have also petitioned Herriman to annex uie Discomie1 ^» 
Properties. 
104. Pursiianl lo j,(jI0-?-'J<'iM> Hi'iii/nun mil lune l"'« .mnrv the I)i*oonnoction Properties. 
105. Any costs for servicing the Disconnection Properties during the process of 
development uiul alleiwank \\\\\ nol I.ill oh ," 1 *111 I tike Count)- bill will, in lead, he the ' 
responsibility of Herriman. 
106 Pursuant to ; J • -I Va^  in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider all relevant 
factors, including the effect of the proposed disconnection on the municipality or community as a 
whole. 
107. The disconnection will have no adverse impacts on the City as a whole. 
• 108. The Discoi i nection I 'i opei ties are physical!;} distil ict froi i i tl ite remaining poi tioi is 
of the City and, for the most part, separated by a distinct and significant physical boundary. 
109. . lp preserve the el laracteristics of the remaining 
area of the City by allowing the remaining areas to be developed with a different zoning and 
dei isit)/ patter i I tl lan is appropr iate foi the Disconnection Properties. ' • • 
110 Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(4)(b), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof •-. i: . aspect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on adjoining property owners. 
111. The disconnection would have no adverse impacts on adjoining property owners. 
112.. ' On the south of the Disconnection Properties is Can lp Willi; ti ns (a I -ederal 
military base) which would not be affected at all 
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113. To the west of Disconnection Properties, in Herriman, is a development planned 
for a density and configuration similar to what has been proposed for the Disconnection 
Properties. 
114. On the northeastern angular side of the Disconnection Properties the adjoining 
properties are almost completely separated from the Disconnection Properties by a physical 
boundary, the Welby-Jacobs Canal over which there are no bridges, roadways or pedestrian 
access between the Disconnection Properties and the remainder of the City. 
115. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(c), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on existing or projected streets or public ways. 
116. There are no existing or projected public streets in the Disconnection Properties 
except for the proposed Mountain View Corridor (formerly known as the Legacy Highway) 
which would not be negatively impacted by the proposed disconnection. 
117. Even if the City has some plans for public streets inside the Disconnection 
Properties there is no reason to believe that such streets would be negatively impacted by the 
proposed disconnection. 
118. Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(d), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on water mains and water services. 
119. There are no existing water mains or water services to the Disconnection 
Properties and thus the disconnection will have no impact. 
120. Disconnection would actually facilitate delivery of water services since there are 
adjacent services provided by Herriman. 
IS 
.121. Piirsuaitl io ';, 10 .'-Sii; 7(4)(c>, in (klciitiiiuiii" whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on sewer mains and sewer services. 
122. There are no existing sewer mains in or sewer services provided to the 
Disconnection Properties. 
123. Sewer services to the Discount led Properties will In pnn Jed b\ ihe Smith 
Valley Sewer District. 
124. Pursi lai it to §10 2 502 7(4)(f). in de tei i i lining whetl lei petitioi lers ha;\ e i i let their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the pi oposed disc nmuTlimi <ii |,tn enfoftvinni! 
125. Law enforcement services, such as they are since the area is uninhabited and 
virtual I bare ground, are and will continue to be provided by the Salt Lake County Sheriff. 
126. The disconnection will have no effect on the provision of law enforcement 
services. 
127. Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(4)(g), in determining WIKIIKT petitioners hnvc iiul their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconi lection ot :t zoi lii ig, 
128. The zoning of the Disconnection Properties currently maintained by the City is 
irrationally lou Jiscrimin.'iie.s ajjainsi moderate income families and violates the City's 
obligations regarding low income housing. 
129. Pursuai it to § 10-2 502 7(4)(h), in determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect 
of the proposed disconnection on other municipal services. 
130. The proposed disconnection will have no impact on the provision of other 
municipal services since the City provides no such services to the uninhabited bare ground of the 
Disconnection Properties. 
131. The City has never denied, or even offered a single shred of evidence, regarding 
the proof by the Landowners that the proposed disconnection meets all of the tests for 
disconnection specified in §10-2-502.7. 
DENIAL OF DISCONNECTION PETITIONS 
132. On May 11, 2004, the Bluffdale City Council voted to deny the Disconnection 
Petitions. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
Declaration of Disconnection 
Petitioners incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-132 above. 
133. Petitioners are entitled to a judgment declaring that the Disconnection Properties 
of the Landowners should be disconnected from the City. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
On the foregoing Petition the Petitioners pray for relief as follows: 
1. For a determination by the Court that disconnection of the Disconnection 
Properties subject to the Disconnection Petitions is proper and required by §10-2-502.7, U.C.A. 
2. For an Order disconnecting the properties from the City. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate. 
h<\ 
DATED this U d   . 
BAIRD& JONES LC 
Attorneys for_Petitioners 
Bruce R. Baird 
HUNT&RUDD 
Attorneys for Petitioner South Farms 
Hollis S. Hunt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ f_ day of August, 2004,1 mailed, by First Class United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED PETITION 
FOR DISCONNECTION OF MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES to the following: 
Dale F. Gardiner, Esq. 
Parry Anderson & Gardiner 
60 East South Temple, #1270 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Bruce R. Baird 
1 6 ICQ 
Addendum "D" 
(Findings <>l I ad Lind Memorandum Decision signed by 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn on February ? 1 2006) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES, LC, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
and SOUTH FARM, LLC, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
: 
Petitioners, 
: CASE NO. 040909930 
vs. 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal 
corporation, : 
Respondent. i 
This matter came for trial pursuant to § 10-2-502.7, Utah Code Ann., 
on January 30, 2006, and continuing through February 2, 2 006. 
Petitioners were represented by Bruce R. Baird of and for Hutchings, 
Baird and Jones, PLLC, and by Hollis S. Hunt of and for Hunt & Rudd. 
Respondent was represented by Dale F. Gardiner and Craig Klieneman of and 
for Parry, Anderson & Gardiner, as well as James K. Tracy and Patrick S. 
Malone of and for Mabey, Murray, LC. The Court, having heard the 
testimony of the witnesses, received the stipulations of counsel, 
reviewed the evidence and considered the legal arguments of the parties, 
hereby enters the following Decision. 
FINDINGS 
A. Jurisdiction 
1 The petitioners have produced prima facie evidence that the 
disconnection petitions filed with the City contained the names, 
BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES 
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real property in the area proposed for disconnection. The City has 
admitted this fact. 
2 1\i(- i 1 hi I 11 t li* i at litt i L t ed I lid I ill i I I In | JUI t <Ju t i I 
prerequisites for filing this disconnection case exist. 
B. Description of the Disconnection Property 
3 The property which is the subject of tins disconnection action 
is a triangle shaped parcel of approximately 3,900 acres in the southwest 
corner of Bluffdale City. The total acreage represents approximately 38% 
of the land area of Bluffdale City. 
4 The land is almost completely undeveloped. There exists some 
water conservancy district facilities on the eastern bordei of the 
disconnection property. There is also one dwelling. 1 ilh these 
exceptions, there are no structures on the disconnection property. 
5 The one dwelling that exists on the disconnection p r 0p e rty 
receives only garbage pickup services from Blutidalo City. The dwelling 
is served by a well and a septic tank on the property. 
6 The disconnection property is separated from Bluffdale City b\ 
substantial manmade barriers Iht | i niui harrier is a JS" wide canal 
known as the "Welby/Jacobs Canal." The easement associated with this 
canal is wider than the canal itself This canal ioi ms the western 
border of the disconnection propoj I
 2 I oi the majority ot Lis ieiujlh Ihe 
MVftk 
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balance of the western border is Redwood Road. There are no public 
bridges that cross the Welby/Jacobs Canal. 
7 There are no public roads on the disconnection property. The 
only City-owned facilities that exist on the disconnection property are 
a 12" water pipe and associated meters and pressure reduction facilities 
that runs parallel to the Welby/Jacobs Canal. 
8 The water line does not currently serve the disconnection 
property. The water line was installed primarily to provide additional 
water pressure and fire protection for the Gardner Estates and other new 
developments in the northern section of Bluffdale City east of the 
Welby/Jacobs Canal and outside the disconnection area. Though this water 
line has some additional capacity that could be directed toward the 
disconnection property, serving this property was not the primary 
motivation for its installation. The petitioners were not consulted with 
respect to the size of the pipe. 
9 The only services historically provided by Bluffdale City to 
the disconnection property are minimal police and fire protection. There 
was evidence that the police had made calls to the property approximately 
twice a year to investigate trespass or other minor criminal conduct. 
In addition, there have been seven to eight fire calls per year. 
C. History of the Dispute 
10 During the 1980's, the entity now known as "South Farm" (the 
lead petitioner in this case), purchased property for investment and 
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development that existed one-half in unincorporated Salt Lake County and 
one-haIf i n Bluffdale. 
11 The one-half which was located in Bluffdale is now entirely 
located within the d i s c o n n e c t i o n p r 0 p e r t y . 
12 Early i n its efforts to develop thi s property, South Farm, 
sought to have its entire property annexed into Riverton, so that" it 
could be developed as a consistent: whole. Bluffdale objected t<» tin 
annexation. Based on Bluffdale's objection, annexation was denied. 
13 After defeat of the annexation petiti on, Soi ith Farm, began an 
application process with Salt Lake County to begin development of the 
portion of its property that was located outside of R l i M d a l e City, The 
process included public meetings with all neighboring communities. 
14 The County approved the General Plan of Development: over the: 
objections of Bluffdale in August of 1,9,99. 
15 The County portion of the South Farm property was ultimately 
incorporated into the City of Herriman, and has since been large!y 
developed Thi" development: is known as "Rosecrest" and, currently 
includes approximately 18 subdivisions and 2,000 residential units. 
16 By all accounts, the Rosecrest Development is a successful and 
attractive mixed-use development, representiiig hi gii standards of land use 
planning. 
17 The Bluffdale portion of the South Farm \roperty has not 
proceeded as smootl i,I:> towards developi i tent In October of 1,9 9 7, Mr Don 
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Wallace, a managing member of South Farm, appeared at a public meeting 
to explain and answer questions regarding South Farm's plans for its land 
in Bluffdale. 
18 The reaction to Mr. Wallace's presentation was emotional, if 
not outright hostile. Mr. Wallace testified that he felt physically 
threatened by the intensity of the opposition expressed in the meeting. 
19 During the time period beginning in the late 1990's and 
concluding in May of 2002, South Farm was dissuaded by City officials 
from presenting any development plans with respect to their Bluffdale 
property. During this period, Bluffdale City was gearing up to address 
the inevitable development pressure that it would face, given the growth 
in the southern area of Salt Lake County. 
20 Bluffdale City recognized the need for long range planning, 
and commenced work on capital improvement pLans, transportation plans, 
water plans, drainage plans, and similar efforts to plan for the city it 
wished to be in the future. The City wanted to have its own planning 
house in order before it invested the necessary resources to consider a 
project of the scale intended by South Farm. 
21 Given the magnitude of the project and the limited resources 
of the City, the planning process was time consuming. From South Farm's 
perspective, the progress was excruciatingly slow. In fact, the planning 
process that began during this time frame continues up through the time 
of trial. Most of the plans remain either unfinished or unadopted. 
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22 Dur i ng t h i s p ro c e s s , S 01 11: h F a rm \ jra s p e :r s u ad e d b} t h e C :i t} r t: c 
hold off on. filing any applications for an amendment to the City's 
General Plan that would allow development oi i\ Bluffdale property. 
23 Th e p a i t: :i c i 11 a i: e 1 e me n t s c: f :i n t *- •v *. . " - . i n g t h a t: n e e d e ci t: :> b e 
finished before consideration of the Soutii Farm Development; as wel ] as 
the time estimates for completion of those elements, were moving targets 
that never seemed to be w:i 1:1 id n reach 
24 .The City was, in fact, in good faith working toward completion 
its planning process; however, there were cleai .y elements •:, • !u- ':-u 
that were hostile to Rosecrest-1 ike develop* m- • ••" * f i - : *- **y. 
The Court accepts the reasonable inference that some :uot-dragging wre-
taking place--whether intentionally or as a result of n^ :idt:Jial TU^I 
tendency to defer consideration of issues tnat - * l-Vf-
contentious. 
25 During this same period, South Farm was encouraged by the City 
to engage in the process of producing a Quality Growth plan. The process 
included immerous public meetings with representatives of the City and 
other stake-holders. 
26 A draft of that Plan was produced in September of 2001. The 
Quality Growth PJ , u i although never formally adopted by the City, gave 
South Farm hope that a Rosecrest-like development was in reach. For 
example, the Quality Growth Plan approved recommended densities as 11igh 
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as 2.5 in the disconnection area (provided 35% open space was also 
reserved). 
27 The Quality Growth Plan was by no means an unequivocal 
endorsement of a Rosecrest-like approach. It frankly acknowledged the 
City's commitment to a "rural-like atmosphere" and a strong preference 
for developments with minimum lot size of one acre. 
28 In the fall of 2001, Shane Jones, the City Engineer, 
approached Don Wallace for an easement across South Farm property for a 
12' water line needed to service newly-developed portions of the City. 
29 Before those discussions were complete, in October of 2001, a 
contractor hired by the City trespassed on South Farm property to 
commence work on the water line. 
30 The City urgently needed the water line to address water 
pressure and fire protection in Gardner Estates and other new 
developments in the northern section of the City east of the Welby/Jacobs 
Canal. 
31 In order to obtain the needed easement and resolve the 
trespass issue with the City, the City and South Farm discussed a trade 
of the easement for adoption of planning policies allowing South Farm to 
develop its property consistent with the existing Rosecrest Development. 
In the context of those discussions, at a City Council meeting, the 
Council was told the following by the City's attorney, Greg Curtis: 
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Mr. Curtis advised that what this resolution does [with 
reference to the South Farm property] is recognizes that this 
will be a mixed residential, commercial, open space, trails, 
schools, etc., in a manner that is compatible with the 
Rosecrest Development in Herriman. This is a policy decision 
that the City Council needs to make. The developer is saying 
that the City wants an easement across the property and in an 
effort to balance out those interests, the developer wants to 
know what the City intends with the developer's property. Mr. 
Curtis advised the Council not to vote for this if the only 
thing they are going to support at this site is one acre lots. 
Mr. Curtis stated ii the City doesn't provide infrastructure 
for development, landowners make a very compelling argument to 
disconnect. 
Mr. Curtis advised the Council if they are not comfortable 
with the mixed use development out in Herriman, not to vote 
for this resolution. 
32 At tiie .same uiee t inq, former county council member and current 
mayor, Claudia Anderson, asked: 
if the Council doesn't approve this resolution, would I In 
developer take the land and go elsewhere? 
To which Mr. Curtis replied: 
it would be fair to say that one of their options would be to 
attempt disconnection. 
* * * * A 
If the Council is not comfortable with this and doesn't want 
mixed-use there, don't vote for it. 
33 Ultimately, on January 8, 2002, the Blulldale City Council 
unanimously approved Resolution No. 2002-5, which resolved the easement 
issue and provided the following statements of good faith: 
Rosecrest has agreed to provide the requested easement without 
cost to the City, but in turn has requested a declaration of 
intent from the City as to the general acceptability of 
Rosecrest's future development of the Rosecrest real property 
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which lies in the City. Rosecrest is in the process of 
completing an existing master planned project, a mixed-use 
real estate development in the town of Herriman which is 
contiguous and immediately adjacent to the Rosecrest real 
property located in the City and is desirous to continue the 
development of its Bluffdale property with similar mixed uses, 
density, and transportation elements as existed in its 
existing master planned project in Herriman. 
(b) Subject to the express continued administration of its 
legislative and regulatory authority over development of the 
Rosecrest real property and without waiving any of its future 
regulatory authority, the City declares its intent regarding 
the development of the Rosecrest property as follows: 
(1) That the best use of the Rosecrest property in the City 
is to develop the Rosecrest property with a mixture of uses, 
density, commercial, recreational, transportation and open 
space elements compatible with Rosecrest property in the town 
of Herriman that is adjacent and contiguous to the Rosecrest 
property in the City of Bluffdale. 
34 By letter, dated December 21, 2001, Bruce Parker, City Planner 
for Bluffdale City, wrote to Mr. Wallace to again dissuade him from 
proposing a General Plan Amendment until the City's internal planning was 
complete. In essence, the letter provided two choices: (1) wait until 
we're ready or (2) propose a development consistent with the current 
zoning, which was one dwelling per five acres. 
35 South Farm waited an additional six months and observed no 
significant progress towards completion of Bluffdale's internal planning. 
36 On May 6, 2002, South Farm formally submitted its General Plan 
Amendment, even though the City's planning process was incomplete. The 
General Plan Amendment was intended to be patterned on the principles of 
the Quality Growth Plan--although clearly beyond the letter of that 
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plan-and consistent with the principles recognized by the City in the 
adoption of Resolution 2002-05. The City began immediate consideration 
of the application through its planning staff. Once again, because of 
the sheer size of the project and the limited resources of the City, the 
progress was unreasonably slow. 
37 On November 12, 2002, the City adopted a series of land use 
planning principles for Planning District No. 4 (which includes 
essentially the same area as the proposed disconnection) . Those 
principles included: 
Planning District No. 4 should generally provide opportunities 
for low density residential uses, with residential density of 
one (1) dwelling unit to one (1) acre and one (1) dwelling 
unit per five (5) acres being provided. 
Only in those areas located immediately adjacent to an 
existing and neighboring municipality , and only in order to 
recognize adjacent land uses and to provide the desired land 
use transitioning and compatibility, shall commercial, 
professional office, public uses and residential uses with 
densities greater than recommended by Policy No. 1 be 
considered by the City. 
(Emphasis added.) 
38 The meaning of "immediately adjacent" in the second principle 
referenced above became an important area of contention. If that phrase 
is read as narrow as the "narrow strip bordering on the existing 
Rosecrest Development," it was significantly more restrictive than the 
recommendations of the Quality Growth Plan and a complete repudiation of 
Resolution 2002-05. On the other hand, if the entire South Farm property 
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were considered "immediately adjacent," a Rosecrest-like development 
could still be achieved. 
39 The year following submission of the General Plan Application 
was characterized by dozens if not hundreds of meetings between South 
Farm and City staff, without any discernible progress towards submission 
of a proposed amendment for approval. 
40 Because of this apparent lack of progress, South Farm proposed 
outsourcing review of the proposed General Plan Amendment. Bluffdale 
accepted the suggestion, and on April 22, 2003, hired J-U-B Engineers, 
Inc., and Tischler & Associates, Inc., to act as the City's consultants 
to review the plan. The consultants were selected by the City, with 
South Farm's agreement to advance the cost of their work. 
41 These consultants completed their report on or about July 7, 
2003. Once again, dozens of meetings were held to address the concerns 
raised in the J-U-B/Tischler report. 
42 By the time the General Plan Amendment was ready for 
consideration by the City Council, South Farm had invested almost a 
million dollars in the planning process and thousands of man-hours. The 
proposed General Plan Amendment was considered by the City Council on 
December 9, 2003. The Planning Commission recommended adoption of the 
General Plan Amendment. The City's consultants, J-U-B and Tischler also 
recommended adoption of the General Plan Amendment. However, the City 
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Council voted to reject the Plan, based upon a narrow reading of Planning 
Principal No. 2, in the Planning District No. 4 Land Use Principles. 
43 Other property owners, including some of the petitioners in 
this case, had closely followed the progress of the South Farm efforts 
to develop their property, and were disillusioned by the results. 
44 On February 12, 2004, the petitioners filed a Petition with 
the City for voluntary adjustment of the boundary with Herriman to move 
the disconnection property from Bluffdale to Herriman, or in the 
alternative, to disconnect the property from Bluffdale City. That 
Petition was rejected by the City. This case was filed May 31, 2004. 
45 Throughout the year 2005, a Herculean effort was undertaken by 
the City and the petitioners to resolve their differences and come up 
with a land use plan that would satisfy both. 
46 On May 24, 2005, the City Council approved a Memorandum of 
Understanding that set a framework for development of the disconnection 
property. 
47 On August 23, 2005, the City Council approved a Special 
Development Plan District Ordinance, that was a necessary prerequisite 
to implementing the Memorandum of Understanding in the disconnection 
property (and that would create an SDP Zone). 
48 Bluffdale citizens opposing the development applied for a 
referendum to overturn the Council's decision to create the SDP zone. 
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Ultimately, sufficient signatures were collected, and the referendum is 
set for June of 2006. 
49 In order to avoid the delay that would be caused by the 
referendum, the petitioners and the City worked out a development plan 
agreement that would be implemented by a Consent Decree. 
5 0 The proposed Consent Decree was approved by the City Council, 
but once again Bluffdale citizens applied for a referendum to overturn 
the Council's approval. 
51 On November 10, 2005, the Court rejected the proposed Consent 
Decree. 
D. Disconnection Impacts 
52 The property is currently undeveloped and will remain 
undeveloped immediately after disconnection. 
53 In its raw state, the disconnection property produces $1,750 
of annual tax revenue for Bluffdale City. If the property is 
disconnected, it would produce something over $4,000 of annual property 
tax revenue to Salt Lake County. 
54 As raw ground, the disconnection property requires minimal 
services, and only limited police and fire protection. 
55 The petitioners intend to apply for annexation of the 
disconnection property by Herriman. 
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56 The parties have stipulated that annexation of the 
disconnection property by Herriman is mandatory if a proper application 
is made. 
57 The Court takes judicial notice that annexation by Herriman 
would not be instantaneous, but would be subject to statutory time frames 
for notice and consideration of the petition by Herriman City. 
58 Based upon the success of the Rosecrest Development currently 
existing in Herriman City, it is more likely than not that South Farm 
could obtain approval from Herriman for a Rosecrest-like development on 
the disconnection property. 
59 South Farm intends to propose a development modeled after 
Exhibit 123, with the exception that the infrastructure enhancements and 
amenities negotiated for the benefit of Bluffdale would not be built. 
60 Even though residential development appears to be a net loss 
for a city because the increased cost of services and infrastructure 
exceed the increased property taxes, a critical mass of residential 
development, coupled with commercial development, attracts sufficient 
retail business to the city to provide more than offsetting revenues 
through sales taxes. 
61 Amounts invested by Bluffdale City in infrastructure in the 
remaining portion of Bluffdale City, such as storm drainage and roads 
were necessary to serve existing Bluffdale City without regard to the 
status of the disconnect property. 
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62 Loss of potential future benefits to Bluffdale City, such as 
the loss of economies of scale and the opportunity to locate facilities 
for secondary water system on the disconnect property are too remote and 
speculative to be considered. 
63 Based upon the evidence presented by petitioners, and in the 
absence of credible evidence to the contrary, the increase in traffic 
arteries leading to Bluffdale from the proposed development would only 
be 2.5%. 
64 The City owns the easement for the 12" water line and related 
facilities that are now serving Gardner Estates and other newly-developed 
areas in the northern section of the city east of the Welby/Jacobs Canal 
and can continue to use that water line, regardless of the disconnection. 
65 The proposed development would have no effect on the cost of 
Bluffdale City's water services. 
66 Bluffdale City currently plans for enhancement of its storm 
drainage system due to water flowing from the disconnection property 
towards Bluffdale City. The proposed development will not require any 
additional storm drainage facilities, and would likely improve the 
control of storm drainage affecting the city. 
67 If the land is developed, the drainage would be collected and 
channeled, and managed more efficiently. Petitioners would be required 
by State law to ensure the development would not add to the volume of 
storm drainage from the disconnection property. 
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68 Whether the land is developed or not, there will be no effect 
on sewer mains or sewer services, because both the disconnection property 
and Bluffdale City would be served by the South Valley Sewer District. 
69 Development of the land as proposed will not affect the cost 
of law enforcement to Bluffdale City. 
70 The proposed development will not affect the cost of zoning or 
other municipal services. 
71 Based upon credible expert testimony, the proposed development 
will not affect the cost of City services. 
72 No property owner affected by disconnection has objected to 
the proposed disconnection. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The case before the Court is a statutory cause of action brought 
by property owners against Bluffdale City to disconnect approximately 
3 8 percent of the land area of Bluffdale City. The statute at issue 
provides in its entirety: 
10-2-502.7. Court action. 
(1) After the filing of a petition under Section 10-2-
502.5 and a response to the petition, the court shall, upon 
request of a party or upon its own motion, conduct a court 
hearing. 
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence 
regarding the viability of the disconnection proposal. 
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: 
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(a) the viability of the disconnection; 
(b) that justice and equity require that the 
territory be disconnected from the municipality; 
(c) that the proposed disconnection will not: 
(i) leave the municipality with an area 
within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or 
other burdens of providing municipal services would 
materially increase over previous years; 
(ii) make it economically or practically 
unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function as 
a municipality; or 
(iii) leave or create one or more islands or 
peninsulas of unincorporated territory; and 
(d) that the county in which the area proposed for 
disconnection is located is capable, in a cost-effective 
manner and without materially increasing the county's costs 
of providing municipal services, of providing to the area the 
services that the municipality will no longer provide to the 
area due to the disconnection. 
(4) In determining whether petitioners have met their 
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3) (c) (i) and 
(ii), the court shall consider all relevant factors, 
including the effect of the proposed disconnection on: 
(a) the municipality or community as a whole; 
(b) adjoining property owners; 
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways; 
(d) water mains and water services; 
(e) sewer mains and sewer services; 
(f) law enforcement; 
(g) zoning; and 
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(h) other municipal services. 
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting 
disconnection shall be in writing with findings and reasons. 
As provided in the statute, the petitioners have the burden of proving 
each element of disconnection by a preponderance of the evidence. 
In addition to disputing that the petitioners have met their burden 
of proof under the statute, Bluffdale City claims that disconnection in 
this case is inappropriate because petitioner's sole remedy lies either 
in an appeal of the zoning and planning decision which prompted this 
action, or in the boundary adjustment statute. 
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing Findings and in the 
legal analysis to follow, the Court believes that petitioners have met 
their burden of proving the statutory prerequisites to disconnection. 
In addition, the Court rejects the City's arguments that petitioner's 
sole remedy lies elsewhere. 
The Court has received evidence of the impact of disconnection, 
both as the land presently sits, and as a result of the development that 
is likely to occur. Though the Court is of the view that the primary 
test should be disconnection of the property as it now exists, the Court 
has also considered the effects of the proposed development to the 
extent that they can reasonably be determined. 
VlV^. 
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(a) The disconnection is viable. 
The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
disconnection is viable whether the property remains undeveloped or is 
annexed into Herriman and developed into a Rosecrest-like project. 
The cost of services currently being provided to the proposed 
disconnect area will not change immediately following the disconnection. 
On the other hand, after disconnection, when the land becomes a part of 
the County, the tax revenue from the land will more than double its 
current $1,750 to $4,000. In this sense
 r the subject land is, if 
anything, more viable as raw land in the County than it is in Bluffdale 
city. 
Consideration of whether the disconnect property will remain viable 
once it is developed presents a more complicated question. The parties 
agreed that annexation by Herriman City is inevitable. The parties also 
agree that considered in isolation, residential development is a net 
financial loss to a city. Karen Wikstrom of Wikstrom Planning and 
Consultants testified credibly that because of the increase in the 
"critical mass" of population brought by the planned development, 
together with planned and existing commerciail and retail elements, the 
planned community will provide more than offsetting revenues through 
sales taxes. 
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Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the disconnection 
property would be viable, even if disconnected, annexed into Herriman, 
and developed as proposed by the petitioners. 
(b) Justice and equity favor disconnection. 
Justice and equity have traditionally been the primary test for 
determining whether disconnection was appropriate. The statute was 
amended, effective May 1983, to its current form. As the statute now 
reads, most of the factors that courts historically considered in 
determining whether justice and equity favor disconnection are 
specifically set forth. The justice and equity test as used in the 
current statute is apparently intended to give the Court broad 
discretion to consider all impacts of disconnection. In that spirit, 
the Court received opinions from virtually every witness that testified 
as to why justice and equity either did or did not require disconnection 
in this case. Notably, no landowner who would be affected has objected 
to disconnection. Having considered that evidence, the Court finds that 
justice and equity require disconnection for three reasons: undeveloped 
land has historically been considered appropriate for disconnection; 
Bluffdale City's zoning and planning process was characterized by 
unreasonable delays and changing standards; and Bluffdale's current 
political environment precludes an orderly development process. 
(1) Undeveloped land has historically been found to be 
appropriate for disconnection. 
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The proposed disconnection property in this case is completely 
undeveloped. There are few structures of any kind on the property, no 
public roads, and little infrastructure. The cases dealing with 
disconnection have universally found such property appropriate for 
disconnection. 
In the case of In the Matter of the Disconnection of Territory and 
Restriction of Corporate Limits of City of Draper, 646 P.2d 699 (1982), 
the court focused on the undeveloped naiture of the property in 
determining that disconnection was appropriate: 
These cases provide adequate guidelines in the instant case. 
The territory to be disconnected is wholly agricultural in 
nature. Draper does not have a municipal sewer system, nor 
is it likely that it will acquire one. There is no municipal 
water system within the city of Draper, and no negotiations 
have occurred for the purchase of a water system. There have 
been no municipal improvements within the area to be 
disconnected. There is no substantial economic relationship 
between Draper and the area to be disconnected. Draper City 
provides minimal police and fire protection. 
Id. at 702. See also. In the Matter of the Disconnection of Territory 
from Layton City, 494 P.2d 948, 949 (1972); and Kennecott Copper 
Corporation v. City of Bingham Canyon, 415 P.2d 209, 211 (1966). In 
each of these cases the court placed great emphasis on the undeveloped 
nature of the property to be disconnected. It does not appear there has 
ever been a case where disconnection of undeveloped property has been 
found to be inappropriate. In this case, the fact that the property at 
issue is undeveloped is an important factor favoring disconnection. 
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(2) Bluffdale's zoning and planning process as applied to South 
Farm reflects unreasonable delay and arbitrarily changing standards. 
The Court has consistently ruled in this case that this is not a 
planning and zoning dispute. The Court cannot and would not disconnect 
property from Bluffdale City simply because it disagreed with a zoning 
decision made by the appropriate governmental authority. While justice 
and equity do not require any specific outcome from a planning and zoning 
process, they do require that the planning process be fair, expeditious 
and consistent. The Bluffdale process as applied to South Farm lacks 
these elements. 
South Farm was attempting to develop a substantial piece of 
property that happened to be about 50 percent in Bluffdale and 50 
percent in Salt Lake County. The County portion of the property is not 
only developed, but is nearly built-out. The Bluffdale portion remains 
raw land. The primary explanation for the difference between the two 
parcels is the delay imposed by the Bluffdale planning process. For 
approximately four years, South Farm was not even permitted to submit 
a development plan because Bluffdale was not sufficiently far along in 
its own planning process to consider such a plan. This internal 
planning process never seemed to achieve critical mass and remains 
largely unfinished to this day. Justice and equity do not require a 
city to bend to a developer's will, but they do require a timely 
response. Where a city has struggled, as Bluffdale has, to get its 
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planning house in order and the result has been inordinate delays in 
responding to development initiatives, justice and equity may require 
that the developer be permitted to pursue its goals in another 
jurisdiction. 
Similarly, justice and equity require that the City not commit to 
good faith consideration of a multi-use development and then completely 
repudiate that approach. The evidence in this case is that by 
encouraging South Farm's participation in the Quality Growth Plan and 
passing Resolution 202-05, Bluffdale expressed commitment to mixed-use 
development in the disconnection property. Hundreds of thousands of 
dollars were invested in reliance on that: commitment. The City's 
decision thereafter to change course may be within its legal 
prerogatives, but is nevertheless a factor that can be considered in 
determining whether justice and equity requires disconnection. 
(3) Bluffdale's current political environment precludes an 
orderly development process. 
The political environment in the City is a factor that in justice 
and equity favors disconnection. The proposed South Farm development has 
been an emotional and contentious issue since the first public meeting 
in October 1997. The divisions have escalated to the point that 
virtually any decision made by the City in favor of development is 
subject to a referendum. In the current climate, it is simply not 
possible to negotiate with the City. The City's administration has in 
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effect become an agent with no authority, who can say no, but can never 
say yes, and provide a reliable decision, not likely to be attacked by 
referendum. Leaving the property in the City will only prolong this 
dysfunctional and contentious process. The Court is not suggesting that 
citizen involvement or the referendum process is anything but salutary. 
It is, however, an unwieldily mechanism for making zoning decisions. 
That unwieldiness is a factor favoring disconnection in this case. 
(c) Disconnection will not leave Bluffdale with an area within its 
borders for which the cost of providing municipal services would 
materially increase. 
Based upon the findings above, the Court concludes that the 
disconnection of this land, when considered as raw ground will not, and 
cannot materially increase Bluffdale City's historical costs, 
requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal services to any 
remaining portion of the city. Accordingly, there is no basis under the 
primary analysis to prevent disconnection under Section 502.7(c) (i). 
Conflicting evidence was heard on the effects of development on the 
existing historical city, most notably the evidence regarding traffic 
flow on existing streets. While both parties' witnesses agreed there 
would be an increase of traffic on the streets now located in Bluffdale 
city, Steve Goeres, Petitioner's traffic analyst specifically testified 
that the increase would only be 2.5%. When countered only by Shane 
Jones' general and unsupported testimony that it would be greater than 
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that, there can be no other conclusion than that the increase in traffic 
would be minimal, and would not cause a material increase in the current 
and historic costs of maintaining those roads. 
While the witnesses agreed that development decreases the permeable 
surface area of the land, thus increasing the amount of surface runoff, 
even the City's witness conceded that development is better in terms of 
storm water management because the water is channeled, controlled and 
managed more efficiently. State law would preclude the development from 
adding to the volume of storm drainage from the disconnection property. 
Sewer services are currently provided to the city by South Valley 
Sewer district, and the subject property, when developed would also be 
served by the district. Because this is not a service provided by the 
City, however, it is not considered for purposes of the proposed 
disconnection. At trial, all the credible evidence suggested that there 
would be no material increase in the cost to the city to provide law 
enforcement, zoning or other municipal services as a result of the 
disconnection of the land, after the land is developed. 
In short, petitioner established through expert testimony, by 
preponderance of the evidence, that whether developed or not, the 
disconnection of the subject property would not materially increase the 
cost to the City of providing municipal services to any existing portion 
of the City. 
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(d) Disconnection would not make it unfeasible for Bluffdale to function 
as a municipality. 
The evidence at trial clearly established three reasons that 
disconnection would not make it unfeasible for Bluffdale to function as 
a municipality: the loss of tax revenue is insignificant; there would 
be no material impact from the proposed development; and Bluffdale 
City's proposed growth plan for the subject property would be 
impractical. 
(1) There is no significant loss of revenue 
As raw land, the disconnection property generates approximately 
$1,750 in tax revenue for Bluffdale City. Loss of this insignificant 
amount, when considered against Bluffdale's budget as a whole, would not 
be enough to make it unfeasible for Bluffdale to function as a 
municipality. Furthermore, in the context of the consideration of 
Bluffdale's ability to function as a municipality, all that Bluffdale is 
losing is raw land, with its associated $1,750 in revenue. From the 
evidence presented at trial, the Court cannot conclude that Bluffdale's 
continued existence hinges upon its ability to develop this raw land in 
the manner it has proposed. 
(2) There is no material impact from development 
The Court's conclusion above that the disconnection would not leave 
the City with an area within its boundaries for which the costs, etc. 
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would materially increase over previous years, also supports the 
conclusion that such immaterial increases in costs, if any, would not 
make Bluffdale's continued existence unfeasible. This is particularly 
true in the case of the costs associated with maintenance and improvement 
of existing roadways. The evidence suggested that these costs are 
necessary infrastructure costs which would be required regardless of 
whether the land is disconnected or not. Similarly, the installation of 
the 12" water main was a necessary infrastructure investment; and the 
value it provided to Bluffdale city will not be lost as a result of the 
disconnection. 
(3) The City's plan for the disconnect property would be 
impractical 
Disconnection would seriously limit Bluffdale's ability to grow, but 
it must be noted that growth is not assumed in any event. The City's 
preference for one acre lots may make growth impossible. Ms. Wikstrom 
credibly opined that it would take in excess of 50 years to build out the 
disconnection property in one acre lots (as Bluffdale City would prefer), 
even assuming that the disconnection property absorbed 100 percent of the 
demand for one acre lots in Salt Lake and Utah counties. 
(e) The disconnection would not create a peninsula 
The proposed disconnection will not leave or create one or more 
islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory. The statutory 
definition of a peninsula requires two separate calculations: 
\ui 
BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES 
V. BLUFFDALE CITY PAGE 28 FINDINGS & MEMORANDUM 
''Peninsula," when used to describe an unincorporated area, 
means an area surrounded on more than V2 of its boundary 
distance, but not completely, by incorporated territory and 
situated so that the length of a line drawn across the 
unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an 
incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% 
of the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(6). A disconnection only creates a peninsula 
if both tests are met. 
(1) Following disconnect the remaining unincorporated area is not 
surrounded on more than V2 of its boundary distance by 
incorporated territory. 
The first of the two tests requires a determination of whether the 
disconnection creates an area that is surrounded on more than one-half 
of its boundary distance, but not completely by incorporated territory. 
The unincorporated area that disconnection would "leave or create" would 
be bordered in part by Bluffdale and in part by Herriman; however, the 
unincorporated area which is left or created is essentially infinite. 
The newly created unincorporated area would join other bordering 
unincorporated areas in Salt Lake County which in turn borders 
unincorporated areas in other counties throughout the state. In the 
Court's view, all contiguous unincorporated areas must be considered in 
making the calculation. Tracing the borders of incorporated territory 
reveals only islands and peninsulas of incorporated land in a vast ocean 
of unincorporated territory. In reality, unless other boundaries are 
l\Q\ 
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utilized, the very definition which was created by the legislature makes 
the existence of a peninsula impossible, because of necessity, every 
"peninsula" with measurable boundaries will also be an island. 
(2) The 25% test as interpreted by the City renders the statute 
vague 
Having concluded that the unincorporated area left or created by 
disconnection is not surrounded by more than one-half of its boundary 
distance by incorporated territory, it is not necessary to make the 
second calculation. The Court further concludes that if the term 
"unincorporated area" were limited to the newly disconnected areas as the 
City proposes, the statute is rendered too vague to apply. In virtually 
any disconnection, it would be possible to draw a line from incorporated 
territory to incorporated territory on the opposite side that either does 
or does not meet the test. In this case, this difficulty was illustrated 
quite clearly at trial as counsel for both parties were able to draw 
lines from one portion of incorporated territory to a point "opposite" 
to support their positions. For instance, it is conceivable that a line 
could be drawn across a corner of any possible section of unincorporated 
land that will always be less than 25% of the aggregate boundaries of the 
unincorporated area if that area were limited to the disconnected area 
as Bluffdale proposes. 
(3) The proposed disconnection does not meet the historical 
definition of "peninsula" 
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Because of the ambiguity that exists in the statutory definition of 
"peninsula," it is useful to examine historical usage of the 
word-particularly in the disconnection context. It is probable that the 
legislature attempted with the definition provided to describe a portion 
of land that, were it surrounded by water, would look like a "peninsula" 
as that word is commonly used. By definition a "peninsula" is "a piece 
of land that projects into a body of water and is connected with the 
mainland by an isthmus." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (3d. Ed. 1992), 1338. An "isthmus" is "a narrow neck of land 
connecting two larger masses of land." Id., at 957. If the land here in 
question were "unincorporated land which projects into an area of 
incorporated land and is connected with the main mass of unincorporated 
land by a narrow neck," it would be possible to apply the definition 
given by the statute to that land with more confidence. Here, the 
protrusion the disconnection would leave is shaped like a right triangle, 
with the narrowest portion farthest removed from the main body of 
unincorporated land. The Court cannot conclude that the legislature 
intended this land to be within its definition of a peninsula. 
Absent a clear statutory definition, the Court turns to the historic 
use of the word. The statutory provisions limiting the creation of 
"peninsulas" or "peninsular land masses" were imposed to avoid irregular 
boundaries or areas of unincorporated territory which unreasonably 
disrupt either the county's or municipality's provision of services to 
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its citizens. Here, no such dangers exist. When the land is considered 
as interrupting incorporated territory, all of Bluffdale is to the east 
of the disconnect property, and all of Herriman lies west of the 
disconnect. The ability of these two municipalities to provide services 
to their citizens would not in any way be impacted by the presence of 
this unincorporated section of land. Also, while the county would be 
required to cross through municipalities in order to provide services to 
the land, currently there are virtually no services to be provided to the 
land. Based upon these historic factors, the Court finds that no 
peninsula here exists. 
(f) Salt Lake County is capable of providing cost-effective municipal 
services to the disconnected parcel. 
Only minimal services, in the form of an occasional police call and 
seven or eight fire calls are currently provided to the property every 
year. The evidence at trial supports a conclusion that this minimal 
involvement would not cause a material increase in Salt Lake County's 
costs of providing these services. Similarly the evidence supports the 
conclusion that the County could provide these services cost effectively. 
(g) Disconnection is not precluded because the petitioners may have had 
other remedies 
Bluffdale City has argued that this action is improper and should 
be dismissed because it is simply the appeal of a zoning decision; and 
is an attempt to circumvent the boundary adjustment procedures at Utah 
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Code Ann. § 10-2-419, which is the Petitioner's exclusive remedy. 
Neither of these contentions are well taken. 
(1) This action is not an appeal of a zoning decision. 
As this Court has previously held, this present action is a 
procedure which seeks distinct remedies from those available through 
appeal of a zoning decision under § 10-9-1001. While it was the 
Petitioners' right to appeal the December 9, 2003 decision to the 
District Court, they certainly did not waive the right to the distinct 
relief which a successful petition under § 10-2-501 would afford, because 
quite simply those issues were never raised in South Farm's attempt at 
amending the general plan and changing zoning. Cities need not be 
concerned that disconnection will result every time a landowner is 
unhappy with the planning and zoning decision. It is a rare circumstance 
that a landowner affected by a planning and zoning decision could meet 
all the tests required for a successful disconnection case. This Court 
has not and would not order disconnection simply because a landowner was 
unhappy with a zoning decision. Justice and equity require that cities 
be allowed reasonable latitude in making such decisions. 
(2) This action is not a boundary adjustment action. 
Respondent argues that Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-419 provides the 
exclusive mechanism for boundary adjustment. Section 419, and § 10-2-
510, upon which the Respondent relies for this conclusion, do not support 
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this contention. Section 510, referring to the disconnection provisions 
contained in §§ 10-2-501 et seq. states: 
This part shall not be construed to abrogate, modify, or 
replace the boundary adjustment procedure provided in Section 
10-2-419. 
Subsection (1) of § 10-2-419 states: 
The legislative bodies of two or more municipalities having 
common boundaries may adjust their common boundaries as 
provided in this section. 
Id. (Emphasis added). The language selected by the legislature makes 
clear that boundary adjustment is a procedure undertaken by two 
municipalities who act in concert. Indeed, under section 419 the only 
right of the owners of property within the portion proposed for 
adjustment is that they may object to the action. Section 10-2-419 does 
not provide a cause of action for a private lamdowner. When read in this 
context, because section 419 describes a procedure exclusive to 
municipalities, § 10-2-510 may not "abrogate, modify, or replace" the 
right of cooperating municipalities to adjust boundary lines. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner's Petition for Disconnection 
is hereby GRANTED. Petitioners are directed to prepare a Decree of 
Disconnection consistent^ith this opinion. 
Dated this Z.S day of February, 2006^00* 
UA? 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES, LC; 
etal. 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal 
corporation, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DISCONNECTION 
Civil No. 040909930 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
Trial in this matter was held from January 30 through February 2, 2006. 
The Petitioners were represented by Bruce R. Baird of Hutchings Baird & Jones, 
PLLC, and Hollis S. Hunt, of Hunt & Rudd. Respondent was represented by Dale 
F. Gardiner, and Craig Klieneman, of Parry Anderson & Gardiner, and James K. 
Decree of Disconnection (re: real property) @J 
n>\ 
l 
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Tracy and Patrick S. Malone, of Mabey Murray, L.C. The Court heard the 
testimony of the witnesses for the Petitioners and the Respondent, reviewed the 
exhibits submitted and considered the various motions, briefs, and other 
procedural matters raised by the parties. The Court having considered the 
evidence and testimony in this matter entered its Findings of Fact and 
Memorandum Decision on February 27, 2006, and now enters the following 
Decree of Disconnection; 
IT IS ORDERED: 
1. The Disconnected Property, as described in Exhibit "A" attached, is 
hereby disconnected and separated from the municipal boundaries of the 
City of Bluffdale, and now becomes a part of the unincorporated area of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Pursuant to § 10-2-507(1), U.C.A., a certified copy of this Decree and a 
transparent reproducible copy of the map, which is attached as Exhibit 
"B", shall be filed by the Clerk of the Court with the Lieutenant 
Governor upon the entry of this Decree. 
3. Pursuant to § 67-la-6.5(7), U.C.A., the Lieutenant Governor shall then 
complete the statutory requirements to certify the disconnection of the 
Disconnected Property. 
4. The City of Bluffdale shall then, pursuant to § 10-1-117, U.C.A., and 
within thirty (30) days after the entry of this Decree, file Amended 
Articles of Incorporation in the Lieutenant Governor's office and in the 
l^kHV 
Salt Lake County Recorders office meeting the statutory requirements 
of§ 10-2-507(2), U.C.A. 
5. The Court finds that there are no taxes that need to be levied on the 
Disconnected Property that are required to pay the Disconnected 
Property's proportionate share of the obligations accrued to the City of 
Bluffdale while the Disconnected Property was part of the City of 
Bluffdale pursuant to § 10-2-506(1), U.C.A. 
6. Any costs reasonably and actually incurred by the City of Bluffdale in 
complying with this Decree shall be charged to the Petitioners who shall 
pay such costs within a reasonable period of time after receiving a 
detailed invoice from the City of Bluffdale. 
7. Other than as provided in Paragraph 6, the parties shall each bear their 
own costs of this action. 
Dated this ZQ day of March, 2006. 
BY THE COU 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Attorney for Bluffdale City 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the (_ day of March, 2006,1 served the foregoing 
DECREE OF DISCONNECTION by hand delivery, addressed to the following: 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Craig R. Kleinman 
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER 
1200 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James K. Tracy 
MAYBE MURRAY LC 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
DISCONNECT LAND ASSOCIATION 
A parcel of land lying in Sections 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 27 of Township 4 
South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the West Quarter corner of said Section 6; thence South 89°36'05" East along 
the centerline of said Section 6 for 3763.944 feet to the west line of the Welby Canal; thence 
along said canal for the following One Hundred Forty Seven (147) courses; South 32°19'55" 
East for 122.651 feet; thence South 23°18'28" East for 49.828 feet; thence South 10°26'48" East 
for 48.555 feet; thence South 00°10'56" West for 48.412 feet; thence South 07°16'50" West for 
52.937 feet; thence South 14°17'03" West for 106.982 feet; thence South 06°22'06" West for 
55.045 feet; thence South 00°43'32" West for 52.928 feet; thence South 01°35'47" East for 
214.599 feet; thence South 10°05'19" East for 57.621 feet; thence South 17°45'41" East for 
55.569 feet; thence South 25°32'39" East for 55.349 feet; thence South 28°09'27" East for 
554.609 feet; thence South 35°11'01" East for 310.277 feet; thence South 37°17'31" East for 
165.659 feet; thence South 44°49'05" East for 112.612 feet; thence South 51°23'01" East for 
215.838 feet; thence South 42°10'48" East for 52.329 feet; thence South 31°33'56" East for 
106.838 feet; thence South 26°17'40" East for 212.555 feet; thence South 29°31'21" East for 
106.223 feet; thence South 38°02'18" East for 58.641 feet; thence South 49°41'00" East for 
161.798 feet; thence South 53°28'05" East for 229.399 feet; thence South 53°25'35" East for 
44.402 feet; thence South 53°24'55" East for 174.082 feet; thence South 55°48'08" East for 
160.484 feet; thence South 70°39'18" East for 54.337 feet; thence South 86°58'33" East for 
56.348 feet; thence North 84°00'14" East for 161.248 feet; thence South 87°22'44" East for 
52.180 feet; thence South 80°15'14" East for 270.231 feet; thence South 77°44'20" East for 
52.132 feet; thence South 65°48'00" East for 51.809 feet; thence South 50°22'11" East for 
50.211 feet; thence South 40°18'00" East for 51.808 feet; thence South 33°26'33" East for 
241.730 feet; thence South 31°29'26" East for 154.228 feet; thence South 20°20'08" East for 
106.043 feet; thence South 13°33'51" East for 423.556 feet; thence South 21°37'17" East for 
56.533 feet; thence South 27°10'54" East for 412.294 feet; thence South 28°35'34" East for 
433.534 feet; thence South 31°31'03" East for 428.536 feet; thence South 19°55'18" East for 
50.061 feet; thence South 00°54'12" East for 47.742 feet; thence South 20°48'38" West for 
158.104 feet; thence South 13°19'41" West for 59.086 feet; thence South 35°53'23" East for 
60.836 feet; thence South 74°29'38" East for 212.583 feet; thence South 67°35'11" East for 
100.955 feet; thence South 67°18'50" East for 355.561 feet; thence South 65°10'20" East for 
215.080 feet; thence South 59°49'02" East for 372.880 feet; thence South 52°54'59" East for 
105.787 feet; thence South 43°55'00" East for 163.875 feet; thence South 42°45'41" East for 
277.617 feet; thence South 34°15'21" East for 107.029 feet; thence South 27°00'54" East for 
778.589 feet; thence South 22°14'40" East for 54.148 feet; thence South 17°13'01" East for 
595.287 feet; thence South 26°14'18" East for 114.291 feet; thence South 50°14'59" East for 
60.701 feet; thence South 63°28'01" East for 348.152 feet; thence South 63°28'01" East for 
295.997 feet; thence South 55°28'17" East for 52.340 feet; thence South 50°09'01" East for 
105.261 feet; thence South 48°19'32" East for 360.507 feet; thence South 48°19'32" East for 
380.852 feet; thence South 46°19'24" East for 108.048 feet; thence South 40°28'11" East for 
106.848 feet; thence South 30°42'43" East for 473.939 feet; thence South 33°57'21" East for 
54.448 feet; thence South 28°53'29" East for 139.550 feet; thence South 36°26'57" East for 
106.518 feet; thence South 46°41'07" East for 166.181 feet; thence South 51°13'15" East for 
168.834 feet; thence South 6O°10'03" East for 53.216 feet; thence South 72°43'17" East for 
53.432 feet; thence South 81°25'55" East for 102.039 feet; thence South 73°24'31" East for 
68.206 feet; thence South 64°25'17" East for 89.155 feet; thence South 58°36'14" East for 
667.789 feet; thence South 60°35'49" East for 106.336 feet; thence South 70°09'05" East for 
107.406 feet; thence South 75°03'21" East for 523.941 feet; thence South 87°19'57" East for 
114.951 feet; thence North 84°42'53" East for 102.480 feet; thence South 68°11'04" East for 
211.037 feet; thence South 81°41'17" East for 161.218 feet; thence South 71°28'13" East for 
50.515 feet; thence South 59°46'29" East for 48.571 feet; thence South 52°13'26" East for 
128.083 feet to the south line of the north half of Section 16; thence South 89°19'49" East along 
said south line for 1781.243 feet more or less to the West Quarter corner of Section 15; thence 
South 89°28'41" East along the south line of the north half of said Section 15 for 422.224 feet 
more or less to the west right-of-way line of Redwood Road; thence along said right-of-way line 
for the following eight (8) courses; with a non-tangent curve to the left, having a radius of 
2770.595 feet, a central angle of 10°56'57" (chord bearing and distance of South 15°29'21" East 
- 528.650 feet) and for an arc distance of 529.455 feet; thence South 13°42'56" East for 301.500 
feet; thence South 19°25'34" East for 1400.000 feet; thence South 25°08'12" East for 301.500 
feet; thence South 19°25'34" East for 1000.393 feet; thence South 13°42'56" East for 301.500 
feet; thence South 19°25'34" East for 7311.125 feet to the intersection of said west right-of-way 
and the south line of the north half of Section 27; thence North 89°35'39" West along said south 
line for 1401.748 feet more or less to the center of said Section 27; thence North 89°35'39" West 
along the centerline of said Section 27 for 1320.000 feet more or less to the Southwest corner of 
the east half of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 27; thence North 00°42'20" West along the 
west line of the east half of said Northwest Quarter for 2627.441 feet more or less to the 
Northwest corner of the east half of said Northwest Quarter; thence South 89°36'50" West along 
the north line of said Section 27 for 1380.651 feet more or less to the Southwest corner of said 
Section 22; thence North 00°03'29" East along the west line of said Section 22 for 2598.603 feet 
more or less to the West Quarter corner of said Section 22; thence North 01°06'41" East along 
the west line of said Section 22 for 1326.035 feet more or less to the Northeast corner of south 
half of the north half of said Section 21; thence South 89°59'33" West along the north line of the 
south half of north half of said Section 21 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the northeast corner 
of the south half of the Northwest Quarter said Section 21; thence South 00°52'20" East for 
1370.072 feet to the center of said Section 21; thence North 88°53' 11" West along the south line 
of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 21 for 2607.161 feet to the West Quarter corner of said 
Section 21; thence South 89°58'02" West along the centerline of said Section 20 for 2640.000 
feet more or less to the center of said Section 20; thence North 00°0r58" West along the 
centerline of said Section 20 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the North Quarter corner of said 
Section 20; thence South 89°28'28" West along the north line of said Section 20 for 2617.134 
feet to the Northwest corner of said Section 20; thence South 00°22'04" East along the west line 
of said Section 20 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the West Quarter corner of said Section 20; 
thence North 89°16'28" West along the centerline of said Section 19 for 5280.000 feet more or 
less to the West Quarter corner of said Section 19; thence North 00°43'32" East along the west 
line of said Section 19 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the Northwest corner of said Section 19; 
thence North 00° 15' 11" East along the west line of said Section 18 for 2650.924 feet to the West 
Quarter Corner of said Section 18; thence North 00°36'54" East along the west line of said 
Section 18 for 2623.328 feet to the Northwest corner of said Section 18; thence North 00°09'22" 
West along the west line of said Section 7 for 2693.831 feet to the West Quarter corner of said 
Section 7; thence North 00°07'48" West along the west line of said Section 7 for 2673.457 feet 
to the Northwest corner of said Section 7; thence North 00° 11'30" West along the west line of 
said Section 6 for 2677.167 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Containing 4052.3182 Acres Gross, more or less 
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LESS AND EXCEPT PARCEL 138 
A parcel of land lying in Northeast Quarter of Section 19 of Township 4 South, Range 1 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of said Section 19; thence South 45°02'26" West for 
1844.418 feet more or less to the southwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter of said section; thence North 00°05'40" West for 1319.955 feet more or less to the 
Northwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said section; thence South 
89°16'09" East for 1307.406 feet more or less to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Containing 19.8064 acres more or less. 
ALSO LESS AND EXCEPTING PARCEL 144 
A parcel of land being the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 21, Township 4 
South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, being more particularly described as 
follows: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the being the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest 
Quarter of said Section 21; thence South 00°52'20" East for 1370.072 feet more or less to the 
Southeast corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 21; thence 
South 89°59'33" West for 1320.000 feet more or less to the Southwest corner of the Northeast 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 21; thence North 01°35'55" West for 1344.924 
feet more or less to the Northwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of 
said Section 21; thence North 88°53'56" East for 1336.913 feet more or less to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
Containing 41.3943 Acres more or less 
Net Acreage 3991.1175 Acres more or less 
February 09, 2004 
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(Exhibit 209, Remote View of Municipalities in Central 
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